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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the influence of politics on the budgeting process within the 
fertiliser manufacturing industry in Indonesia. Prior budgeting �tudies have focused on 
one of the following three theoretical frameworks - economic, psychological, and sociai. 
This study expands the research corpus by assessing the effect of politics on the 
budgeting process. The objectives of this study are: (a) to investigate the effect of politics 
in the relationship between managerial roles and budgeting process - budgetary 
participation, budgetary communication, and budgetary control including budgetary 
monitoring and budgetary evaluation. and (b) to assess the impact of structural and 
individual power on the budgeting process. 
The study uses a mixed research methodology - survey method supplemented by 
interviews. The survey questionnaire is adapted from previous studies. The sample for 
this study consists of four fertiliser-manufacturing enterprises in the state owned sector of 
Indonesia. The respondents of the survey questionnaire were middle managers 
responsible for unit budgets in the sample companies. Respondents were asked to rate on 
a seven-point scale their agreement or disagreement with issues concerning the budgeting 
process, manag'trial roles and politics. Survey interviews, based on the questionnaire, 
were developed for a select group of respondents, consisting of middle and senior 
managers. 
- Vl -
The results of the study, both survey questionnaire and interviews, indicate that politics 
has a significant influence on the budgeting process. f urthcr, it showed that the influence 
appeared different, depending whether structural or individual power is involved. 
The major implications of this study centre on the strong moderating effect of politics on 
the relationship between the budgeting process and managerial roles: this seems to be a 
relevant construct and should be developed further. Hopefully. the study will advance the 
thinking of scholars in this area and create interest in replicating this method of analysis 
and validating the findings. The conceptual model should also be applied to the role of 
politics on the budgeting process in oth�r industries to assess the external validity of the 
model. 
- vn -. .  
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1.1. Statement of the Prohlems 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A considerabie amount of behavioural research exists on the budgeting systems area, 
however th\"' results are difficult to integrate and are often contradictory. The findings 
of traditional budgeting studies are situation-sp"•cific. Most of the studies have 
focused on individual, interpersonal, cultural, and uncertainty variables, rather than on 
the social perspective. These studies have led to conflicting results because the 
budgeting process is likely to interact with not only the traditional budget standpoint, 
but also political behaviour point of view (Hopwood, 1976; and Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1986 see also Wildavsky, 1968, Pfeffer. 1981 ). In addition, findings 
concerning the traditional budgeting perspective are not always mutually consistent. 
Recently, a body of literature has emerged concerning investigation of the political 
aspects of budgeting (Pfef
f
er and Suhmcik, 1974: Hopwood. 1976: and Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, l Q86). Research on the influence of politics in the l:>udgeting process is 
sparse and for the most part emphasise the process of budget allocation in non-profit 
organisations. This study exte11ds it to state owned commercial enterprises which a.re 
common in both developed and developing countries. The study investigates the 
nature and extent of political influence within the budget�ng process. More 
sprecifically, it attempts to identify the role of politics on the relaticmship between 
managerial roles and the budgeting process. 
- l -
The activities involved in budgeting comprise budgetary participation, budgetary 
comm•mication, budgetary control including budgetary monitoring and budgetary 
evaluation. The characteristic� of managerial roles include interpersonal roles, 
informational roles, and decisional roles, while characteristics of politics include 
budget goals and preterences, budgeting process characteristics, budget rules and 
norms, budget information requiremet1ts, budget information use, budgeting process 
outcomes, and budget ideology. Thus this study is an extension of the previous 
studies, mainly confined to the role of politics on budget allocation decision in the 
context of developed countries. 
1.2. Motivation for the Study 
Since the pioneering study of Argyris ( 1952) in budgeting and Locke ( 1968) in goal 
setting, a considerable body of research has developed in investigating the 
relationship between budget and managerial performance, and that between budget 
and management functions such as planning and controlling. Previous studies in 
budgeting have, for the most part, concentrated on investigating the relationship 
between budgetary participation and managerial performance in either the simple 
direct or expanded association. However, the results of studies on simple association 
have not been conclusive. For example, the relationship between budgetary 
participation and managerial performance was found to be significantly positive in 
Brownell & Mcinnes ( 1986) and Kenis ( 1979), but contrary results were found in 
Ivancevich (1976), K.ren (1990), Milani, (1975), Latham & Yuki (1976), and French, 
Israel & As, ( 1960). These researchers found no significant relationship between 
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participatory budgeting and managt.'1ial performance. wh!lc Stedry ( 1960) and Bryan 
& Locke (1967) found a significant negative association. 
In considering those conflicting results with regard to simple direct association, 
Hopwood ( 1976) suggests that there might not be a simple direct relationship between 
budgetary participation and managerial performance. Instead, the budgetary 
participation and managerial performance relationship may be affected by other 
situational factors - called contingency variables. Some studies have focused on the 
moderating effects ')f situational factors, such as uncertainty variables in terms of 
environmental uncertainty (Brownell, 1985, 1987) and task uncertainty 
(Govindarajan, 1984) and (Brownell & Hirst, 1986). Other studies used personal 
variables: e.g. locus of control by Brownell (l 981 and 1982b ), interpersonal variables 
in terms of evaluation style by Brownell ( 1982a and 1983b ), Brownell and Hirst 
( 1986), Imoisili ( 1986), and Dunk (1989), and cultural variables by Chow, Shields 
and Chan (1991); Chow, Kato, and Shields (1994); Goddard, (1997); and Lau, Low, 
and Eggleton ( 1995). 
Again, the results of the budgeting studies with contingency variables have not been 
conclusive. Some studies have reported a significant positive relationship between 
budgetary participation and performance under different situational factors. But other 
studies have reported that there is no relationship or a negative relationship between 
budgetary participation and perfonnance under different situational factors. For 
example, Brownell ( 1985, 1987) found that budgetary participation was related to 
both job satisfaction and managerial performance in situations of low environmental 
complexity but not in situations of high environmental complexity. In contrast, 
- 3 -
Govindarajan ( 1986) found that greater budgetary participation contributed to 
managerial perfonnance and attitudes in a high environmental uncertainty situation 
but hampered performance and attitudes in low uncertainty situations. Meanwhile 
Brownell and Hirst ( 1986) found no sib'Tlificant relationship among the three factors, 
viz; participation, perf onnance, and task uncertainty. 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between budgcting�related 
behaviour and managerial roles Macintosh & Williams ( 1992) found that the 
relationship between budget and managerial roles is significant, whereas William et 
al. ( 1997), who investigated the relationship between budgeting and managerial roles, 
found that a relationship docs exist excep. under low task difficulty. In contrast, 
Mintzberg (1972) and Covaleski & Dirsmith (1986) found that there is no correlation 
between budgeting and managerial roles (see also Preston, 1986 ). 
To date, not many attempts have been made to examine the influ�nce of politics on 
budgeting and the relationship between budgeting and managerial roles within the 
firm. A few studies focussed only on the effect of politics on budget allocations 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974; Wildavsky, 1979; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; and Hackman, 
1985). 
Pfeffer and 3alancik (1974) conducted a study of the effect of politics on budgeting. 
They revealed that politics could be seen to influence budget decisions and that there 
is a significant relationship between budget allocation and political power. Pfeffer & 
Moore ( 1980) and Hackman ( 1985) repiicated and extended the work of Pfeffer & 
Salancik (1974) on budget alJocation at Universities. The results of these studies 
- 4 -
support Pfeffer & SalandK's study and find that political power significantly 
influences the allocation of budget funds. In addition, Fernandez, Perez, and Robson 
( 1999) conducted an empirical study of the introduction of budgetary participation 
within a divisio•.1 of a European subsidiary of a large North American car 
manufacturer. ·• 'hey found that political context informed the budgetary process in the 
division. 
Wit!: rcfrrencl' to earlier studies, Covaleski and Dirsmith (1986) argued that 
b�dgeting might be considered as more of a social rather than a technical reality. They 
found no relationship between budgeting behaviour and managerial roles. They stated 
that Nurse Managers would be powerless if they use budgetary factors to support their 
arguments. Nevertheless, based on an understanding of the dynamics of the health 
agency's budget system, they found considerable merit in the political perspective of 
budgeting. 
The Indonesian Context. The Indonesian government was planning to implement an 
Agricultural Development Program, with the aim of making the country self sufficient 
in food production, especially rice. To make the program successful, fertiliser was 
considered as the most essential input. The Indonesian government has concentrated 
on encouraging the local fertiliser induE"try to fulfil domestic fertiliser demand. 
Natural gas is the main raw material for urea fertiliser production. The Indonesian 
government had discovered several natural gas wells in different parts of Indonesia. 
The Government decided to take advantage of these resources to support the 
Agricultural Development Program rather than spending money for importing the 
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fertiliser. The government developed several fertiliser factories in areas close to 
natural gas resources. 
The government had already established Pupuk Sriwijaya 1959 to cover the demand 
for fertiliser within Indonesia. As mentioned before, the government realised the 
necessity to establish more such factories in order to boost the Agricultural 
Development Program. Most Indonesian people work in the agricultural sector, which 
is growing with the population increase, and this was another reason for establishing 
more fertiliser companies. The new companies operate in different places within the 
Indonesian archipelago. Three companies, Pupuk Sriwijaya. Pupuk Kujang, and 
Petrokimia Gresik, aim to serve fertiliser markets in western and middle Indonesia. 
Surplus production of these companies feeds eastern Indonesian markets. Pupuic 
Kaltim serves the eastern areas exclusively, including Borneo, Sulawesi, Maluku, 
Papua, and other !)mailer islands. 
As an important industry linked to the national development strategy, the Indonesian 
government was keen to make it a success. The companies were expected to operate 
efficiently so that they wil1 be able to maintain the facilities out of their operating 
revenue and replace their fixed costs as needed out of retained profits. In other words, 
although initial investment was provided by the government, the companies were 
expected to be self sufficient as commercial ventures. Budgeting was seen as one of 
the tools of planning and control for those entities. 
The Government regulates the State Owned Enterprises (SOE's) through decree 
No.12/1998 of the Ministry of Finance. The SOE's are required to provide a budget 
- 6 -
plan to the Government on a yearly basis. Furthcnnore, the Government through a 
decree of the Ministry of State Owned Enterprises (No: Kep-88/M-PBUMN/ 1999) 
provides the general planning and control framework for the SOE's (see Bachtiar, 
1999). The Indonesian government, through the Minister of State Owned Enterprises, 
imposes sanctions or penalties on companies not submitting their budget plans timely. 
Moreover, the companies are not eligible to obtain any other kind of assistance such 
as subsidies or soft loans from the Government. 
In practice, the budget fonnulation is often influenced by external factors unrelated to 
the operations of the business and such interference tends to create inefficiency in the 
operations of the company. The Ministry of Agriculture often intervenes over the 
budget targets. The Ministry of Agriculture tends to become a dominant player in the 
budget decision because it has to execute the Agricultural Development Program in 
order to be self sufficient in food production (see also Bachtiar, 1999). On the other 
hand, individuals participating in the budget plan do not always strive to fonnulate the 
right budget. Motivations of individuals involved in the process of budgetary 
participation are to share experience with each other regardless of the objectives of the 
budget. Unit managers are also interested to attend the budget meeting especially in 
accomplishing the budget plan because they gain substantial incentives from the 
organisation. Moreover, unit managers are interested to attend the budget meeting 
because they have to maintain their particular interests on their budgets. If they do not 
come to the budget meeting, no.t only they might lose the incentive but also their 
budget interests might be sacrificed in the budget allocation decision. 
-7-
In the implementation of the budget, in controllin_g their activities, the unit managen, 
do not emphasise the budget variance reports. Man?.gers and their superiors still need 
the budget variance reports but treat them merely as formalities to be complied with. 
This also leads to a lack of emphasis on the budget variance r�rts in controlling the 
overall organisational goals. Similarly, Hoards of Directors often change the budget 
targets midway (Bachtiar, 1999). As a result, the budgeting system cannot be used as 
a management control gystem. Furthermore, the companies do not use budget 
achievement as a measure of performance appraisal and determinant of managerial 
compensation (Bachtiar, 1999). Consequently, the unit managers tend to use 
measurement indicators based on their unit's operations rather than budget 
performance for evaluating subunit's performance and subordinates' reward. It is 
supported by their superiors in which superiors W:,e measurement indicators based on 
their purposes and intentions, for example the production unit focuses on its 
production targets, instead of budget performance. Again, the effectiveness of the 
budget as a tool for improving efficiency is compromised 
This study assesses the effect of political influence on the budgeting prc,cess ofSOE's 
in ln�onesia. It examines the influence of politics on the relationship between 
budgeting process and managerial roles. 
In the context of budgeting in the fertiliser manufacturing enterprises in Indonesia, 
this study investigates the following issues: 
1. Whether or not budgetary participation is significantly related to managerial roles . 
• 8 -
2. Whether budgetary control, including budgetary monitoring and budgetary 
evaluation, is significantly related to managerial roles. 
3. Whether politics significantly moderates the relationship betwe,m budgetary 
participation and managerial roles. 
4. Whether politics significantly moderates the relationship between budgetary 
control and managerial roles. 
5. Whether the moderating effect of politics in the relationship between budgetary 
participation and managerial roles would differ under sources of power: structural 
power and individual power. 
6. Whether the moderating effect of politics in the relationship betwee.1 budgetary 
control and managerial roles would differ under sources of power: structural 
power and individual power. 
1.3. Overview of the Research 
This study attempts to develop and test a model of political influence on the 
relationship between the budgeting proc�ss and managerial roles. The theoretical 
framework that describes the relationship is developed in chapter two. The activities 
of the budgeting process relate to three general processes consisting of budgetary 
participation, budgetary communication, and budgetary control including budgetary 
monitoring and evaluation (see Swieringa & Moncur, 1974; B'1lns & Waterhouse, 
1975; Merchant, 1981; and Macintosh & Williams, 1992). In a participative budgeting 
system, budget allocations are frequently influenced by political games among 
participants. Triggered by varied interests - purposes, aspirations and beliefs, 
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individuals face difficulties in deciding on budget allocations that enable 
maximisation of goals. Differences in interests among individuals produce 
inconsistencies (Pfeffer, 1981 ). Furthennore, conflict will arise and individuals might 
'play politics' as a result: bargaining relies more on power than on consensus (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1974; and Pfeffer, 1981 ). Yet, during the process of budgetary 
participation, participants should not play politics instead of utilising their managerial 
roles to reduce conflict of interests by collecting infonnation from available sources. 
In reality, however, unit managers have real constraints in tenns of degree of skills, 
knowledge, and information to produce an appropriate budget. Thus they play politics 
in their efforts to overcome resistance to their desired budgetary outcomes. 
Managers can lose power by trying to use the budget to support their arguments. 
Thus, they tend to use infonnation based on their intentions, purposes, and beliefs 
(Marginson, 1999), and ignore the budget information (Mintzberg, 1972; Pre5ton, 
1986). In the process of budgetary control, managers do not emphasize the use of 
budget variance reports to control activities and to coordinate functional activities in 
line with attaining the organisational objectives. Instead, they develop and rely on 
their own reports to control activities. Moreover, the top managers do not give 
significant feedback on budget achievement in evaluating performance and rewards. 
There are a couple of reasons why this is the case. Firstly, infonnation from the 
budget is not satisfactory in that it is often too general, rigid, past performance based, 
financially oriented, and contains no operational infonnation. Secondly, managers 
may lack skills, knowledge and information to analyse and interpret information from 
the budget variance reports. However, unit managers need specific performance 
indicators to judge attainment of goals in regard to task achievement. They, therefore, 
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ter,d to develop performance indicators based on their own unit tasks. yet these 
indicators might be inconsistent with each other in terms of attaining organisational 
goals and might bear little relation to budget performance feedback. Hence, budget 
function as a tool of control is frequently ineffective in improving the possibilities of 
managerial roles helping to attain organisational objectives 
1.4. Contribution of the Study 
The findings of this study wou!J assist management in establishing a budget system. 
For example, the results could indicate that politics has a significant positive impact 
on the budgeting proc�s, so organisations may need to redesign their systems and 
procedures of budgeting and reassess managerial role5 to maximise organisational 
goals. The results of this research could also answer questions arising from conflicting 
resuits of prior budgetary research. Another potential of the findings lies in their 
contribution to knowledge of how budgets can best be implemented. 
The findings of the study can also help organisations and researchers to improve 
budget functions. by helping organisations to conduct budgeting functions effectively 
and managers to perform their managerial roles better in order to achieve the desired 
organisational objectives. In particular, benefits may arise along the following ways: 
1. The budget as an instrument of planning will be effective in helping formulate 
the organisational objectives if the organisation is able to minimise the conflict 
of interests in the proct:Ss of budgetary participation. 
- li -
2. The orgar,isation might produce a "right budget" if the organisation is able to 
create interactions among participants that are in line with the objectives of the 
budget. 
3. Minimisation of the influence of politics on budgetary control might assist in 
the attainment of organisational objectives, since the budget as an instrument 
of control will then be more effective in helping to co-ordinate activities 
within units and those functional activities bearing the organisational 
objectives. 
4. The budget as an instrument of motivation will be effective if the organisation 
uses feedback on budget achievement in performance evaluation and reward 
systems. 
Finally, it is hoped and anticipated that the findings of this study, with its particular 
reference to the effect of politics on the budgeting process, will inform and expand the 
alreatly-existing body of literature on budgeting systems. 
1.5. Overview of the Thesis 
Chapter two gives a review of the relevant literature that links budgeting process, 
managerial roles, and politics. The theoretical framework of previous budgeting 
studies are explained in brief. A political-social contingency based model of the 
budgeting process provides the theoretical foundation for specifying the link between 
budgeting process and managerial roles and the moderating role of politics. This 
chapter is structured along the following lines. First, a review cf research in budgetary 
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participation and budgetary control is provided. Then the links between budgeting 
process and managerial roles, and the role of politics on the process of budgetary 
participation is discussed. This is followed by an examination of the role of politics on 
the process of budgetary control. The research hypotheses that follow from the 
discussion are then presented. 
Chapter three describes the data collection procedures that have been used in this 
study, and explains the feedback of respondents. This chapter also discusses other 
methodological issues that relate to the study, variable measurement is explained in 
next discussion, and finally statistical analysis methods will be described. 
The results of the study are presented in chapter four. The first section summarizes the 
demographic data. An overview of the descriptive statistics is presented in the second 
section. The third section presents the Pearson correlation. Finally, the results with 
regard to the tests of the hypotheses are presented in section four. 
Furthermore, chapter five describes the findings of interviews conducted with 
managers for the purpose of assessing the role of politics in the budgeting process. 
The format of this chapter is as follows: The first section provides a brief introduction 
to the Industry and the sample companies. The rest of this chapter analyses the role of 
politics in the process of budgetary part1cipation, budgetary control, budgetary 
monitoring, and budgetary evaluation. 
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Finally, chapter six is organised into three sections. Section one describes the 
summary of the study. Limitations of study is reviewed in section two, and 
opportunities for future research is discussed in the last section. 
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CHAPTER2 
LJTERA TURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature that links the budgeting 
process to managerial roles, and politics. lbe theoretical framework of previous 
budgeting studies will be explained in brief. In this study, a political, social 
contingency hased model of the budgeting process provides the theoretical foundation 
for specifying the link between the budgeting process and managerial roles that is 
moderated by politics. The structure of this chapter is as follows. First a review of 
research in budgetary participation and budgetary control is provided. Then the links 
between the budgeting process and managerial roles, and the role of politics on the 
process of budgetary participation is discussed. This is followed by an examination of 
the role of politics on the process of budgetar:,' control. The research hypotheses that 
follow from the discussion are then presented. 
2.1. Theoretical Framework of Traditional Budgeting Studies 
In the accounting iiterature, budget is defined as a tool used by the organisation to 
express quantitatively a plan of action, to coordinate and implement the plan, to 
control operational activities, and to evaluate managerial performance in the 
organisation (Cherrington and Cherrington, 1973; Anderson and Caldwell, 1984; 
Anthony, Dearden, and Bedford, 1989; Anthony, Dearden, and Govindarajan, J 992; 
Anthony and Young, 1988, 1994; and Anthony, Weisch, and Reece, 1984). However, 
- 15 -
the budgeting process cannot be viewed as a product of technical accounting only. As 
Cherrington and Cherrington ( 1973) mentioned that budget couldn't be analysed from 
an accounting standpoint only because people develop budgets for the purpose of 
guiding their actions, controlling their activities, and measurlng their performance. 
They suggest that if an organisation wants to budget effoctively, people must be aware 
of the behavioural considerations involved. Studies of traditional budgeting have paid 
more attention to the individual behavioural implications of budgeting. Much of this 
attention has focused on the individual who may be involved in the budgeting process. 
Shield and ::,hield ( 1998) suggest that behaviour of people involved in the budgeting 
process can be explained based on three theoretical frameworks. They review 
previous budgeting studies and conclude that studies of budgeting are mostly rooted 
in one of three theoretical frameworks: economics, psychology and sociology theory. 
2.1.1 Economic Theory 
The economic theory is based on an investigation of the key role of information anJ 
its associated costs in choices between alternative ways of organising activity in order 
to attain the organisation's objectives efficiently (Spicer and Ballew, 1983; Evans, 
1998; Sisaye, 1998). The economic theory is predicated on the assumption that a 
budget is used to provide a sound basis for seiecting information and sharing 
information among budget participants. The participants may have an opportunity to 
get much relevant information to coordinate their tasks and to improve budget 
decision-making that is in line with the organisational objectives (Hopwood, 1976; 
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see also Spicer and Ballew, 1983}. The theory assumes that a subordinate knows more 
about his/her task and task environment than does his/her superior. Through a process 
of budgetary participation, managers might gain information �o reduce uncertah1ty 
about their subordinates' task and environment, and they might increase their roles to 
produce efficiently and effectively their unit budget goals. From the economic theory 
point of view, the process of budgetary participation can be viewed in two ways: ( 1) a 
process through which budget can "e shared for joint decision making purposes; and 
{2) a mechanism aimed at injecting a less calculative orientation into internal 
dealings; i.e. as a mechanism for improving atmosphere and building commitment to 
overall organisational objectives. 
When the subordinates' V1ew of the budgetary objectives is consonant with the 
organisation's objectives, the implementation of the incentive contract based on 
budget will be fair. Subordinates involved in the process of budgetary participation 
will pay more attention to gaining in-depth knowledge about their tasks and task co­
ordination becomes important to organisational objectives. Through the process of 
budgetary participation, horizontal information asymmetry reduces, because a 
superior can learn about the subordinates' private information and interdependent 
tasks and thus gain information to co-ordinate their tasks and formulate the budget 
efficiently and effectively {Kanodia, 1993; Spicer and Ballew, 1983; Evans, 1998; 
Sisaye, 1998). The subordinates who are highly involved in the process of budgetary 
participation will, in most cases, perform at their best and achieve a greater percentage 
of their goals (Ivancevich, 1976). The economic theory assumes that individuals 
involved in the process of budgetary participation will be motivated by the dual 
stimuli of information sharing and task coRordination. 
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Information sharing. Mintzberg ( l 973) found that the managers he studied placed 
much attention on informational roles as monitor of internal and external information. 
He found that managers spend time on many tasks other than their own, such as 
consideration of global strategy. Bruns and McKinnon (1993). Chalos and Haka 
(1989), and Dunk (1993a, 1995) support Mintzberg's finding. They conducted 
interviews with 73 managers in twelve manufacturing organisations m North 
America, six each in the United States and Canada. They found that managers are 
keen to seek information from every source available and to disseminate information 
to other parties supp,.,rting the accomplishment of their unit tasks. Chalos and Haka 
( I 989), investigating the role of information on managerial roles, provide substantial 
evidence that information can enhance managerial performance through the process of 
budgetary participation. 
Dunk ( 1993a, 1995) indicated that the process of budgetary participation allows 
individuals to exchange information and acquire more understanding about their own 
tasks and overall organisational objectives. He investigated the interaction between 
budgetary participation aud infonnation asymmetry on budget slack and managerial 
perfo1mance. He found significant interaction between budgetary partici?ation, and 
information asymmetry on budget slack and he also found significant interaction 
between budgetary participation and information asymmetry on managerial 
performance. Investigating transfer of information, Hopwood (1976) has indicated 
that the process of budgetary participation as a mechanism for information exchange 
enables individuals to obtain a clearer understanding of their jobs, thereby helping 
them to improve their managerial performance. 
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In their work on theoretical research in economics, Baiman and Evans ( 1983) assume 
that budget participation exists in order to ensure sharing of information between a 
superior and a subordinate. As mentioned before, the economic theory suggests that 
budget participation can be used by a supc:rior to learn and manage the subordinate's 
tasks through his/her suhurdinate's information. Several budgeting studies have 
argued that subordinates have more accura:e information than their superiors 
regarding local conditions (Merchant, 1981; Cristensen, 1982; Chow e al.. 1988). In 
the agency-principal model, subordinates are said to have private information about 
local conditions. In the budgeting process, subordinates ma)' disclose their own 
private information, which might result in more realistic plans and more accurate 
budgets. As a resu1t, the superior can formulate better comprehensive unit budget 
goals and also use the information as a sound basis on which to measure budget-based 
incentive in the organisation. In other words, in the process of budgetary participation, 
there is an opportunity to balance the involvement of superiors and tlleir subordinates 
in information-processing or problem-solving endeavours in order to improve the 
effectiveness of budget allocation decisions. The ultimate aim of the process of 
budgetary participation is to overcome information asymmetries and task 
interdependency in budget decision making. 
Task c1J-Ordination. The characteristics of unit tasks in the organisation are task 
difficulty, and task variability, and task interdependency (Van de Ven and Delbercq, 
1974). Thus, the organisation need.-; a task co-ordination mechanism for maintaining 
the same direction in attaining the overall organisation objectives. A unit task is 
difficult because a unit is always faced with complexity and heterogeneity in its 
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operation due to unpredictability of internal and external environment and lack of a 
prescribed performance procedure, or changing operational technology (Perrow, 
1967). A unit task is difficult because of its variability. On the other hand, when a unit 
task become less difficult as a result of a learning process in the organisation, it is 
likely to become less variable in its implementation be(..:ause a body of knowledge has 
been established, specifying a prescribed wav t0 perform it (Van de Ven and 
Delbercq, 1974). Most units within an organisation depend on each other, in term of 
the materials, resources, knowledge, and advice needed to accomplish their tasks. 
The process of budgetary participation allows an individual to bring their private 
information to the task of specifying standarcts of performance, and as such, may lead 
to deeper understanding of task interdependency. On the other hand, task co­
ordination is a most importani activity because of its impact on the co-ordination of 
units' activities by helping unit managers to manage task characteristics such as task 
difficulty, variability, and interdependency through the process of budgetary 
participation (Van de Ven and Delbercq, 1974; see also Merchant, 1984; Brownell 
and Dunk, 1991; Lau, Low and Eggleton, 1995). These studies conclude that 
participation in the budgeting process exists to co-ordinate task interdependency 
regarding overall functional activities within the organisation under conditions of 
information asymmetry. 
The process of budgetary participation can facilitate communication among 
participants in order to co-ordinate their activities in regard to task interdependency 
and reduce information asymmetry. As a result, the process of budgetary participation 
can produce a mechanism to co-ordinate interdependent activities of units and the 
• 20 • 
. 
capacity of unit managers to meaningfully identify with and contribute to overall 
organisation objectives. Participants may get better inforn,ation to obtain clearer 
understanding of their task interdependency. 
Mia ( 1989) examined the interaction effect of budgetary participation and job 
difficulty on managerial perforn,ance. He conducted a survey questionnaire for 
middle -level managers of six companies working in various functional areas in New 
Zealand. Respondents included one food manufacturer, one maker of furniture and 
wood products, one assembler of automobiles, two providers of retail services and one 
provider of banking services. He found that the interaction effect of job difficulty and 
budgetary participation is positive and significant for managerial performance. It 
means that when a manager has a high level of job difficulty, his/her participation in 
the budgeting process should be also be high, resulting in improved managerial 
performance. 
Relating to task interdependency, Williams, Macintosh, and Moore ( 1990) conducted 
a study of twenty-two public sector departmentc:; in Canada. They investigated 
whether the relationship between budget-related behaviour and departmental 
performance goals is moderated by departmental task interdependency. The results of 
their study indicate a fairly substantial relationship between budget-related behaviour 
and departmental performance relies on the degree of departmental task 
interdependency. Based cm discussions above, they clearly concluded that one of the 
most important reasons for individuals to be involved in the budgeting process is to 
co-ordinate functional activities regarding task interdependency and information 
asymmetry. 
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2.1.2. Psychology Theory 
Like the economic theory, the theory of psychology assumes that the process of 
budgetary participation exists to provide infonnation exchange between a superior 
and a subordinate (e.g. Hopwood, 1976; Locke and Schweiger, 1979; Locke and 
Latham, 1990). In the process of budgetary participation, subordinates provide their 
own private infonnation and job�relevant infonnation to a superior when fonnulating 
the budget targets. By this means, a superior involved in the process of budgetary 
participation learns much about infonnation of subordinates' tasks and may be able to 
suggest the subordinates how to design better jobs. The economic and psychology 
theories both posit that the involvement of subordinates and superiors in the budgetary 
process is necessitated by information asymmetry and environmental and task 
uncertainty. Through the exchange of infonnation in the process of budgetary 
participation, sharing internal or external infonnation between subordinate and 
superior, it can be expected that infonnation asymmetry will be reduced and 
environmental and task uncertainty controlled, enabling effective budgets to be 
formulated, consonant with the organisation's objectives. 
The psychology theory posits that there are two main reasons for budgetary 
participation (Hopwood, 1976; Brownell, 1982a; Young, 1988; and Dunk, 1993b). 
First, involvement of both superiors and subordinates, as outlined above, in the 
process of budgetary participation, would encourage the control of infonnation 
asymmetry and task uncertainty. Second, through the process of budgetary 
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participation, individuals may reduce job�related tension and gain job satisfaction, 
thus possibly reduce budget slack. 
The theory of psychology identifies three main considerations in the involvement of 
subordinate and superior in the process of budgetary participation; namely, the factors 
of value attainment, cognition and motivation. (Locke and Schweiger, 1979; Locke 
and Latham, 1990). 
Value attainment. Shield and Shield ( 1998) stated that "value attainment is theorised 
to affect satisfaction and morale because the process (act) of participation allows a 
subordinate to experience self respect and feelings of equality arising from 
opportunities to express his/her value (p.59)". When individuals have the same 
opportunity to express their aspirations, information and knowledge in the process of 
budgetary participation, a fair budget can be generated. A fair budgeting process is 
defined as the involvement of subordinates in the budgeting process through a voice 
mechanism and the provision of an explanation for their lack of influence over the 
budget that is finally set (Libby, 1999). The voice mechanism deals with the ability of 
subordinates to be involved in a dec-i<:ion process by communicating their views to 
their superior (Leventhal, 1980), whereas explanation mechanism deals with a causal 
account or justification provided by the superior when outcome of the decision 
process is not affected by subordinates' communicated preferences (Bies, 1987). 
There are var.io-:.is ways for individuals to express their value during the budgeting 
prflcess. For example, individuals should feel free to make suggestions regarding 
budget allocation decisions by voicing the reasons for their proposed budget, based on 
their activity plans or performance appraisal systems (see Feuille and Chachere, 
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1995). In practice, however, a full voice mechanism in the budgeting process might be 
impractical. Libby ( 1999) found that partidpation in the budgeting process leads more 
to improved individual and organisational performance when voice and explanation 
are combined compared to voice alone. 
Cognitive mechanJsm. This deals with the acquisition and use of information and 
comprehension of job requirements (Locke, Schweiger and Latham,1986). In the 
process of budgetary participation, cognitive mechanism improves subordinate 
performance by increasing the quality of budget decisions as a result of the 
subordinate sharing information with the superior (Shield and Shield, 1998). Baiman 
(1982) and Tiessen and Waterhouse (1983) have mentioned there are two primary 
types of information in organisations, namely. decision influencing, which is collected 
about a manager's behaviour for the purposes of performance evaluation; and job­
relevant information which helps a manager to improve his or her action choice 
through better-informed effort. Similarly, Locke, Schweiger and La:harn ( 1986) 
stated that the manager needs information to have better understanding of decisions 
and actions to reach organisational objectives. 
Job-relevant information (hereafter JRJ) can improve performance because it allows 
more accurate predictions of environmental states and thus allows more effective 
selection of appropriate courses of action. For example, Campbell and Gingrich 
( 1986) provided evidence to support the effect of JRI on managerial performance. 
They found positive and significant effects of JRI on managerial performance. 
Managers involved in budgeting may get a better understanding and interpretation of 
their JRI, since budget participation facilitates the acquisition and use of it. 
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Participation in the budgeting process provides an opportunity to influence budget 
decision.� before a budget is finalised. Managers who are more involved in budgetary 
decisions will be motivated to share their knowledge, skill, and information in 
considering and evaluating altematiw budget goals. As a result, managers are likely 
to give their best effort to the fommlation of accurate forecasts of environmental 
states, and focus their attention on decisions and behaviours needed in both budget 
objectives and the objectives of the organisation. 
Several empirical studies have supported the above discussions. Mia ( 1989), using a 
survey questionnaire from middle managers working in six companies operating in 
New Zealand, examines the effect of cognitive factors associated with JRI. He 
hypothesised that perceptions of job difficulty moderate the relationship between 
budget participation and managerial performance. He assumes that participation in 
budgeting provides valuable information for difficult jobs. Mia found a positive and 
significant relationship between budget participation and managerial performance 
only when job difficulty is high. Dunk ( 1993b) found that job-related tension has a 
significant positive association with managerial performance. In a survey study, 
Chenhall and Brownell ( 1988) have suggested that role ambiguity is linked I to budget 
participation and managerial performance. They found that participation in budgeting 
reduced role ambiguity resulting in improved performance. 
Motivation mechanism. Shield and Shield ( 1998) stated that '·the motivational 
mechanism depicts the act of participation as increasing a subordinate's trust, sense of 
control, and ego-involvement with organisation, which then jointly cause less 
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resistance to change and more acceptable of, and commitment to, the budget 
decisions, in turn causing improved performance (p.59)". Kenis ( 1979) conducted a 
study of department managers and supervisors of plants located in the New Jersey­
Philadelphia area. He examines whether budgetary participation and budget goals 
clarity lead to better attitude toward budgets and higher budgetary motivation. Kenis 
found that budgetary participation and budget goal clarity tend to have positive and 
significant effects on managers' job-related attitude and budget-related motivation. 
Kenis also examines whether budgetary participation and budget goal difficulty lead 
to negative attitude toward budgets and lower budget motivation. Kenis found that 
budgetary participation has significant influence on budgetary performance of 
managers. However, a high level of budget goal difficulty was found to have an 
adverse effect on managers' attitude and managerial performance. 
Mia ( 1988) stated that the effectiveness of the role of budgetary participation on 
managerial performance depends on the level of participant's motivation. Based on a 
study of survey questionnaire to a sample of lower and middle level managers in a 
large company in Australia as a mining and associated investments company, he 
examines the effect of budget participation on managerial performance by using 
contingency variables including managerial attitude and motivation. Mia found that 
motivation and managerial attitude moderate the effectiveness of budget participation 
on managerial performance. Managers participating in the budgeting process who 
have a favourable attitude and motivation are likely to improve significantly the 
managerial perfonnance, whereas managers who have a less favourable attitude and 
motivation can be expected to deteriorate in performance. 
Similarly, Brownell and Mclnnes ( 1986), Searfos and Monczka ( 1973), Searfoss 
(1976), and Hofstede (1967) found that the effect of motivation is significantly and 
1 Role ambiguity and job-relevant infonnation are similar constructs in that the latter reflects the extent 
to which managers understand their duties and responsibilities whH� the fonner is a measure of the 
infonnation available to managers to accomplish job-related t?..::sks. 
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positively related to the budgetary participation and managerial performance. Even 
though Merchant ( 1981) used motivation as an intervening variabJe instead of a 
moderating variable in the study of nineteen firms in the electronics industry, he also 
found that an individual's motivation correlates positively and significantly with 
budget participation. 
AU three of the mechanisms are assumed to influence participative budgeting's 
effects. The assumed cause of participative hudgeting is either uncertainty or a 
superior-subordinate information asymmetry. Regarding these three mechanisms, 
when a subordinate possesses better job-related information, the superior is assumed 
to use participative budgeting to learn more about this information in order to develop 
higher quality budget decisions. This cause of participative budgeting has been called 
information exchange (Hopwood, 1976; Lawler and Rhode, 1976; Locke and 
Schweger, 1979). 
2.1.3. Sociology Theory 
Shield and Shield ( 1998) state that the sociology theory assumes that when an 
organisation's external environment becomes more uncertain, it responds by 
increasing its differentiation (e.g. number and type of units). This consequently 
requires an increase in participation in the budgeting process for co-ordinating unit 
activities and integrating overall activities of the organisation. They also stated that 
the theoretical underpinning of the social budget research has been based on the 
contingency theory of organisations. The contingency theory principle basically posits 
that there is no single type of organisation structure and management system that is 
invariably the most effective or efficient for all organi�ations. Instead, effective 
- 27 -
organisation structure and mana�ement systems for organisations in different 
ecological contexts are considered to be contingent on certain key contextual factors 
such as organisation size, l��hnology, and environment (Lawrence and Lorch, 1967; 
Galbraith, 1973; Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; Gordon and Miller, 1976; Hayes, 
1977; Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978; Fisher, 1995; 1998; Birnberg, 1998). 
Earlier budgeting studies used contingency variables based on organisational context 
(e.g. environmental uncertainty), and organisation structure (e.g. decentralisation, 
functional differentiation). Several researchers have used a traditional contingency 
framework in their studies ( e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 196 7; Galbraith, 1973; 
Merchant, 1981; Brownell and Hirst, 1986; Govindarajan, 1986; Mia, 1988). For 
example, Lawrence and Lorsch ( l  967), in a field study with a variety of companies, 
found that when companies faced with higher environmental uncertainty, successful 
companies designed organisational structures - decentralised as a base to facilitate the 
flow of information both horizontally and vertically is important factor to make 
decisions effectively. In those companies that were faced with lower environmental 
uncertainty, successful firms were more centralised, since the information required to 
make decisions was available to senior managers. 
Regarding the uncertainty factor, Galbraith (1973) argued that for greater 
effectiveness, participation in decision-making (e.g. budget) should vary with task 
uncertainty. He views organisations as information-processing systems and posited 
that as the task environment of a unit becomes more uncertain. the unit level will 
increase its information-processing capacity. When firms are faced with low 
uncertainty, they might be able to specify behaviours, in the form of rules, in advance 
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of task execution. Galbraith also mentioned that participation in budget decisions does 
not come cost-free. Increased participation implies that the unit's managers need to 
spend greater amounts of time and additional overhead expenses on co-ordination and 
control for implementing the budgeting process. Thcrdore the benefits of 
participation in the budgeting process might outweigh its costs only in situations 
involving a high level of uncertainty. 
In a study of managers of nineteen organisations in the electronics industry, Merchant 
(1981) uses contingency variables to investigate how differences in corporate-level 
budgeting systems are related to corporate size, diversity, and degree of 
decentralisation, and how different choices in system design and use are related to 
organiaational performance. Merchant found that managers in the larger, more 
diverse, decentralised firms appear to participate more highly in budgeting on a 
formal level, with fewer direct interpersonal interactions with either subordinates or 
superiors, and they feel that meeting the budget goals is important to their careers. In 
this study, Merchant concludes that in all sampled firms, the more formal and 
elaborate budgeting processes ar� generally received well by the managers but the 
larger firms appear to be more positively linked with organisational performance. 
Empirical support for Lawrence and Lorsch, and Galbraith was provided by 
Govindarajan ( l 986) and K.ren ( 1992). Govindarajan examined the effect of 
environmental uncertainty in the budgeting process with sample middle managers of 
responsibility centres which have different levels of environmental uncertainly. He 
found that environmental uncertainty had a positive and significi"\Ilt moderating effect 
on the relationship between participation in budgeting process and managerial 
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p1�rformance. In other words, the greater environmental uncertainty, the greater the 
positive in1pact of budget participation on managerial perfonnance. 
Kren ( ! 992) provides evidence to support the findings of Govindarajan (1986). Based 
on a questionnaire survey of division managers in large corporations, Kren found a 
positive and significant relationship between budget participation and managerial 
perfonnance when environmental volatility is high. On the other hand, Brownell and 
Dunk (1991) examine the effect of task uncertainty as a contingency variable in their 
study. They conducted a questionnaire survey am�ngst managers of manufacturing 
organisations in Sydney, Australia. They found that where task difficulty is low, the 
effect of participation, while apparently positive, does not approach significance at 
any reasonable level. By contrast, where task difficulty is high, the coefficient for 
participation is positive and significant. 
Lau, Low, and Eggleton ( 1995) developed the framework for examining the effect of 
task uncertainty, not only on budgetary participation but also on budgetary emphasis. 
They examine the interaction effect of task uncertainty, budget emphasis, and 
budgetary participation on managerial performance. They conducted a questionnaire 
survey with a sample of 240 functional heads from 80 Singaporean manufacturing 
companies with more than 100 employees each. Their results indicate a significant 
three-way interaction between budgetary emphasis, budgetary participation and task 
uncertainty affecting managerial perfonnance. These findings were supported by the 
work of Brownell and Hirst's (1986), who also used task uncertainty as a moderating 
variable to investigate the interaction effect of budgetary emphasis, budgetary 
participation, and task uncertainty on job-related tension. Based on the study of a 
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surw:y questionnaire using a sample of line managers representing a wide variety of 
functions in a large manufacturing company headquartered in Sydney, Australia; they 
found a three-way interaction among budgetary participation, budgetary emphasis, 
and task uncertainty on job-related tension to be negative and significant. In similar 
vein, Lau and Tan's ( 1998) study indicates that budget participation interacts 
significantly with task difficulty to affect managerial performance. 
2. 2. Research in Traditional Budgetary Participation 
Studies of budgeting mostly focus on budgetary participation. Researchers have been 
interested in studying this area because budgetary participation plays a vital role in 
organisational functioning (Hopwood, 1978) and is one of the most important 
components of the overall budgeting process (Daft and Macintosh, 1987; Anderson, 
1984). Oaf. and Macintosh interviewed middle managers from nine companies, 
including a major bank, a national finance company, a heavy-machinery 
manufacturing plant, a telephone company, an advertising company, a textile 
manufacturing, a pulp producer, the chemical division of a large conglomerate and a 
department store chain. They examined implementations of management control sub­
systems within the companies, including budget, statistical reports, policies and 
procedures, performance appraisal and non-MCS such as personal influence and 
leadership. They found that middle managers were more likely to rely on budget, 
rather than other management control sub-systems, as primary tool for planning and 
formulating their targets, but on the other hand, they use budget as secondary tool for 
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controlling their activities. Simuarly, Anderson ( 1984) stated that budgeting is fine for 
mechanism of planning but not for controlling. 
The studies of traditional budgeting behaviour have mostly concentrated on 
investigating the relationship between budgetary participation and managerial 
performance on either the direct or expanded association. However, the results of 
these studies on direct association have not been conclusive. For example, the 
relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance was found 
to be Rignificantly positive in Brownell & Mcinnes ( 1986)� and Kenis ( 1979) but 
contrary results were found in Ivancevich (1976), Kren (1990), Milani (1975), Latham 
& Yuki (1976), and French, Israel, & As (1960) where there were no significant 
relationships between budgetary participation and managerial perrormance, while 
Stedry (1960) and Bryan & Locke ( 1967) found a significant negative association. 
In view of those conflicting results on the direct association, Hopwood (I 976) 
suggested that there might not be a simple direct relationship between participation 
and performance. Instead, situational factors or contingency variables may affect the 
participation and performance relationship. Brownell ( 1979) comprises the 
contingency variables into four variables: personal variables (motivation, budget goals 
clarity, budget goals difficulty, feedback, locus cuntrol, etc), interpersonal variables 
(leadership style, managerial roles, etc), environmental/organisational variables 
(environmental uncertainty, task uncertainty, decentralisation, size, etc), and cultural 
variable. 
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The results of the studies by using contingent variables have not been conclusive yet. 
Some studies have found a significant positive relationship between budgetary 
participation and perfonnance under different situational factors. But other studies 
have found there is no or negative relationship between budgetary participation and 
performance under different situational factors. For example Kenis ( 1979) found that 
the effect of motivation on the relationship between budget participation and 
managerial performance is significant. However Mia ( 1989), Brownell and Mcinnes 
( 1986), and lvancevich {1979) found that there is no significant effect of motivation 
on such relationship. Other studies, notably by Lawrence & Lorsch ( 1967), Thompson 
(1967) and Hayes (1977) revealed that budgeting information is more useful for the 
firms in relative certain/stable environment than in uncertain/unstable environment. In 
contrast, Merchant (l 981) and Govindarajan (1986) found that organisations in 
unstable environment use budget more than in stable environment. They argue that 
organisations need to develop adaptive planning and controlling by scanning the 
environment in dealing with changes in underlying assumptions of budgeting plan. 
2.3. Research in the Traditional Budgetary Control 
This section addresses motivation for using the budget as a control tool. Budgeting 
literature indicates that a budget serves not only as a planning tool for the firm but 
also as a control tool. Budgetary control is the process of ensuring that an organisation 
is adapted to its environment and pursuing courses of actions that will enable it to 
achieve its purposes. For example, Argyris ( 1977 ,pp. 113-114) states that "a budget 
control system is designed to increase the likelihood that certain objectives will be 
met. If the objectives are not met but the cause can be corrected without questioning 
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the original objectives around which it was designed or without questioning the 
competence and loyalty of those using it, then the error will, in all likelihood, be 
corrected". Moreover, budgetary control is a fundamental part of organisational 
activity (Otley and Berry, 1980). As a control tool, firms use the budget to help 
managers to control and co-ordinate their activities, and to evaluate their performance 
{Homgren and Foster, 1989; Churchill, 1984; Kaplan, 1982). 
The budget variance reports provide managers with a sound basis for measuring 
efficiency, identifying problems and controlling costs. In addition, the co-ordination 
of various units' activities in the organisation, such as sales, marketing, production, 
purchasing and cash flow, is accomplished through the process of budget control. 
Communication of budgeted goals downward in an organisation informs subordinates 
about what their superiors expect of them: conversely, superiors learn about the 
accomplishment and problems of their subordinates through urward-flowing budget 
reports, comparing budgeted goals with the actualities. 
Furthermore, budget information helps superiors to evaluate th� performance of their 
subordinates and distribute rewards and punishments. Therefore, feedback Rbout the 
degree to which budget goals have been achieved is an important motivation for 
subordinates. If the subordinates do not know the results of theit' efforts, they have no 
basis for feelings of success or failure and no incentive for higher performance: 
furthermore, they might become dissatisfied. Budgetary evaluation refers to the extent 
to which budget variances are traced back to individual units, and is used in 
evaluating unit performance. If budgets are used in performance evaluation, they tend 
-34 -
to influence the behaviour, attitudes, and performance of participants (Hopwood, 
1976; Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; Merchant, l 981 ). 
Several researchers have used a traditional contingency framework in the process of 
budgetary control (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Pugh, Hickson, Hinnings and Turner, 1967; Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; 
Merchant, 1981 ). The earlier studies argued that the success of budgetary control 
relies on individual behaviour such as interpersonal contact - i.e. leadership - and 
organisational structure such as distribution of authority and work roles (DeCoster and 
Fertakis, 1968; Foran and Decoster, 1974; Hopwood, 1976; and Swieringa and 
Moncur, 1972, 197 5). 
Budgets provide a basis for directing and evaluating the performance of individuals or 
units of the organisation. Through budget, activities of different units of the 
organisation can be co-ordinated and controlled. A control system typically 
incorporates measures and techniques that conform to the responsibilities delegated to 
managers under the organisation's structure. 
Organisational structure is viewed as being contingent on the context in which the 
organisation operates, including such characteristics as its size and technology 
{Woodw.,sd, 1965; Bums and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Pugh, 
Hickson, Hinings, and Turner, 1969). Size and technology variables are seen as 
affecting individual behaviour in the process of budgetary control, including the 
quantity of such behaviour, the kind of behaviour, and the quality and satisfaction in 
terms of the extent to which the budget is seen as effective in accomplishing 
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organisational objectives (Bnms; and Waterhouse, 1975). A study of twenty-seven 
organisations with a wide a variety of different structures, organisations of different 
sizes, operating in different environments, and diverse technology has been conducted 
by Bruns and Waterhouse (1975). They examine the relationship between budgetary 
control and organisation structure. The results of their study indicate cl�arly that the 
relationship between organisation structure and the use and effects of budgetary 
control is significant and provide insight into several complex relationships including 
size, environment, and technology. 
Hofstede ( 1967) examines the effects on managerial motivation of various control 
aspects of the budgeting system. He draws conclusions regarding the effects of tight 
and loose standards, the degree of participation in budget setting, the organisation of 
the control function and certain other aspects ot the general environment in which the 
organisation operates. One of his findings was that the way in which superiors in the 
hierarchy handled budget problems and the extent to which they discussed budg�t 
results with subordinates had a strong impact on the subordinate's attitudes about the 
budget system and his perceptions or the relevancy of the budget standards to his job. 
In a somewhat related study, Fertakis (1967) and DeCoster and Fertakis (1968) 
examine the relationship between budget-induced pressure and a supervisor's 
leadership behaviour. They found that a supervisor, when subjected to budget-induced 
pressure, tended to exhibit both more structuring and more considerate behaviour 
toward his subordinates. 
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Stedry ( 1960) used analytical and experimental techniques to examine the relationship 
between managerial performance, aspiration levels, and externally imposed budgets. 
He concludes that an individual's aspirations affected his performance and suggested 
that performance could be improved by choosing budget levels attuned to the 
motivational structures of the individual. In subsequent study, Swieringa and Moncur 
(1972) investigate the relationship between managers' budget-oriented behaviour and 
selected attitude, position, size, and performance measure. They used a survey 
research questionnaire on managers drawn from the branch organisation of a large 
international bank. They suggest that the existence and direction of a relationship 
between budget-oriented behaviour and performance measures may be dependent 
upon aspects such as attitude, position, and size. 
Kenis ( 1979), in a study of department managers and supervisors of plants located in 
the New Jersey-Philadelphia area, examines whether budget goals' clarity and 
budgetary feedback have a positive effect on budgetary performance, cost efficiency, 
and job performance. Kenis found that budgetary feedback affects the performance of 
managers. Kenis also examines whether budgetary evaluation has a negative effect on 
budgetary performance, cost efficiency, and job performance. Kenis found that there 
is no effect of budgetary feedback on performance evaluation and reward of 
managers. 
Cherrington and Cherrington ( 1973) reasoned that a reward structure which was based 
on budget achievement would represent appropriate reinforcement only for 
individuals who are largely responsible for the determination of budget targets, while 
a reward structure de-emphasising the budget would provide appropriate 
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reinforcement only for individuals for whom the budget is largely imposed. In other 
words, rewards for budget.related perfonnance should be compatible with the level of 
emphasis placed on budgets. In an experimental task involving 230 undergraduate 
business students, Cherrington and Cherrington examine the effects of budgetary 
control and reward contingencies on managerial performance and budget satisfaction. 
They found results that tended to confirm that managerial performance and budget 
satisfaction were higher in the budget-based reward/high participation than in the non­
budget based reward/low participation group. 
Similarly, Bruns and DeCoster ( 1969) and Merchant (1985) identify that managers 
use the budget system for incentive and performance evaluation purposes, and to 
influence the behaviour of subordinates consistent with organisational goals. 
Budgeting systems thus take on roles of management functions, because they 
facilitate the flow of information in the organisation and guide individual behaviour to 
be consistent with organisation goals. A superior secures subordinates' accountability 
through incentives and control, by offering economic reward based on the budget 
perfonnance (Baiman, 1982, 1990). 
2.4 Relationship between Budgeting Process and Managerial Roles 
Macintosh and Williams ( 1992) have found a significant relationship between 
budgeting process and managerial roles. They indicate that the budgeting process is a 
key activity in the whole organisation process that has been linked to managerial 
roles. Managers need to be involved in the process of budget to implement their 
managerial roles in the performance of their day-to-day activities in order to achieve 
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the organisation•s goals. Managerial roles refer to behaviours attributable to a job or 
position. Managerial roles have been defined as sets of managers' behaviours 
attributable to their roles in performing management functions, such as planning, 
organising, leading, and controlling, in order to achieve organisation goals (McKenna, 
1999; Vecchio et al, l 997; Robbins, 1993; Williams and Macintosh, 1992; and 
Mintzberg, 1973). 
Mintzberg (1973) conducted an in-depth study of five executives at work. Based on 
his observations of actual managers on the job, he concluded that those managers 
displayed ten different characteristics, but that these were highly interrelated roles. 
Mintzberg suggests that those ten managerial roles can be grouped into three areas: 
interpersonal, informational, and decisional. 
Interpersonal roles cover the relationships that a manager has to have with others. The 
three roles within this category are figurehead, leader, and liaison. Managers have to 
act as figureheads, representing their organisations, becau:;e of their formal authority 
and symbolic position. As leaders, managers have to bring together the needs of an 
organisation and those of the individuals under their command. The third 
interpersonal role, liaison, deals with the horizontal relationships which work-activity 
studies have shown to be important for a manager. A manager has to maintain a 
network of relationships outside the organisation. 
Furthermore, information roles refer to managers who have to collect, disseminate, 
and transmit infonnation. There are three informational roles; namely, monitor, 
disseminator, and spokesman. A manager is an important figure in monitoring what 
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goes on in the organisation, receiving information about both internal and external 
events, and transmitting it to others. This process of transmission involves the 
dissemination roles, passing on information of both factual and value kinds. A 
manager often has to give information concerning the organisation to outsiders, taking 
the role of spokesman to both the general public and those in positions of influence. 
Finally, decision roles are the most crucial part of management activity. There are 
four roles in this category, based on different classes of decision; namely, 
entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator, and negotiator. As 
entrepreneurs, managers make decisions about changing what is happening in an 
organisation. They may have both to initiate change and to take an active part in 
deciding exactly what is to be done. In principle, they are acting voluntarily. This is 
very different from their role as a disturbance handler, where managers have to make 
decisions, which arise from unpredicted events beyond their control. The ability to 
react to events as well as to plan activities is an important managerial skill. The 
resource allocation role of a manager is a central part of organisational analysis. A 
manager has to make decisions about the allocation of money, people, equipment, 
time, information, and so on. To perform this role, a manager is actually scheduling 
time, programming work, and authorising actions. A manager has to negotiate with 
others. and in the process be able to make decisions about the commitment of 
organisational resources. 
Prior studies have found a positive significant relationship between budgeting process 
and managerial roles ( e.g Macintosh and Wilfouns, 1992; and Williams et al., 1997). 
They indicated that participants who participate in the budgeting process would obtain 
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much infonnation from their superiors, subordinates, and others and they also would 
communicate their own information to other parties. Macintosh and Williams { 1992) 
and Williams et al { 1997) also revealed that transfer of infonnation during the 
budgeting process would enhance the quality of leader roles and decision roles. 
Hopwood ( 1976) pointed out that the budgeting process is a medium for the 
facilitation of the flow of information, both horizontally and vertically, including that 
from superior to subordinate and vice versa. 
As mentioned before, the economic theory maintains that a subordinate knows more 
about his/her unit operational activity than does his/her superior. Therefore, managers 
use the budgeting process as a medium to gain infonnation from their subordinates 
(Baiman and Evans, 1983; Kanodia, l 993; Shield and Shield, 1998). The mechanism 
of budgeting within an organisation may minimise "infonnation asymmetry" or 
reduce uncertainty about subordinate's task and task environment (Shield and Shield, 
1998). 
On the other hand, the psychology theory views that involvement of individuals, both 
superiors and subordinates, in the budgeting process, would have implications on their 
value attainment, cognition, and motivation (Shield and Shield, 1998; Locke and 
Schweiger, l 976� Locke and Latham, 1990). Value attainment affects satisfaction and 
morale because the activities of budgeting allow a subordinate to experience self 
respect and feelings of equality arising from the opportunity to express his/her values 
(Shield and Shield, 1998). 
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Tne mechanism of cognitive process may increase the subordinates' performance 
through improvement in the quality of budget targets as a result of sharing 
information between subordinates and superiors (Shield and Shield, 1998). The 
involvement of subordinates in the budgeting process may help to increase "the 
subordinate's trust, sense of control, and ego-involvement with organisation, which 
then jointly cause less resistance to change and more acceptable of, and commitment 
to, the budget decisions, in tum causing improved performance" (Shield and Shield, 
1998, p.59). Following psychology theory, an important reason for superior and 
subordinate involvement in the budgeting process is to facilitate a better 
understanding about task and environmental uncertainty and to reduce information 
asymmetry. 
The social theory suggests that an organisation has to face uncertaintien as a 
significant feature of its external environment. Units would show their differences in 
responding to environmental uncertainty. Therefore, the units need a mechanism such 
as a budget process to realise roles in order to integrate and to co-ordinate the units' 
aci.tVities for achieving the organisation's objectives (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1976; 
Brownell, 1982a). Scme budgeting studies have modelled the sociology theory within 
the organisation based on such variables as: (1) organisation context (e.g. 
environmental uncertainty) and (2) organisation structure ( e.g. decentralisation, 
functio:.1al differentiation). The contingency theory of the organisation has been 
applied as the theoretical underpinning of the prior social budgeting studies 
(Hopwood, 1976, Brownell, 1982a; Otley and Wilkinson, 1988; Fisher, 1995; 
Macintosh and Williams, 1992; Williams et al, 1997). 
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In contrast, Mintzberg (1973). Preston (1988), and Bruns and Williams (1993) have 
failed to detect a strong relationship between budget and managerial roles: in fact, 
they found that there is no relationship between budget and managerial roles. Bruns 
and Williams ( 1993) maintain that managers do not emphasise budget infom1ation to 
control their activities. Managers prefer to seek information from others that relate 
directly to actionable managerial roles. They are interested in using reports that 
contain information necessary for their own specific operating decisions, or for 
monitoring key success factors in favour of accomplishing their unit targets. They 
want to minimise uncertainties about an operation's status and the results of activities 
for which the manager is responsible. As a result, managers expend considerable 
resources to collect, manipulate, aggregate and distribute information as reports useful 
to them in controlling their activities. 
Mintzberg ( 1973) argued that managers tend to avoid using the budget information for 
getting current information in their decisions. As a result, therefore, managers develop 
their internal networking to seek and distribute information relevant to their own unit 
decision making. Covalesky and Dirsmith ( 1986) support the findings of Mintzberg. 
They examined the relationship between the performance of budgeting responsibilities 
and managerial roles and concluded that no such relationship existed. On the other 
hand, Preston (1986) provides evidence that links managerial roles to paits of the 
budget information system. A manager's use of budget information depends on that 
manager's purposes, beliefs and feelings, rather than being affected by the need to 
control their internal activities and to co-ordinate functional activities in line with the 
overall operational effectiveness (Hopwood, 1972, 1976; Pfeffer, 1981 ). 
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Williams et al (1997) conducted a questionnaire survey of seventy nine lower level 
operating managers from five large companies listed on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange, in an effort to identify a situational factor that may moderate such a 
relationship. They used task uncertainty as a contingency variable, and examined 
whether there is a moderating effect of task uncertainty on the relationship between 
managerial roles and the budgeting process. They found a significant relationship 
between managerial roles and the budgeting process in every task context except that 
oflow task difficulty. 
2.5. The Role of Politics in the Budgeting Process 
This study aims to identify the role of politics in the budgeting process. This section, 
therefore, defines the role of politics in this process for the purpose of this study. As 
we have seen in the budgeting literature review, a budget serves to assist firms to help 
their managers in planning and controlling activities in order to pursue orgdllisational 
goals. In this section, the study investigates two aspects of political influence on the 
budgeting proceSs, namely, the role of politics in budgetary planning and the role of 
politics in budgetary control. 
2.5.l Political Influence in the Process of Decision-making 
Politics is inevitable in an organisation: it is an inevitable part of the reality of 
organisational life (Pfeffer, 1981; Pettigrew, l 973; Kreitner and Kinicki, 1992; Steers, 
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1986; Robbins, 1993; and Wood, Wallace, Zeffane, Schennerhorn, Hunt, and Osborn, 
1998). Lasswell (1936) defines politics as 11who get what, when, and how". Other 
scholars argue that politics is .. power in action" - the exercise of power to get 
something accomplished. Its activities focus therefore, around the acquisition and use 
of power. Power, in turn, is defined as any force that results in behaviour which would 
not have occurred if the force had not been present (Mechanic, 1962). Politics is an 
important means of understanding how organisations operate, especially how the 
decision-making process works. 
The political model of organisation provides an accurate description of decision­
making process. Pfeffer and Salancik {l 974), Pfeffer (1981 ), Cyert and March (1963) 
were straightforward to conclude that actors in the process of decision-making are 
human beings and thus have human frailties. Actors in the process of decision-making 
seldom have a consistent ordering of goals; they do not always pursue systematically 
the goals they hold; they have made choices with incomplete information; and they 
seldom conduct an exhaustive search for alternative decisions (March and Simon. 
1958). 
More realistically. actors in decision-making process recognise only a limited number 
of decision criteria. They propose only a limited number f alternatives. Ti1eir choices 
of criteria and the weights they give them, and their choice of alternatives and 
assessment of those alternatives, will reflect their self-interests. The result is that an 
actor's selection of the best solution is not an optimum choice but one that satisfies. 
Ratter than considering all alternatives and listing them, from most preferred to least 
preferred, the actor searches until an alternative emerges that is good enough. Actual 
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decision-making process, therefore, is not a comprehensive process of infonnation 
searching for an optimum solution. It is an incremental process whereby the actor in 
the process of decision-making assesses choices until one is found that meets the 
minimum acceptable level. Once this level is attait �. the search stops and the choice 
is made. As mentioned above, social political theory views the organisation as a 
coalition of divergent interests in which conflict and bargaining are to be solved take 
place by power (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1974; Pettigrew, 1973). For example Pettigrew has argued that individuals 
involved in any decision-making process tend to exercise their ability, influence and 
power in obtaining their preferred outcomes. 
In the words of Pettigrew (1973): 
Organisation is an open political system. The division of work in an organisation 
creates sub-units. These sub-units develop interests based on specialized functions and 
responsibilities. Although such sub-units have specialized tasks. they may also be 
interdependent. This interdependence may be played out within a joint decision­
making process. Within such decision-making processes, interest-based demands are 
made. Given heten.,geneity in the demand-generating pro, -:ss and the absence of a 
clearly set system of priorities between those demands, conflict is likely to ensue. Sub­
units with differential interests make claims on scarce organisational resources. The 
extent of the claims is likely to be a reflection of the unit's perception of how cntical 
the resources up for negotiation are to its survival and development. The success any 
claimant has in furthering his interests will be a consequence of his abilio• to generate 
support for his demand. It is the involvement of sub-units in such demand and support 
generating processes within the decision-making processes of the organisation that 
ccnstitutes the political dimensfon (p.17). 
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2.5.2 Role of Politics in the Process of Budgetary Planning 
Prior studies in budgeting have tended to view that the process of budgeting is not 
only involved with management of financial resources but also in the particular 
patterns of organisational visibility (e.g. Hopwood, 1976; Covalesky and Dirsmith, 
1986). Many accounting studies indicate that budget infonnation is often ignored, 
manipulated, and falsified by those to whom it is provided (Mintzberg, 1975; 
Hopwood, 1972; and Yetton, 19 /6). They reveal that dysfunctional behaviour 
frequently stems from the fact that the infonnation provided by the budget system 
does not adequately match the complexity of the underlying organisational and 
economic events; but it is also evident that distortion of infonnation can occur even 
when the budgeting system itself is technically adequate. Such distortion is a 
consequence of the divergence of individuals' goals, purposes, aspirations and beliefs 
{Hopwood, 1976; Pfeffer, 1981) from those of the organisation, and most commonly 
manifests itself in attempts to make budget reports reflect more favourably on an 
individual's performance instead of on overall organisational pcrfonnance. 
Other studies have argued that the process of budgeting is recognised as a cohesive 
mechanism of social management rather than a purely technical phenomenon 
(Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes, and Nahapiet, 1980; and Burchell, Clubb and 
Hopwood, 1985; Covalesky and Dirsmith, 1986; and Miller, 1994) and it manifests as 
a product of the creation of a particular pattern of political power (Sisaye, 1998; 
Dirsmith, 1998; Hopwood, 1976; Bariff and Galbraith. 1978). The budgeting process 
is not the outcome of a rational process of the theory of budgeting. Rather, it is 
characterised by a multitude of rationalities at play, in which the allocation of budget 
is compounded in many areas by an absence of any "right" measure of budget 
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assumptions and budget outputs; also, budget decisions result from lack of knowledge 
and information of how means are related to ends in input/output transformation. 
Pfeffer (1981) has emphatically stated that the budgeting processes are a product of 
politics. Politics refers to efforts of budgeting participants to mobilize support for or 
against the budget decisions in which the outcome of budget will have some effect on 
them. Pfeffer defines several characteristics of politics in organisational decision 
making, namely: goals/preferences, power and control, decision process, rules and 
norms, information and computational requirements, beliefs about action­
consequences relationship, decisions, and ideology (p.31 ). 
The political viewpoint posits that budget iargets each individual in a manner 
consistent with his or her own interests, but inconsistent with the interests of the entire 
organisation. Budgetary decision processes are characterised by push and pull of 
different interests, each individual focussing on targets advantageous to their 
perceived needs. Each individual comes to the process of budgetary participation with 
various goals, preferences, beliefs and aspirations, sc, open conflict of interests is 
legitimate and inevitable. Unit managers serve information to support their units' 
proposed budget targets and tend to discredit others and to distort t."1e entire 
organisation objectives. Budget decisions result from bargaining among individuals. 
determined mainly by their relative levels of power. Each individual has to struggle to 
obtain a budget allocation consonant with his or her interests. Politics, therefore, is 
essentially the exercise of power. 
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Hickson et al ( 1971) have proposed a strategic contingency model of organisational 
power which states that power within an organisation comes from the ability of 
individuals or unit managers to successfully cope with critical organisational 
uncertainties, the importance of the uncertainty, and the degree to which other 
individuals or unit managers can provide substitute services. 
Similarly Crozier ( 1964} and Thompson ( 1967) have noted that individual power is 
related to uncertainties in the technology and environment faced by an organisation. 
Therefore, individual power within an organisation is contingent on the context of the 
unit to the extent that environmental uncertainties or technologies form the basis from 
which individuals may gain power. The individual's particular skill and knowledge 
and his access to infrrmation pertinent to the uncertainty are presumed to be critically 
related to the individual's ability to cope successfully and are, therefore, important 
factors in maintaining and exercising power. 
Lukka (1988) supports evidence that the process of budgetary participation represents 
a substantial political process. He recognised that the existence of bias in budget 
decision-making results mainly from political processes (see also Cyert and March, 
1963; Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Pettigrew, 1972). Lulcka concluded that budgets are 
created mainly on the basis of factors that are inconsistent with an honest and 
straightforward process. He developed the theoretical framework of budget in the 
study of profit centres of the household supplies, retail trade, and hotel businesses. He 
used a multiple factor of personal goals, organisational factors, political power 
factors, situational factors, and the role of information in the study. He found that "on 
the whole, the theoretical framework developed in the study was felt to constitute a 
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valid basis for an empirical analysis: budgetary biasing behaviour could be understood 
through the factors"(p.296). Lukka 's ( 1988) findings are consistent with those of 
Spicer and Ballew ( 1983), who said that budget bias is caused by conflict between 
organisational objectives (long-range planning) and particular currents within the 
operation of units. 
Wildavsky (1979) found a significant correlation between budget allocation and 
politics. He studied the allocation of resources across governmental agencies, and 
stated that budgets are a product of political activity, as demonstrated by 
characteristics of political power, such as conflict, struggle, coalitions, and bargaining. 
In th� words of (Wildavsky, 1968): 
Budgets are attempts to allocate financial resources through political processes. If 
politics is regarded as conflict over whose preferences are to prevail in the 
detennination of policy, then the budget records the outcomes of this stn1ggle. If one 
asks who gets what the (public or private) organisation has to give. then the answ�rs 
for a moment in time are recorded in the budget. If organisations are viewed as 
political coalitions, budgets are mechanisms through which sub-unit, bargain over 
conflicting goals, make side-payments, and try to motivate one another to accomplish 
their objectives (I 968: 193). 
The theory of politics does not sustain a view that the main motivation of participants 
involved in the process of budgetary participation are the sharing of information and 
co-ordination of their functional activities in favour of improving the quality of the 
resulting budget. The main reason for managers to participate in the budgetary process 
is to press forward their own aspirations in a way that will favour their own particular 
position. Several researchers have mentioned that individuals emphasise more their 
own objectives than overall organisational objectives in the budgeting process. For 
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example, Markus and Pfeffer ( 1983) provide evidence that the uses to which 
management infonnation systems are put relate to the acquisition or exercise of 
power: setting direction, altering perfonnance, and conferring legitimacy. 
Burchell et al. ( 1980) put forward the notion of infonnation as ammunition to promote 
a particular point of view. Individuals collect and distribute infonnation for purposes 
of rationalisation. Individuals seek to legitimise and justify actions that already have 
been decided upon. In other words, individuals involved in the budgeting process seek 
to justify their own budget decisions, rather than to co-ordinate their activities in line 
with overall organisational objectives (Bower, 1970). Feldman and March (1981) 
present substantial evidence that the motivation of individuals involved in the 
budgeting process is to hold support their own interests in the proposed budget. They 
found that individuals collect a great deal of information that frequently has little 
relevance to organisational decisions that have to be made. Rather, the information is 
used to justify decisions that have already been made in their individual budgets. 
The particular purpose of individuals involved in the budgeting process also has been 
mentioned by Brownell and Hirst ( 1982). They said that "participation may serve a 
critical purpose whether budget emphasis is matched with it or not. Specifically, 
participation may provide the opportunity for managers to gain access to res0t,Wsoer 
which can be used to buffer task performance from the unanticipated effects oVothern. 
and to introduce new and better means to address tasks" (p.242). Mi;lireover, 
\''ildavsky (l 975), Hopwood (1976), Jonsson (1982), Sisaye (l 995), and Feman�dez et 
al. ( 1999) have concluded that budgeting process takes place within political activity 
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on which individuals' behaviour focuses on maintaining their own interests rather 
than exploring the objectives of the organisation. 
In a case study involving Delta as th...: subsidiary of a division of one of the major 
North American multi-national car manufacturers which operates in southern Spain, 
Fernandez et al. ( 1999) indicate that the role of budget is a ritual of control and 
legitimation without substantive involvement of middle managers. There are politics 
involved in the process of budget negotiation, involving divisions in which managers 
develop their own interest in the budget. They said that "the budget process took on 
the character of a ceremonial activity as Delta's managers played out a process of 
negotiation with the financial managers of the European office in order to develop a 
budget that displayed a 'break-even' income even though the market for Delta's 
products remained highly problematic ( 1999: 401 )". 
Kren ( 1992) stated that participation is related to the source of control of the specific 
demand because when it is present, participation allows an individual to influence 
budget allocation decisions in favour of his own demand through the exercise of 
power. In contrast, when participation is absent, the individual is not able to exercise 
power, and therefore control over their demands is held by external parties. 
Individuals need to be involved in the process of bargaining, since the final form of 
the budget will be determined by the struggle for power which the process inevitably 
involves. As Mintzberg ( 1983) identifies power as a significant factor in the process 
of budget decision-making, he says that power is a most important factor that cannot 
be ignored by anyone interested in understanding how budget decision-making in the 
organisation works. 
· 52 . 
Individuals involved in the budgeting process, especially in budget allocation 
decisions, have to mobilise, show, and exercise their power to get budget allocation 
consonant with their own demands. Kuru,1maki ( 1999) said that struggles between 
participants, in various institutions and between individuals involved in the functions 
of an organisation, are inevitable. The protagonists have differing chances of winning 
or losing, depending on their degree of power. Participants who have more power 
may get more opportunity to ensure the success of "their own purposes". 
Many definitions of power involve the ability of one individual to overcome 
resistance in achieving a desired result (House, 1988; Pfeffer, 1981 ), or the ability to 
affect outcomes or get things done (Mintzberg, 1983; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977), or 
the capacity of individuals to exm their wills {Finkelstein, 1992). All those 
definitions are consistent with Mechanic ( 1962) who defines power as "any force that 
results in behaviour which would not have occurred if the force had not been present" 
(p.351 ). 
Sources of power. French and Raven (1959) were the first to specify homogeneous 
groups, or "bases" of resources, which an individual might employ in a power 
relationship. They identified six sources of power - coercive, reward, legitimate, 
referent, expert and information. Coercive power is S's ability to mediate punishment 
on R. Reward power is S's ability to mediate rewards for R. The ability of an 
individual to produce punishments as well as rewards for others gives that individual 
an additional source of power. Legitimate power is most often related to the formal 
position of the individual and may also be labelled as authority. When a unit manager 
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depends on other unit managers, the result is a potential source of power for the other 
unit managers. 
A distinction of sources of power is often made between structural and individual 
source of power (Brass and Burkhardt, 1993; French and Raven, 1959, Mechanic, 
1962). Structural sources of power reflect the properties of a social system rather than 
the particular attributes of individual. There are two kinds of structural sources of 
power that serve as a basis for the exercise of power - formal (hierarchical level) and 
informal (network position). The power related to a hierarchical level in organisation 
is often referred to as authority or legitimate power. It means that top management is 
more powerful than lower management. For example, chief executive officer - CEO is 
usually the most powerful member of the organisation (Mintzberg, 1983 ). Finkelstein 
(1992) presents evidence that top managers (e.g. boards of directors as representatives 
of a firm's shareholders) play a dominant power in strategic decision making. 
On the other hand, individual sources of power reflect the attributes of the individual 
concerned, such as experience, seniority, education, and professional activity (French 
and Raven, 1959; and ·�·ushman and Romanelli, 1983) or ability and skill (Brass and 
Burkhardt, 1993). Individuals differ in these attributes and willingness to use them to 
acquire and exercise power. Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978) stated that the power of 
an individual manager results from superior knowledge and skill in optimum co­
ordination and/or operating methods. Individuals holding a power advantage display 
higher levels of perceived self-efficacy and are more likely to perceive unequal 
outcomes as fair ( Stolte, 1983; Hegtvedt, 1990). 
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Several studies have indicated that there is a strong influence of political power on 
budget decisions. For example Pfeffer and Salancik ( 1978) investigated the 
relationship between decision making as political process and budget allocation using 
the sample of a single university, the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, 
during the period 1958 to I 970. They found a significant relationship between budget 
allocation and a department's power. Powerful units would want to be represented on 
the committees that would provide additional power for the sub-unit because the 
committees have control over the allocation of resources. By participating in the 
process of budget allocation bargaining, those committee members wi11 influ.!nce 
committee decisions in favour of their own sub-unit. In this arena, they engage in 
political activity to overcome resistance to the achievement of their own unit's 
interest. Based on their study, Pfeffer and Salancik conclude that budget allocation is 
a product of political process. Furthermore, Pfeffer and Moore ( 1980) replicated and 
extended Pfeffer and Salancik's ( 1974) work in a study on budgeting allocation in two 
universities instead of one, as in the prior study. Their results confonn to the findings 
of the previous study. 
Hackman {1985) conducted a study designed to produce understanding of political 
power among intra-organisational units (see also Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974) in 
colleges and universities. His study focused on how power influences decision 
making for budget allocation in six universities, especiaily critical decisions about 
resource allocation to academic departments and non-academic offices. He defined 
power as the strength of a unit's influence within an organisation, as demonstrated by 
institutional and environmental power. Institutional power is the unit's relative 
influence within the organisation. 
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The variables of institutional power examined in the study were potentially related to 
internal institutional power: historical power within the institution, length of time in 
the institution, visibility within the organisation, visibility outside the institution, 
visibility with the board of trustees, number of full-time equivalent employees, 
percentage of faculty relative to managerial and professional staff, number of students 
serviced, interaction with central administration, number of times monthly that unit 
director talks with central administration, support of president, ease of direct access to 
president, support of dean or director, and legal commitments from the institution. 
Environmental power is the ability of a unit to t-ring in outside resources that are 
critically needed by the institution. A unit realises this form of power wher1 the rest of 
the institution recognises both the organisation's motivational investment in the 
resources that the unit can acquire and relative ability of the unit to bring in needed 
resources from the environment. The v nriables of environmental power consist of 
student recruitment and retention, faculty recruitment and retention, recruitment and 
retention of other expertise, prestige, ability to cope with current societal needs and 
problems, overall outside financial support, foundation support, business and industry 
support, alumni support, community support, state support, and state legislature 
support. He found a positive and significant effect of institutional and environmental 
power in budget allocation. In other words, respondents with high-high scores on both 
institutional and environmental power indices were budgetary gainers, and all but one 
of the low-low were losers. Even though Hackman ( 1985) followed a somewhat 
different methodology from that of Salancik and Pfeffer (1974), the findings of both 
studies regarding the role of environmental power in budget allocation are consistent. 
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l.5.3. The Role of Politics in the Process of Budgetary Control 
As discussed in the section 2.5.2, a budget is created by a political process. 
Individuals within the organisation act to me �t specific goals for their individual units, 
then they spend much time and effort on the attainment of sr,ecific goais rather than 
being concerned with how to achieve the overall organisational objectives (Etzoni, 
1961). As a result, managers tend to be reluctant to use budget information and 
develop networking to seek other information from various resources either from their 
own individual unit's reports (CovaJesky and Dirsmith, 1986; Marginson, 1999) or 
from informal information (Mintzberg, 1973; Bruns and Williams, 1993). 
As discussed before, the economic theory holds the view that in a firm in which the 
subordinate has better inf01mation than the superior, a participation-based 
management control system allows the subordinate to reveal or communicate some of 
his OWi! private information which may then be incorporated into the standard or 
budget against which his actual performance is evaluated. In practice, although the 
budgeting process will al!ow the subordinate's information to be incorporated into his 
performance evaluation system, one important difficulty with this process is that the 
subordinate may not communicate all of his information to the superior or may not 
communicate it honestly in favour of "budget function" (Baiman and Evans, 1983). 
Unit managers participate in the budgeting process by communicating information 
regarding their local environment purposes to their superiors. Thus, each unit manager 
can focus entirely on activities within his unit without concern for how his decisions 
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affect to other units or entirely organisation (Christensen, 1982; Kanodia, 1993). As a 
result, managers tend to obtain infonnation from other reports as a basis for 
communication with their superiors, to control their activities, and to evaluate their 
managerial performance. Therefore they refute the influence of organiliational control 
mechanisms on the basis of budget reports. 
In a study of nationalised jute mills of Bangladesh, Mia ( 1995) conducted a 
questionnaire survey of managers and a series of interviews with key personnel of the 
organisation. Mia attempted to explore how the managers were involved in the 
budgeting process within their organisation. He indicated that managers were highly 
dissatisfied with various aspects of the budget reports such as flexibility, timeliness, 
usefulness, and motivation. He also found that most managers pay little attention to 
budget as a control instrument in the organisation. However, even though managers 
do not recognise the role of budgeting, they still need some parts of the budget reports 
to obtain information about available resources in their budget (Preston, 1986). 
Otley and Berry ( 1980) have mentioned the influence of political power in the process 
of budgetary control, saying that individuals exercise their political power in 
maintaining their own individual aspirations, purposes, and bcuefs during the process 
of budget control, both in the vertical interaction between superior and subordinate or 
vice versa and in the horizontal interaction among superiors or subordinates. Apart 
from the process of budget setting, the fact that the political process also appears in 
the process of budgetary control has been mentioned by some studies. 
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Marginson ( 1999) pointed out that managers appeared to treat budget information as 
one part of an information jigsaw. He said managers did not view budget information 
as an instrument for controlling their own activities or for co-ordinating with others 
( 1999). Instead, they tended to reflect their needs and purposes by looking for "fresh 
information". 
Covaleski and Dirsmith ( 1986) conclude that Managers act on the basis of the 
influence being exerted by social (politics) rather than administrative control (budget) 
for monitoring subordinates' performances. They conducted extensive research on the 
budgeting process. They investigated the relationship between this process and 
managerial roles by interviewing fifty nursing managers (hereafter, NMs) who are 
responsible for budgets in six hospitals. They found that NMs have no political gain 
by relying on budgets when they perform controlling activities, because they lack 
lrnowledge, skills, and information t0 analyse and interpret their units' budget 
variance reports. Therefore, they prefer to use reports based on their units' operation 
because they have strong knowledge and skills to support their arguments in 
controlling their units' activities. Thus, they gain power by using those reports rather 
than the budget report. 
Amey (1979) has mentioned inconsistencies in the objectives of budgetary control. 
Amey identicates that the objective of budget control, based on accounting literature, 
is to equalise deviations (variances) from iniemal norms (budget targets, standards) 
which are not the results of an optimisation (as a product of politics see Pfeffer and 
Salancik. I 978; Pfeffer and Moore, 1980; and Hackman, 1985), either by taking 
corrective action on mismatch information or, where this is not feasible or impossible, 
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by adapting the norms (revising the budget). More precisely, the aim is to keep 
deviations within a certain range. In practice, the objective of budgetary control is 
often less systematic than this. For instance, deviations on revenue items are seldom 
analysed, and the investigation of cost deviations is often asymmetric, being confined 
to adverse deviations. 
Kanodia (1993) posits that participative budgets emerge endogenously as an optimal 
co-ordination mechanism when unit managers share their private information about 
their operating environments with the superior in order to have an optimal budget 
allocation. Such participative budgets can contribute to internal task understanding, 
help co-ordinate functional activities and provide a benchmark for skill and 
knowledge, against which subsequent performance can be evaluated. However, 
Kanodia's' findings contradict the view that co-ordination activity is best achieved by 
rewarding each unit manager on the basis of achievement of budget targets. 
Previous studies have mentioned the gap between theory and practice m budget 
implementation. Based on the prior studies, it appears that the reasons for this gap 
might be categorised as follows: first, the budgeting system is not well matched to 
operational activities. The budget focuses only on financial results and further, it does 
not necessarily pay sufficient attention to means of controlling current internal unit 
performance. Some aspects of performance which are relieved by unit managers to be 
key indicators may not be obtained from the budget, the level of measurement 
available in the budget is inadequate or distorts the attainment of operational targets 
being measured (Otley, 1999; Vaivio, 1999). Second, unit managers and superiors are 
not convinced of the advantages of using the budget to control their activities and 
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performance. They tend to strive for their own particular purposes, aspirations, and 
goals based on their preferred reports (Hopwood, 1976; Pfeffer, 1981; Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1986; Otley, 1999). Furthermore, they may find the budget too technically 
complex to utilise, since they lack the required knowledge and training. (Comerford 
and Abernethy, 1999; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1986). Finally, unit managers 
frequently do not understand each other's job requirements and targets, thus the 
budget cannot apply as a mechanism of control in respect to organisational objectives. 
Achievement of budget targets may play an important role in budgetary control, 
because the budget represents standards of both effectiveness and efficiency. A 
budget represents a standard of effectiveness insofar as it specifies a set of desired 
outputs and a standard of efficiency to the extent that it details the inputs deemed 
necessary to produce the specified output. Data on the budget's actual performance 
may then be used as a yardstick for comparison with the budget standard to evaluate 
certain dimensions of managerial performance. The fact is that a budgetary system 
may not be designed primarily as a means of performance evaluation (Preston, 1986; 
Anderson, 1984; Daft and Macintosh, 1987) even though there is evidence to suggest 
that it is often used for that purpose, whether formally sanctioned or not (Hopwood, 
1976; Hofstede, 1968). Due to the fact that information fr0m budget performance 
provides only quant\tative information that is used as a basis for performance 
evaluation, it is lik,;ly that the effects of such use will predominate in determining 
how a manager responds to the budget performance (Lukka, 1988; Otley, i 978). 
Hayes ( 1977) examined the accuracy and importance of the role of financial data in 
performance evaluat10n in production, research and development and marketing units. 
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He concluded that budgets might be relatively poor indicators of performance 
evaluation effectiveness, especially in marketing units, because financial measures are 
poor surrogates for entire set of particular interest factors which influence unit 
performance. 
Organisations tend to emphasise non-budget indicators to evaluate unit performance. 
In a study of the operation of management co11trol systems in a large nationalised jute 
mill in Bangladesh, Hoque and Hopper ( 1994) found that mill managers did not use 
the budget as important vehicle in controlling their activities. The mill managers used 
a variety of social/informal control mechanisms to cope with the complexity and 
uncertainty around their operations, but budget data was not a dominant mode of 
control in the organisation. Hoque and Hopper also found that there are no bonuses 
tied to the manager's achievement of budget targets and no retribution was taken 
against any manager who failed to achieve the �udget targets. Moreover, promotion of 
managers was not related to their record in budget achievement. 
As Meyer (1982) pointed out that the organisations develop the performance 
indicators based on internal value and external value. Internal value is characterised 
by efficiency such as profit, cash flow, customer satisfaction, and quality satisfaction. 
Economic indicators characterise external value, for example stability of distribution, 
price, social contribution, and specific tasks. Meyer (1982:53) found "hospitals whose 
members liken their organisations to human beings appear more consistent to 
outsiders than hospitals whose members liken their organisations to businesses or 
machines". 
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Other studies indicate that top executive management prefers to use external, rather 
than internal, measurement indicators to scr .'e their own interests. For example, 
Kurunmaki ( 1999) found that top executives reject the use of budgetary control as the 
main measure of the level of efficiency for evaluating the competition base of health 
care organisations. She conducted extensive interviews and observations in one 
university hospital and two central hospitals in Finland. She saw that hospital 
representatives were showing little motivation to set up competition between hospital 
institutions based solely on economic incentives. In the word of Kurunmaki: 
. . . . . a competition-based reallocation of resources between central hospitals the 
strong influence of local politics on health care decision making. The municipal 
politicians, in their dual roles of purchase agents and owners of health care 
organisations, were seen as having little motivation to set up competition between 
hospit.11 institutions based solely on economic incentives. Contrary to the basic idea 
of market based resource redistribution. it was thought that local decision-makers 
never fully accepted the idea of health care institutions as independent accounting 
entities which would be assessed on the basis of their financial efficiency. Instead, 
wider concerns relating to regional politics (such as the economic influence of 
transferring the labour-intensive health industry to other areas, and the subsequent 
loss of local tax income) as well as various kinds of non-financial issues" (pp. I 08-
109). 
2.6. Theoretical Development 
Individuals who are enthusiastically involved in the process of budgetary participation 
present their own particular interests - purposes, aspirations, beliefs. The interests of 
each individual are rarely one and the same with the interests of the organisation. 
They do not view budget participation as a means of employing their managerial 
roles: rather, they tend to view the budget as an instrument for the promotion of their 
particular interests. Individual managers act in self-int�est and further, their choices 
will reflect only the criteria and preferences, those that are compatible with their own 
objectives. They are not concerned with economic efficiencies and view the 
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budgeting process would facilitate these efficiencies. They develop budgP.ts that are 
inconsistent with each other, since each is likely to use the budgets as a means of 
furthering their own aspirations, purposes and beliefs. Individuals strive to articulate 
the desirability of particular decisions and actions that are relevant to local own 
objectives, rather than creating a basis for communication and interchange of 
information to understand the task, task interdependency, and overall organisational 
objectives. 
Differences in interests � aspirations. purposes, and beliefs over the objectives of a 
budget trigger conflicts of interest. The bargaining process is used as a mechanism to 
solve conflicts of interest. The bargain form is to protect and improve their vested 
interests in the budgets, until an acceptable final budget is produced. Basically, 
individual managers may have competing reasons to influence the budget committee 
in getting their desired budgets. The dominant bargain is the one that has the power to 
affect the budget decision. 
The existence of various interests and a bargaining process leads to the use of political 
power. It is very difficult to have a possible agreement among individual managers on 
preference outcomes, bargains wrestle in a power struggle. The power of individual 
managers determines significantly the final budget. In the bargaining process, 
therefore, each individual managers exercise their political power to get desired 
budget consonant with their own interests. The role of political power as a dominant 
factor to get the desired budget has been mentioned by prior studies (e.g. Pfeffer and 
Salancik, l 974; Pfeffer, 1981; Schilt and Locke, 1982). 
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Similarly, the process of budgetary control bears a political process in which unit 
managers do not view budget information as an instrument of control for evaluating 
their activities and rewarding their performance. Unit managers develop criteria in 
favour of their own units where these criteria tend to be inconsistent with the budget 
objectives. They select the parameters of performance criteria that will support the 
achievement of their unit objectives. Basical1y. the performance criteria for each unit 
are not the same because each unit builds performance criteria based on its interests 
and preferences (Marginson, 1999; Newman et al., 1989; Pfeffer, 1981; and 
Mintzberg, 1972) in which it tends to be deviant to each other. Therefore divergent of 
performance criteria is inevitable within an organisation. For example, the specific 
goals pursued by the various units are different, with the marketing unit is iPterested 
in sales maximisation, whereas the finance unit is interested in increasing profit and 
cash flow. In evaluating and rewarding their unit performance, managers expect to 
emphasise their own criteria based on the technical side of their units operations. 
As a result, the attainment of budget targets does not relate to the performance 
evaluation and reward system because unit managers view that the budget contains 
financial measurement only without sufficient consideration of their unit operational 
objectives. Consequently, their aim is to acquire more power by using other 
performance criteria instead of the criteria frorr the budget variance reports 
(Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1986). 
On the basis of the above discussions, it is concluded that managers of necessity have 
to resort to political means in the budgeting process to maintain their own criteria in 
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PhD Thesis Chapter 2 
evaluating and rewarding for their units. The theoretical framework of the study can 
be seen in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: 
Theoretical Framework of the Moderating Effect of Politics 
on the Relationship between Budgeting Process and Managerial Roles 
Political Dimensions 
Differences in aspiration, 
purpose, and belief 
Conflict of 
Interests 
Bargaining Process 
Rely on sources of Power: 
Structural and individual 
Politics 
(Moderating.variable) 
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A moderated regression analysis was used to determine the interaction effects (Cohen 
and Cohen, 1983; Arnold, 1982;1984; Champoux and Peters, 1987; Hartmann and 
Moers, I 999) between budgeting process and politics on managerial roles. Two-way 
interactive models were applied to examine the main effect and interaction effects for 
the independent variables. To investigate the effect of structural power, this study 
conducts "split-file", department operations were coded I and otherwise 0. Similarly, 
co investigate the effect of individual power, the study coded 1 for high individual unit 
manager's qualification and O for otherwise. The relationship between the variables as 
shown in the following models: 
Direct and Moderating Effect: 
Y = !3o + f31 X1 + 132 X2 + !33 X1X2 + E 
Structural and Individual Power: 
Y1 = !3o + 131 X1 + 132 X2 + !33 X1X2 + E 
Y2 = f3o + !31X1 +!32X2+!33X1X2 + E 
(I) 
( la) 
(lb) 
Where Y is managerial roles, X 1 is budgetary participation or budgetary 
communication or budgetary control or budgetary evaluation or budgetary evaluation, 
X2 is politics, X1X2 is interaction effect, and Y1 is operation departments/high 
individual unit manager's qualification, Y 2 is non-operation departments/low 
individual unit manager's qualification, and E is the error tenns. 
Equation I is used to analyse the rnam effect, and two-way interaction effects 
whereas equation I a and I b are used to analyse the comparison two-way interaction 
effects on managerial roles based on structural and individual power. 
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2. 7. Hypotheses Development 
From the above discussions, it is obvious that politics has a significant influence on 
the process of budgetary participation. The process of budgetary participation is 
viewed as a political process in which outcomes are a function of the balancing of 
various interests, conflict, bargain, and power vectors. The processing of interests and 
the generation of support are the principal components of the political process through 
which power is wielded. The final budget decision will evolve out of the processes of 
power mobilisation attempted by each individual in support of their own interests. 
These interests are generated in the context of political behaviour, where individuals 
differ in interests - purpose, aspiration and belief compete to get budget allocation. 
The success of individual interest is mainly based on the individuals' ability to 
exercise their political power. 
This study tries to investigate the budgeting process in certain state owned enterprises 
of Indonesia: public sector fertiliser manufacturing enterprises, in which, it is 
suspected, the process of budgetary participation does not work properly. Unit 
managers of sampled companies involved in the process of budgetary participation are 
mainly to fulfil the requirement of the Government. The Government regulates the 
state owned enterprises (SOE's) through a decree of the Ministry of Finance 
No.12/1998. Under this regulation, all the SOE's are regulated to provide one budget 
plan to the Government. Furthermore, the Government through the decree of Ministry 
of State Owned Enterprises (No: Kep-88/M-PBUMN/1999) provides general planning 
and control system for the SOE's; the guidnnce of budget formulation of the SOE's, 
for example, (see Bachtiar, 1999). 
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The companies will get a penalty if they do not submit their budget plans on a timely 
basis to the government through the Ministry of State Owned Enterprises. The 
companies are unable to get aid or/and facilities from the Government, for example 
subsidies and soft loans. Moreover, the budget formulation is often deteriorated by the 
external factors which do not relate directly with the line of organisational business 
and these factors also tend to inconsistent with the organisational objectives. 
The Indonesian government, for example the Minister of Agriculture, oft.en intervenes 
over the budget targets. The Ministry of Agriculture tends to become a dominant 
player in the budget dee. .un because it has to execute the Agricultural Development 
Program in order to be self sufficient in food production (see also Bachtiar, 1999). 
Other motivations of individuals involved in the process of budgetary participation are 
to share experiences with each other regardless of mechanisms of exchange 
information for coordinating functional activities or attaining the organisational 
objectives. 
Unit managers are also interested to attend the budget meeting especially in 
accomplishing the budget plan because they gain substantial incentives from the 
organisation. Moreover, unit managers are interested to attend the budget meeting 
because they have to maintain their interests on proposed budget. If they do not come 
in the budget meeting, not only they might lose the incentive but also their budgets 
might be sacrificed in the budget allocation decision. The briefs of companies can be 
seen in the section 5. l. Based on the foregoing discussion, the following hypotheses 
are formulated: 
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HI : There is a significant relationship between budgetary participation and 
managerial roJes 
H2: There is a significant relationship between budgetary communication and 
managerial roles. 
H3: The relationship between budgetary participation and managerial roles is 
moderated by politics. 
H4: The relationship between budgetary communication and managerial roles 1s 
moderated by politics. 
The process of budgetary control is a political process, in which managers do not view 
budget information as a control instrument for their own activities or for co-ordinating 
with others. They have no political gain in using the budget variance reports. Instead 
they tend to look to other reports that reflect their needs and purposes in attaining the 
unit's operational targets. However, individual managers still need the budget reports 
to maintain information about their legitimate resources that might be available in the 
budget. The budget deviates from the ideology of efficiency becanse each individual 
struggles to use all budget resources, whether they really need to use them or not. 
Furthermore, the attainment of budget targets does not relate to the performance 
evaluation and reward system, because the budget focuses only on financial 
measurement without sufficient emphasis on unit operation. 
In the context of state owned enterprises of Indonesia, when managers control their 
activities, they do not base it on an in-depth analysis of the budget variance reports. 
Managers and superiors still need the budget variance reports but treat them merely as 
formalities. They tend to use information from the operating reports of their units 
because they understand those better. This also leads to a lack of emphasis on the 
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budget variance reports in controlling the overall organis�tional goals. In addition, 
the budgeting system as management control device could not be applied since the 
Board of Directors often changes the organisational targets (Bachtiar, 1999). As a 
result, the budget plan has to be revised as well. On the other hand, the fertiJiser 
manufacturing industry is in the public sector of Indonesia where evaluation of 
performance and reward are not based on budget achievement (Bachtiar, 1999). 
Managers tend to be forced to use measurement indicators based on their unit's 
operations rather than budget performance for evaluating subunit's performance and 
subordinates' reward. In addition, superiors use measurement indicators based vn 
their purposes and intentions instead of budget performance. However, managers and 
superiors still need the budgeting report merely to maintain information about budget 
resources available for them. 
The above discussion is the basis for the following hypotheses: 
HS: There is a significant relationship between budgetary control and managerial 
roles. 
HSa: There is a significant relationship between budgetary monitoring and managerial 
roles. 
H5b: There is a significant relationship between budgetary evaluation and managerial 
roles. 
H6: The relationship between budgetary control and managerial roles is moderated by 
politics. 
H6a: The relationship between budgetary monitoring and managerial roles 1s 
moderated by politics. 
H6b: The relationship between budgetary evaluation and managerial roles is 
moderated by politics. 
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CHAPTER3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the research design, the data collection procedures, and the 
measurement of variables. The chapter comprises five sections. Section one presents 
the data collection procedures. Section two discusses response rates. Other 
methodological issues are discussed in section three. Variable measurement is 
described in section four. Finally, section five describes the statistical analysis 
methods which are employed. 
3.1. Data Collection 
This study uses a mixed methodology. Both quantitative and qualitative techniques 
have been used to obtain data in the study. Hussey and Hussey (1997) note that 
"quantitative and qualitative approaches to data collection present a mixture of 
advantages ...... "(p.151 ). Each method can be greatly strengthened by appealing to 
the unique qualities of the other. Formal hypothesis testing is based on quantitative 
data. This is supplemented by an analysis of qualitative data obtained through 
structured interviews. This, it is believed, will provide more reliable conclusions and 
add further insight into the relationship between the variables of interest. 
- 75 -
3.1.1 Survey Questionnaire 
Data for the study was collected by a survey questionnaire, which was sent to a 
sample of managers who had budget responsibilities. Four of the five large state 
owned enterprises (SOE's) oflndonesia engaged in the fertiliser industry are included 
in the study. The selection of companies was based on their willingness to participate 
and make data available. According to Sekaran (2000), "convenience sampling 
involves collecting information from members of the population who are conveniently 
available to provide it" (277). In addition, this sector also has some of the largest 
companies in the country, involving significant formal budgeting activities. 
The study used only middle managers as respondents for questionnaire based research 
in attaining homogeneous respondents but used middle managers and senior managers 
as respondents for interview based research in attaining wider desired information. 
These respondents were selected because they are in a position to provide information 
about the influence of politics in the budgeting process. As Sekaran (2000) notes 
"judgment sampling involves the choice of subjects who are in the best position to 
provide the information required" (p.278). 
Two hundred and fifty questionnaires were sent to middle managers of these 
companies who have budget responsibilities and are, therefore, frequently engaged in 
the politics of the budgetary process. Respondents were chosen from a variety of 
functional areas within the companies, including accounting, finance, marketing, 
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operation, engineering, research and development, corporate secretarial and internal 
control. 
The questionnaire was distributed through the companies' internal mailing systems. 
Accompanying each questionnaire was a covering letter explaining the research, an 
endorsement letter from top management encouraging participation in the study, and 
written instructions from the researcher for completing the questionnaire. 
Respondents were asked to complete the questionnaire independently and to return the 
questionnaire directly to the researcher in postage-paid return envelops. These 
procedures are similar to Sekaran's (2000) and were aimed at obtaining a better 
response rate. 
The questionnaire was initially constructed in English, and then translated into 
Indonesian. Since the questionnaire is bilingual, translation fidelity is an issue. As 
noted by Sekaran (2000): 
"Certain special issues need to be addressed while designing instruments for 
collecting data from different countries. Since different languages are spoken in 
different countries, it is important to ensure that the translation of the instrument to 
the local language is equivalent to the original language in which the instrument 
was developed" (p.242). 
To control this issue, a "blind" translator back translated the Indonesian version of the 
questionnaire into English, and then results of this translation were compared with the 
original English version by a "blind" judge to assess translation fidelity. The "blind" 
judge stated that the results of the translations were considered to be fair. These 
procedures are similar to those suggested and employed by Sekaran (2000), Adler 
(1984), Breslin (1980) and Ellis (1989). 
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3.1.2 Survey Interview 
The interview method is a technique of accessing respondent's perceptions, meanings, 
and definitions of situations and construction of reality. Punch ( 1998) notes, "the 
point of interview method is to look at something holistically and comprehensively, to 
study it in its complexity, and to understand it in its context. These points correspond 
to three common criticisms of quantitative social research: that it is too reductionist in 
its approach to the study of behaviour, thereby losing sight of the whole picture; that it 
over-simplifies social reality in its stress on measurement and that it strips away 
context from the data" (p.192). Therefore, the interview approach is useful as a way of 
conveying the full picture of the study by balancing the shortcomings of the 
quantitative approach. 
The researcher personally interviewed a total of forty managers, including middle 
managers and senior managers. All respondents were from the four sample companies 
and they represented several departments such as engineering, operation, marketing, 
finance and human resources. According to Sekaran (2000), "the interviewer should 
not rely on memory, because information recalled from memory is imprecise and 
often likely to be incorrect. Furthermore, if more than one interview is scheduled for 
the day, the amount of information received increases, as do possible sources of error 
in recalling from memory as to who said what" (p.229). Therefore, the researcher 
recorded the interviews on tape with permission of the respondents. In addition, since 
the respondents of the study do not speak English, the researcher used the local 
language to collect information from interviewees and then translated the results into 
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English usmg an expert. The researcher used the local language for conducting 
interviews in order to control the language problem, as noted by Punnett and Shenkar 
(1996). They stated: 
"Not only is there a problem with concepts having different meanings in different 
cultures, but there is the problem of people not being comfortable using English. If they 
are not comfortable, respondents either restrict themselves to short answers, depriving 
the researcher of much valuable information, or withdraw from the research because 
they do not want to be embarrassed. This withdrawal introduces another source of error, 
because those who are fluent in English may have different attitudes and behaviours 
than those who are not. There is also the probability of misunderstanding. A third 
source of error is that one also thinks differently in a different language, and a 
researcher may get subtly different answers to questions, depending on the language in 
which they are asked" (p.73). 
3.1.2.1 Rationality for Using Interview Method 
Nachmias and Nachmias (1987) stated that there are four limitations of questionnaire 
based research, namely, it requires simple questions, no opportunity for probes, no 
control over who fills out the questionnaire, and a low response rate. Given these 
shortcomings of questionnaire-based research, a structured interview was the primary 
means of data collection to support the analysis of survey findings. The interviews 
were undertaken in an effort to get more information to cover the limitations of 
questionnaire-based research. More specifically the study used the interview method -
to gain a richer insight into the phenomenon of interest, the role of politics on the 
budgeting process is a sensitive topic, and the interview method provides flexibility. 
Gain richer insight into the phenomenon of interest. Several researchers have 
noted that while questionnaires are a very efficient method for gathering data, the 
information they provide lacks the richness of data that may be gathered from either 
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structured or unstructured interviews (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Franklin and 
Osborne, 1971; Snow and Thomas, 1990). Interviews provide a more "real" basis for 
analysis and interpretation: some researchers have suggested that attempts to gain 
qualitative insights through interviews can be especially useful in examining 
phenomena that are not well understood and for which there is not an established line 
of research to structure investigations (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Duncan, 1979; 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Martin and Turner, 1986). 
According to Sekaran (2000), " one method of collecting data is to review 
respondents to obtain information on the issues of interest" (p.222). The role of 
politics in the budgeting process would seem to be an ideal phenomenon for 
investigation by a researcher doing an interview. Because early research on the role of 
politics on the budgeting process was based primarily on qualitative analyses of cases 
of particular companies in government agencies, the ideas emanating from this early 
work have not led to a growing, cumulative body of empirical research. While this 
lack of progress may be due to the models and methodologies used by earlier 
researchers, it may also stem from a basic lack of understanding of the phenomenon 
of the political context in the budgeting process. That understanding could, perhaps, 
be refined or improved through quantitative and qualitative insight into the topic of 
this study. 
It was thought that qualitative data collected through interviews could be used to 
supplement and clarify the quantitative analyses of the study and thus, provide greater 
insight into the relevant issues (such as political power in budget allocation decisions). 
The qualitative findings may also be useful in providing details that support the 
quantitative results. 
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Influence of politics on budgeting process is a sensitive topic. The role of politics 
on the budgeting process is a sensitive topic for most firms, and it was thought that the 
interview method would better alleviate any reservations participants might have. In 
this study, there was a distinct possibility that managers' reservations would be 
heightened by the nature of the questions being asked. For example, questions about 
the role of politics on the budgeting process may evoke memories of decisions that 
were unpleasant for participants. Hence, it was concluded that the interview method 
would be the best way to overcome possible resistance for several reasons. For 
example, an interview can help overcome possible resistance, as the field researcher 
can tactfully bring to the surface information on emotionally charged issues through 
careful follow-up questions. Indeed, it was observed that in the first few minutes of 
several interviews the respondents would provide only very short answers to certain 
questions because they seemed dubious of opening up and telling their story. In all 
instances, this was overcome through continued and timely use of follow-up questions 
interspersed with occasional reminders of the confidentiality of their answers. Such 
probing and reassurances are obviously impracticable using a survey technique2 • 
Another reason is that there was some precedent for the effective use of the interview 
method as a data collection tool in similar circumstances. Covaleski and Dirsmith 
(1986, 1988) utilized structured interviews and were very effective in examining the 
influence of political power in the budgeting process, which is also a sensitive issue 
with many negative connotations about the meaning of politics from respondents. 
2 In this study, the researcher developed the qualitative questions based on the questionnaire's 
questions. 
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Interview method provides flexibility. According to Nachmias and Nachmias 
( 1987), "interview allows greater flexibility in the questioning process where 
interview approach allows the interviewer to determine the wording of the questions, 
to clarify terms that are unclear, to control the order in which the questions are 
presented, and to probe for additional and more detailed information" (p.240). Hence, 
the interview allows the researcher to clarify questions that otherwise would be left up 
to the interpretation of the respondent. 
Whi.le many questions on a survey questionnaire can be worded so that a respondent 
needs to make as little interpretation as possible, careful wording cannot anticipate all 
the unique organisational circumstances that allow respondents to interpret questions 
differently. Given that some of this study's questions could have multiple 
interpretations and that the answers to certain questions were extremely important 
(such as questions on involvement in the process of budgetary participation), the 
interview method appeared to be a sound means of covering possible weaknesses in 
the questionnaire method of data collection. Another reason for backing up the 
questionnaire with an interview is that managers are very busy people, and from the 
inception of this data collection, there was substantial doubt that managers would 
have enough time to carefully complete a detailed mail questionnaire. 
The interview method was thought likely to generate more interest and commitment 
for two reasons. First, it places less burden on the respondent because he or she does 
not have to read, interpret and respond to a lengthy list of questions, but can instead 
respond to the interviewer's queries with the story of the company's budgeting 
process. Second, it was thought likely to heighten respondents' commitment to this 
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study. Because appointments were specially arranged, both respondents and the 
researcher dedicated a block of time to the process, so a friendlier, more relaxed 
atmosphere was generated during the interviews. 
3.2. Response Rates 
Low response rates to questionnaires can seriously damage the validity of survey­
based generalisation. Babbie (1979) considers "a response rate of at least 50 percent 
adequate" (p.335), while Neuman (1994) stated that "most researchers consider 
anything below 50 percent to be poor and over 90 percent as excellent" (p.238). In 
this study, a relatively high response rate was expected because the questionnaire 
distribution was handled through the company's internal mailing system under a 
covering letter from top management encouraging co-operation in the study. 
In addition, careful application of survey improvement techniques was instigated to 
reduce non-respondents to the lowest level attainable within existing financial and 
temporal constraints. Crohan and Lowe ( 1981) concluded that an "optimal mailing 
strategy uses third class postage on the sending envelopes and a business reply permit 
on the return envelope" (p.130). Fox, Crask, and Kim (1988) supported this 
conclusion. They said that a better response rate might be obtained if first-class 
stamps and deadlines are used on all of the correspondence. The cover letter asked 
participants to return the questionnaire within twenty working days. In addition, first­
class stamps were used for the return of the questionnaire. Subjects were provided 
with a reasonably complete description of the research project and a statement of the 
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expected benefits. The above procedure resulted in 191 questionnaires being returned 
by the participants, yielding a 76.40% response rate. 
From the 191 returns, a total of 14 responses were excluded from the study because of 
incomplete questionnaires and or their relevance to the study was limited due to the 
lack of experience in budget setting. Thus finally, the study used 177 responses 
(70.80%) in the data analysis. 
3.3. Other Methodological Issues. 
This section deals with certain concerns about the administration and design of the 
questionnaire and analysis of the data. A discussion of the major issues follows: 
3.3.1 Bias in Questions 
Bias in questions may occur for several reasons. Alreck and Settle ( 1985) stated that 
response bias of questions occurs "when bias is introduced because of the mentality of 
participants of respondents (p.112)". Therefore, this study considered seven types of 
question bias: double-barrelled questions, ambiguous questions, recall-dependent 
questions, leading questions, loaded questions, social desirability, extremity, and 
ordering of questions. 
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3.3.1.1 Double-Barrelled Questions. 
A double-barrelled question refers to a question that lends itself to different possible 
responses to its sub-parts (Sekaran, 2001 ). Questions should be avoided that introduce 
multiple concepts and do not have a single answer: it is better to ask two or more 
separate questions instead (Sekaran, 2001; Neuman, 1994; and Sudman and Bradburn, 
1982). Take, for example, the question "Do you think that the budgeting process is 
useful for your unit?" This question would be likely to confuse respondents and result 
in an ambiguous response because they might assume that the budgeting process is 
only useful for their units in budget setting, but is not useful in budget monitoring or 
budget evaluation. In this case, it would be better to ask three questions: (1) Do you 
think that participating in budget setting can assist your unit? (2) Do you think that 
budget variance reports are useful in controlling your unit? (3) Do you think that 
budget performance is a factor in evaluating your unit performance? Separating the 
questions and avoiding double-barrelled questions should prevent confusing the 
respondents. This study, therefore, separates the examination of the role of politics on 
the budgeting process into three analyses: the role of politics on the budgetary 
participation, budgetary monitoring, and budgetary evaluation. 
3.3.1.2 Ambiguous Questions 
Even if the questionnaire does not contain double-barrelled questions, it might contain 
ambiguous wording, therefore the respondents might not be exactly sure of the 
question's meaning (Sekaran, 2001). Take for example the question "Are you happy 
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with your budget plan?" A manager, as the unit's representative, might be unsure as to 
whether the question refers to him/her alone or to the overall unit. The questions in 
this study are clearly wonted so as to make it plain that they refer to the individual, 
rather than the group. 
3.3.1.3 Recall-Dependent Questions 
According to Sekaran (2001 ) ... some questions might require respondents to recall 
experiences from the past that are hazy in their memory. Answers to such questions 
might have bias" (p.238) For instance. if a n:'<ipondent who is not the unit's manager 
was asked to explai,1 the budgeting process within a unit. he may not be able to give 
correct explanations. To address this situation in this study only respondents holding a 
current position as a manager were included in the survey. 
3.3.1.4 Leading Questions 
Sekaran (200 I) stated that "questions should not be phrased in such a way that they 
lead the respondents to give the responses that the researcher would like or want them 
to give" (p.238 see also Neuman, 1994. p.228 ). T akc for example the question "Don't 
you think that in planning the cost reduction program. managers should agree to cut 
their salaries?". By asking such a questicm. the researcher is signs.Hing and pressuring 
respondents to say "yes". Labelling the question to introduce the idea of cutting their 
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salaries might de-motivate managers to implemeilt such program. ln this study, care 
was taken to avoid leading questions in the questionnaire. 
3.3.1.5 Loaded Questions 
One type C'f bias in questions occurs when the questions are phrased man emotionally 
charge; manner (Sekaran, 2001 ). An example of a loaded question is asking an 
employee: "To what extent do you think managers are likely to be vindictive if top 
management decides to deny the use of budget attainment in performance evaluation". 
The words vindictive and denied are emotionally charged tem1s. polarising managers 
and top management. Hence. asking a question such as the alsiove would elicit strongly 
emotional and highly biased responses. This <;tudy was designed to eliminate loaded 
questions in both the questionnaire and interviews. 
3.3.1.6 Social Desirabmty 
(Sekaran, 2001, p.239) suggested that "questions should noire worded such that they 
elicit so:::iaily desirable responses". For example, a question such as "Do you think 
that older managers should be concerned with budget achievement?" would elicit a 
"no" response, mainly because society would frown on a person who would say tha� 
elderly people should not be conc-erned with the budget targets even if they are 
capable of attaining the budget. Hence, when questionnaires are used to measure an 
individual's attitude and perceptions, it is possible that individuals will respond "in a 
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way that makes the person loo!\ positive with regard to culturally derived norms and 
standards" (Ganster et Sill., 1983, p.322). Questions should not be worded in such a 
way that they are likely to elicit socially desirable responses. Failure to elicit the true 
feelings of the respondents would impact on socially desirability outcomes. In this 
study, the researcher has born in mind the necessity to present the questions in a,; 
uncluttered a way as possible, so as to reveal the true beliefa and perceptions of the 
respondents. 
3.3.1. 7 Extremity 
This form of response bias in questions occurs when "clarity of extremes and 
ambiguity of midrange options encourages extreme responses" (Alreck and Settle. 
1985, p.112). Respondents sometimes have a tendency to respond to the scale by 
picking only extreme values. This bias may generate from there biing too many 
numbers in the scale. If the numbers of scale points are in line with the respondents' 
preferences, extremity bias will be reduced (Alred:. and Settle. 1985 ). This study uses 
a seven-point Ukert-type scale which has been shown to provide adequate frequency. 
thereby controlling extreme bias (see 0rdering discussion regarding the use of a 
seven-point Likert-type scale). 
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3.3.1.8 Ordering of Questions. 
According to Alreck and Settle ( 1985), "the order or sequence in which survey 
questions or scales items are listed will oft.en affect the response" (p. 1 1 7). Ordering 
bias in questions may emanate from several reasons: 
Firstly, if the contents of scaled items are related, they may affect one another 
(content-related bias). For instance, it has t-een shown that managerial roles and 
participation in budget setting are related (Macintosh and Wiiliams, 1992; and 
Williams et al. , 1997). Therefore, presenting the participation in budget setting scale 
followed by the managerial roles' scale to the participants may produce different 
results than would be the case if participants were provided with the managerial roles' 
scale followed by the participation in budget setting scale. 
Secondly, learning how to handle the response task may result in biased early 
responses (initiation bias). Alfreck and Settle ( 1 985) stated that thi!-. problem could b� 
dealt with by listin6 samples or items of little importance first: they suggest that 
starting with easy and salient but necessary questions and then putting more difficult 
questions near the end of the questionnaire. One type of bias in questions refers to 
ordering of questions as noted by Sekaran (2001) "the sequence of questions in the 
questionnaire should be such that the respondent is led from questions of a general 
nature to those that are more specific 'md from questions that are relatively easy to 
answer to those that are progressively more difficult" (p.240). Festinger and Katz 
(1966) called it the funnel approach. The aim of this funnel approach is to help 
respondents to move through the questionnaire easily and comfortably. This study 
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controlled this bias through designing a questionnaire that started with general 
information ar,d ended with questions about politics. 
Thirdly, responding to a long lisi cf items may cause fatigue. A questionnaire that 
presents simple and short questions is better than Jong questions. According to 
Sudman and Bradburn ( 1982), " ... it has generally been the practice to make questions 
as short as possible. This practice was based on attitude questions that indicated that 
response reliability declines as the length of the questions increase" (p.50). As a rule 
of thumb, a question or a statement in the questionnaire should not exceed 20 words, 
or one full line in print (Horst, I 968� and Oppenheim, I 986 on Sekaran, 200 l, p.239). 
This study presented short and simple questicns in order \o maintain high response 
reliability. 
Fourthly, respondents have a tendency to read carefully only at the begirming of the 
questionnaire as noted by Al reek and Settle ( 1985 ), "if that happens, respondents may 
respond carefully to the earlier items and carelessly to the later ones on the list. 
causing error, bias, or both (p. l 17)''. The questionnaire of this study considered the 
level of difficulty of the questions in order to obtain responses in line with the 
purposes of the study. 
Finally, "when several similar items appear in sequence, the routine nature of 
responding may lead to a response strategy or policy (Alreck and Settle, l 985, 
p.11 7)". Reversing the wording of some questions and/or the anchor of the scales can 
reduce this routine bias. The questions of this study were designed to control ordering 
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bias in questions. For example, this study used short and simple questions and 
reversed the wording of some questions. 
3.3.2. Reliability 
Reliability means that information provided by indicators (e.g. a questionnaire) does 
not vary as a result of characteristics of the indicator, instrument, or measurement 
device itself. ln other words, if yoH have a reliable indicator or measure, it gives you 
the same results each time the same thing is measured as long as what you are 
measuring does not change. According to Osgood et al ( 1 957), "the reliability of an 
instrument is said to be the degree to which the same score can be reproduced when 
tht! same objects are measured repeatedly (p.126)". Three types of reliability were 
consi<lered in dealing with the questionnaire: content sampling, content heterogeneity, 
and discriminant reliability. 
3.3.2. l Coutent sampling 
Content sampling, as one type of instrument reliability check, deals with the ability of 
the questionnaire to produce a consistent answer for similar questions (i.e., 
consistency of response to different item samples). As Grove and Savich ( 1 979) note, 
"instrument reliability can be sta�istically tested by performing spht-half or odd-even 
correlation upon two sets of independent, but similar, items within the instrumenC 
(p.524 see also Sekaran, 2000). In this study, the split-half procedure (Spearman 
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Brown reliability coefficient) was employed to check instrument reliability. The 
results are presented in appendix C. The lowest Spearman Brown reliability 
coefficient attained was 0.603 for the measure of budgetary evaluation and the highest 
was 0.950 for the meRSure of managerial roles. In general, the variables of the study 
seem to have adequate reliability with regard to content sampling. 
3.3.2.2 Content Heterogeneity 
Content heterogeneity deals with heterogeneity of the behaviour domam sampled. 
That is, the more homogeneous tt1� items of the scale, the higher the inter-item 
consistency. The internal consistenc) of the variables was determined by Cronbach 's 
coefficient alpha for earh scale (Ntnnally, I 97� ) . Coefficient alpha treats both content 
sampling and content heterogeneity as the sources af variance. The Crnnbach 's  alpha 
is based on the average correlation of items within a test if the items are standardised. 
If the items are not standardised, it is based on the average covariance among items .  
In this study, the Cronbach's alpha was based on the standard items. The results are 
presented in appendix C .  The Cronbach 's  coefficient alpha observed ranged from 
0.6025 to 0.8811. According to Blair, Anderson, Tatham and Black ( 1998), "measure 
of reliability ranges from O to l ,  with values of .60 to .70 deemed the lower limit of 
acceptability" (p.88). This argument is also supported by Sekaran (2000). She stated 
that "in general, reliabilities less than 0.60 are ronsiclered to be poor. those in the 0. 70 
range, acceptable, and those over 0.80 good" (p.31 2). Thus. the inter-item consistency 
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(content sampling and content homogeneity) of the measures used in this study can be 
considered to be good. 
3.3.2.3 Discriminant Reliability 
Discriminant reliability deals with significant dit!-:�rences in response to a particular 
question by re;;pondents. If more than 90 percent of respondents answer a question 
similarly, the discriminating ability of that question is suspect (Grove and Savich, 
l 979). A histogram analysis was conducted separately on each item of the 
questionnaire. Except as noted below. all i terns showed adequate discriminatint� 
ability (i.e., in general, less than 50 percent of respondents answered a question 
similarly}. The exceptions were: 
I .  Gender: 90% of the respondents were male. 
2. Department: 60% of the respondents indicated that they were working in 
operation departments including engineering, production. maintenance, 
and marketing. 
3. Education: 70% of respondents held a bachelor degree or higher. 
4. Age: 70% of respondents were 40 years old and over. 
5. Experience: 70% of respondents had worked for 20 years in the company 
and 90% of respondents had worked for l O years in their current position. 
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3.3.3. V alitlity 
Validity deals with the degree of fit between a construct and indicators (e.g. 
questionnaire) of it. It refers to how well the conceptual and operational definitions 
mesh with each other. According to Osgood et al ( 1957), "An instrument is said to be 
valid when it measures what it is supposed to measure (p. 1 40)". Five types of val idity 
were considered: content, criterion-related, construct, internal, and external val idity. 
33.3.1 .  Content Validity 
Content validity ensures that the measures include an adequate and representative set 
of i tems and the clarity of the definition and concept used. As Kerl inger ( ! 986) notes, 
"content validation if guided by the question: is the substance or content of this 
measure representative of the content of the universe of the pr0perty being meao;ured 
(p.4 1 7)". A major threat to content val idity is ill-defined terms and or concepts. The 
variable measurements of the study were consistent with prior studies and hence there 
did not seem to be any threat to content validity. 
3.3.3.2. Criterion-Related Validity. 
Criterion-related validity deals with the instrument 's ability to measure an item 
accurately and analyze it. As Grove and Savich ( 1 979) note, a major aspect of 
criterion-related validity is performance measure. According to Grove and Savich 
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( 1 979), "the type of response scale is an important attitude research factor in 
measuring performance (p.529)". Measurement in this study will be mainly with a 
seven-point Likert-type scale. This is a popular scaling technique and is used widely 
in managerial accounting research. Grove and Savich ( 1979}, drawing on the work of 
Osgood et al ( 1 957), note that the use of a seven-point scale tends to provide roughly 
equal frequencies. On the other hand, the use of a nine-point scale may provide quite 
lower frequencies, and the use of a five-point scale may cause subjects' frustration "at 
not being able to discriminate finely enough (Grove and Savich, 1979, p.529)". 
This study used a seven-point l .ikert-type scale to increase performance measure of 
criterion-related vaiidity. In addition, the responses to the questionnaire indicated that 
participants did not show the finely discriminative position of a seven-;>oint Likert­
type scale ( e.g. only 1 ,  7), providing further support for the appropriateness of the 
scale .  
33.3.3. Construct Validity 
Construct validity testifies as to how "the possibi lity that the op!.'rational definition of 
a cause or effect can be construed in terms of more than one construct, all of which 
are stated at the sam� level of reduction" (Cook and Campbel l ,  1976, p.92). It is 
assessed through convergent and discriminant vaJ ;dities. In determining the 
convergent validity, the researcher must confirm that "evidence from different 
resources gathered in different ways all indicate the same or similar meaning of the 
construct" (Kerlinger, 1 986, p.42 1 ). In determining discriminant validity, the 
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researcher must confirm that "one can empirically differentiate the construct from 
other constructs that may be similar, and that one can point out what is unrelated to 
the construct" (Kerlinger, 1986, p. 42 1 ) .  The measures used in this study have been 
found to have acceptable convergent and discriminant validities. Furthermore, this 
study used factor analysis to test the construct validity of the measures. 
Factor analysis is a method for reducing a large number of variables to a smaller 
nwnber of presumed underlying unities called factors. Factors are usually derived 
from the interactions arr.ong variables. 
According to Blair et al. ( 1998) : 
"Factor analysis is a generic name given to a class of multivariate statistical methods 
whose primary purpos.: is to define th.: underlying structure in a data matrix. Broadly 
speaking, it addresse:i the problem of analysing the structure of the interrelationships 
(correlations) among a large number of variables (e .g . ,  test scores, test items, 
questionnaire responses) by defining a set of common underlying dimensions, known as 
factors" (p.90). 
The study examined the assumptions underlying factor analysis based on statistical 
and conceptual standpoints. Statistical analysis is to test whether they depart from 
normality, homoscedascity, and linearity, and applies only to the extent that they 
diminish the observed correlation (Hair et al., 1 998). The results of these tests can be 
seen in appendix B. Other methods to testify the appropriateness of factor analyses are 
by computing partial and entire correlations. Hair et al ( 1998) note "the partial 
correlations should be small because the vari�ble can be explained by the factor 
(variates with loadings for each variable). If the partial c01Tdations are high, then 
there are no '1rue" underlying factors and factor ana!ysis is inappropriateness" (p.99). 
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The anti•image correlation is used to assess the sampling adequacy of each variable. 
Variables with a measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) that falls below the acceptable 
level of 0.50 should be excluded from the analysis. A� Hair et al. ( 1 998) note "this 
index ranges from O to I ,  reaching 1 when each variable is perfectly predicted without 
error by the other variables. The measure can be interpreted with the following 
guidelines: 0.80 or above, meritorious; 0. 70 above, middling; 0.60 or above, 
mediocre; 0.50 or above, miserable; and below 0.50, unacceptable" (p.99). The 
results of MSA values are favourable and were presented in appendix D. 
Both tests of the Bartlett test of sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy were used to determine the factorability of the matrix as a whole. 
If Bartlett 's test of sphericity is large and significant, and if the Kaiser-Meyer·Olkin 
m�.asure is greater than 0.60, then factorability is assumed (Coakes and Steed, 1999, 
p.156). The results of Bartlett 's test were satisfied and presented in appendix D. 
Viewed from statistical standpoint, the results are satisfactory with parameters of 
assumptions in factor analysis, while the conceptual ass•.imptions underlying factor 
analysis relate to the set of variables selected and the sample chosen (Hair et al . ,  
1998). This study presents a homogeneous sample because all of questionnaire' s  
respondents are middle managers. 
The results of factor analysis testing the construct validity of the measures can be seen 
in appendix D and are reported in section 3 .5. 
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3.3.3.4. Internal Validity 
The internal validity "refers to the approximate validity with which we infer that a 
relationship between two variables is causal or that the absence of a relationship 
implies the absence of cause" (Cook and Camvbel l ,  I 979, p.37). In other words, it 
addresses the confidence we place in the cause and effect relationship. Cook and 
Campbell { 1 979) contend that the use of randomised samples provide an appropriate 
safeguard against the threats to internal validity. According to Cook and Campbell 
( 1979, p .56), ''with quasi-experimental groups, the situation is quite different. Instead 
of relying on randomisation to rule out most internal validity threats, the investigator 
has to make all the threats explicit and then rule tht!ITI out one by one". Since this 
study did not employ a random sample, several threats to internal validity were dealt 
with accordingly. These were selection and ambiguity about the direction of causal 
influence. 
Selection is a threat when "an effect may be due to the difference between kinds of 
people in one experimental group as opposed to another" (Cook and Campbel l ,  1979, 
p.5 1 ). The use of several companies is expected to reduce the selection threats to 
internal validity. Ambiguity about the direction of causal ir.fluence is a threat "when 
all plausible third variable explanations of an A-B relationship have been ruled out 
and where it is not clear whether A causes B or B causes A" (Cook and Campbell ,  
1 979, p.9 1 ). While any model can be criticised for not including more variables, the 
proposed model was conceptualised after a comprehensive review of .:he literature and 
hence was expected to include variables that may have moderated the relationship 
between budgetary participation and managerial roles, relationship between budBetary 
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communication and managerial roles, relationship between budgetary control and 
managerial roles, relationship between budgetary monitoring and managerial roles, 
relationship between budgetary evaluation and managerial roles. Moreover, the causal 
relationships among variables were based on the relevant theoretical and �pirical 
research. Therefor�. there does not seem to be any serious ambigui ty about the 
direction of causal ir.fluence in the proposed model 
3.3.3.5. External Validity 
External validity ''refers to the approx imate validity with which we can infer that the 
presumed causal relationship can be generalis�d to and across alternate measures of 
the cause and effect and across different types of persons, settings, and times" (Cook 
and Campbell, 1979, p.37}. In other words, it addresses the extent of generalisability 
of the results of a causal study to other settings, people , or events. S ince data for this 
study was collected from various departme;its in four large fertiliser companies, the 
limitation (e.g. :-.pecific work to the participant company) with respect to 
generalisability of the findings does not cancel out the importance of the study. 
3A Cha:rncteristics of variables 
Budgeting Process. Budgeting is an extremely important part of an overall 
management control system (Hungren, 1982; Kaplan, 1982). A budget provides 
information to both departrr:ental and upper management regarding the organisation's 
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progress towards achieving i ts goals (Macintosh and Daft. 1 987). ln the accounting 
literature, the budgeting process is used int<.'fchangcabl y with budget related 
behaviour (BRB). The budgeting process 1s defined as managt.'fial activities, actions, 
attitude, and interactions amongst managers and their tasks which relate to the 
budgeting system (Bruns & Waterhouse. 1 975 ;  Dt.•Coster & Fcrtalos, 1 968; Fcrtakis . .  
1 967; Swieringa & Moncur. 1 975 :  Wil l iams, Macintosh. & Moore, 1 990). The 
characteristics of the budget process that have frequently been used in previous 
studies including budgetary participation. budgetary wmmunication, and budgetary 
control ( including budgetary monitoring and budgetary evaluati on) can be seen in 
table 3. 1 .  
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Table 3. 1: Characteristics of Budgeting Process 
Characteristics Descnp11on 
A. Budgetary Participation 
I .  influence in Budgeting The extent of impact on the budget plans in term of the budget 
Setting. including changes the wanager has suggested and the budget 
not being finalised until .he manager 1s satisfied W1th it. 
2. Involvement in the Budget The extent to which the manager offer!! opinions on the budget 
matter.. and offer suggesuons for budget plan improvements. 
B. Budgetary Communication 
3 .  Interactions with The extent of interaction with the managers' subordinates 
Subordinates during budget preparation as well as interaction to obtain 
inputs on budget achievement. 
4. Interactions with Superiors The extent of interaction with the managers ' superior during 
budget preparatio:i as well as interaction to obtain advice on 
budget achievement. 
C. Budgetary Control 
Budget Monitoring 
5.  Budget Variance Analysis The extent to which a manager is required to report and 
�xplain variances and identify the courses thereot 
6. Personal Attention to The extent to which a manager investigates personally to great 
Budget V :uiance a number of details buth favourable and unfavourable budget 
variances within his/her unit. 
Hudget f valuation 
7. Evaluation by Budget The ex.tent to which managers are evaluated upon their ability 
to meet the budget and are aware of the importance of meeting 
the sub-unit budget. 
8 .  Reactions to Expected The extent to which a manager response to budget o ,enuns . 
Budget Overruns 
Managerial Roles. Mintzberg ( 1 973) conducted an in-depth study of five executives 
at work. Based on his observations of actual managers on the job, he concluded that 
managers have ten different characteristics, but highly interrelated roles. 
• 1 0  I -
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Table 3 .2: Characteristics of Managerial Roles 
- - -
Characteristics Description 
Interpersonal Roles 
1 .  Leader Leadership role requires a manager who has responsibility for the 
mot:vation and direction of subordinates in order to get the Job 
done properly. 
2. Liaison Liaison role is one in which the manager develops and maintains an 
exchange of infonnat1on, such as budgetary information, and 
renders favours to individuals outside of the sub-unit in 0rder to 
represent its cause. 
Informational Roles 
3 .  Disseminator Disseminator role requires a manager to transmit organisational 
information to members of the sub-unit with the pull'ose of co--
ordinatmg and controlling their activities. 
4. Spokesman Spokesperson role requires a manager to convey information to 
significant individuals outside of the unit, typically sur,enors or 
resource providers such as customers and stakeholders. 
5. Monitor Monitoring roles require a manager to keep up with market trends, 
scan the env1rurunent for opportunities, and gather information 
about customers and competitors. 
Decision&! Roles 
I 6. Resource allocator Resource allocator role requires a manager to take responsibility for 
allocating sub-unit resources among the project and personnel 
within the sub-unit, for example, the budget. 
7. Negotiator Negotiator role requires a manager to represent the interests of the 
sub-unit and its rrembers at all major organisational negotiat10ns 
over resources. 
'Managerial roles · refers to behaviours attributable to a job or position and is defined 
as sets of managers' behaviours attributable to their jobs that are necessary to perform 
the management functions of planning, organising, leading, and controlling in order to 
achieve organisational goals (Mc Kenna, 1 999; Vecchio et al, l 997;  Robbins, 1 993; 
Williams and Macint')sh, 1992 ; and Mintzberg, 1 973). TI1e study used the seven roles 
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that can be classified into three main roles: those primarily concerned with 
interpersonal relationships, those with the transfer of information, and those with 
decision-making. Interpersonal roles include activities related to leadership and 
liaison; infonnational roles include monitoring, disseminating information and 
spokesperson activities; and decisional roles include resource allocator and negotiator. 
Oescnptions of r.haracteristics of managerial roles can be seen in table 3.2. 
Politics. Lasswell ( 1 936) defined politics as "who get what, when, and how". Other 
scholars argue politics is a power in action that involves the exercise of power to get 
something accomplished. Its activities focus around the acquisition and use of power. 
Power, in turn, is defined as any force that results in behaviour which would not have 
occurred if the force had not been present (Mechanic, 1 962). Power is also defined as 
the ability of  one actor to overcome resistance in achieving a desired result (Brass & 
Burkhardt, 1 993; House, 1988; Pfeffer, 1981 ) or as the ability to affect outcomes or to 
get things done (Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1 981  ). Power is manifested through 
behavioural action (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). 
This study employed the characteristics of politics based on Pfeffer ( 1 98 1  ). The 
characteristics of politics comprise budget goals, preferences, aspirations, and beliefs; 
budgeting process characteristics; budget rules and norms, budget information 
requirements, budget information use and budgeting process outcomes, and budget 
ideology (see Pfeffer, 1 981 ) that can be seen in table 3 . 3  . 
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Characteristics 
I .  Budget goals, 
preferences, aspirations, 
and beliefs 
2. Budgeting process 
characteristics 
3. Budget rules and Nonns 
4. Budget information use 
5. Budget information 
requirement 
6. Budgeting process 
Outcomes 
7. Budget ideology 
Table 3.3 :  Characteristics of Pol itics 
Description 
Budget goal�. preferences, aspirations, and beliefs are comistent within 
social actors; inconsistent, and pluralistic within the organisation. Goals, 
preferences, aspirations, and beliefs arc a function of unit goals; right 
infomiat1on has little effect o,, the budget goals, preferences, aspirations, 
and belief. 
Characterised in the budgeting process by push and pull of different 
interests; individuals de1 , , •e problems to their advantage; solution are 
stressed or dP.pressed. 
In the budgeting process. conflict is legitimate and accepted; control over 
analysis is seen as a source of power; free play of market forces. 
Budget information is used and withheld strategically to influence 
desired results on performance measurement and reward systems; budget 
information may be distorted in favour of unit mterests. 
Search for Information during the budgeting process is usually not 
systematic and in-depth; information is sought to support a unit ' s  view of 
the particular objective, problem and/or to discredit others. 
Budgeting processes result from bargaining among the various interests 
of individual managers in the organisation; choices are made when unit 
amasses sufficient power; the alternative chosen is the om: favoured by 
the most powerful unit. 
Budget participants in a political struggle ove values. goals, preferences, 
aspiration, and definition of measurements. As a consequence, the budget 
participants have to struggle to solve the conflict of interest,;, to be 
winners and losers. 
3.5. Variable Measurement 
In this section, the operational definition as well as the measurement of variables is 
presented. According to Kerlinger ( 1986 ), an operational definition is the one that 
assigns meaning to a construct or a variable by specifying the activities or 
"operations" necessary to measure the construct or variable. Kidder and Judd 
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( 1986,p.4 1 )  note "operational definitions arc the means by which we obtain the 
numbers of categories for the variables. That is, an operational definition ts the 
sequence of steps or procedures a researcher follows to obtain a measurement". 
The survey question,1aire obtained information regarding: ( I )  managerial roles as 
dependent variables, (2) budget participation, budget monitoring and budget 
evaluation as independent variables, (3) politics as a moderating variable, and sources 
of power as control variables. The measurement of the variables and their tests of 
construct validities are discussed in the following sections. 
3.5.1 Budgeting Process 
Originally DeCoster and Fertakis ( 1968) developed a questionnaire containing 97 
items that related to "Supervisory activities, actions, events, and inter-relationships 
which occur on a regular basis and which the supervisor could relate to the system of 
budgetary controls used in his devartment" (p 240). Swieringa and Moncur ( 197) 
modified and reduced this set of questionnaire to 65 items. Later , they rewrote the 
items, added I �  new ones, and on the basis of field testing and personal interviews 
derived 44 items that " . . . provided the basis for developing capsule descriptions of 
how the manager used budgeting in carrying out his management functions and how 
his use of budgeting was related to the amount and form of participation afforded him 
in budget setting" {Swieringa and Moncur, 1 974, p.49). This 44-itcm questionnaire 
was used by a number of researchers (Swieringa and Monsur, 1974; Sruns and 
Waterhouse, 1975; Merchant, 198 1; Brownell and Merchant, 1990; and William et al, 
1990). Previous studies concerned seven general categories of budget variables: 
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influence in budget setting, involvement in budget system, budget communications, 
budget variance analysis, personal attention to budget variances, evaluation by budget, 
and reactions to unexpected budget overruns (sec Table 3 . 1  ). 
Furthermore, Williams, Macintosh, and Moore ( 1990) and Macintosh and Williams 
( 1992) used a 24-item questionnaire for the budgeting process. This questionnaire was 
adopted with one modification. The question is " i am required to prepare reports 
comparing actual results with budget". This study used a 23-item questionnaire for 
data analysis. One of 24 questions was out from analysis because it is not relevant and 
also it has a small number of factor loading. The budget variance reports are produced 
by the accounting unit and distributed to users. 
The instrument adopted in this study attempted to assess the respondent 's activity in 
budgetary participation, budgetary communication, and budgetary control ( consisting 
of budgetary monitoring and budgetary evaluation). This is done with the help of a 
seven point Likert-type scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly 
agree) . The use of this scale can be defended in terms of reliability and val idity (see 
Brownell, 1 982; Mia 1988). According to Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black ( 1 998); 
and Sekaran, (2000) a Cronbach Alpha score exce..:ding 0.60 indicates acceptable 
level of reliability. The results of the factor loading have to be greater than 0.30 to 
indicate the presence of sufficient degree of internal validity for the instrument (Hair 
et al. ,  1998; and Coakes and Steed, 1 999). 
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3.5. 1 . 1  Budgetary Participation 
It aims to assess the respondent 's influence and involvement in the budget setting. 
This is done with the help vf a seven point Likert-type scale ranging from one 
(strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). The Cronbach Alpha coefficient of the 
instrument used is 0.76 which indicates an acceptable degree of reliability (table C.8 
in appendix C). The results from the factor analysis of four items revealed that two 
factors were extracted with an eigenvalue greater than one that explains 74.52% of the 
total variance (see appendix D on table D.3). On table D.4, the results of component 
matrix factor were iJresented. Factor I comprises 4 items with factor loadings ranging 
from 0.87 to 0 .69 and factor 2 comprises a single item with factor loading 0.98. All of 
these factor loadings are greater than 0.30. Therefore, these results are considered 
satisfactory in respect of internal validity. 
3.5.1 .2 Budgetary Communication 
It aims to assess the respondent 's  interactions with subordinates and interactions with 
superiors . This is done with the help of a seven point Likert-type scale ranging from 
one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). The Cronbach Alpha coefficient of 
the instrument used is 0.85 which indicates an acceptable degree of reliability (table 
C.9 in appendix C). The results from the factor analysis of four items revealed that a 
single factor was extracted with an eigenvalue greater than one that explains 85. 1 4% 
of the total variance (see appendix D on table D.7). On table D.8, the results of 
component matrix factor were presented. The single factor comprises 4 items with 
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factor loadings ranging from 0.92 to 0.72. Since all of these factor loadings are greater 
than 0.30 results are considered satisfactory in respect of internal validity. 
3.5.1.3 Budgetary Contrnl 
It aims to assess the respondent 's budget vanance analysis, personal attention to 
budget variances, evaluation by budget, and reactions to expected budget ovenuns. 
This is done with the help of a seven point Likert-type scale ranging from one 
(strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). The Cronbach Alpha coefficient of the 
instrument used is 0. 77 which indicates an acceptable degree of reliability (table C. l 0 
in appendix C). The results from the factor analysis of fourteen items revealed that 
five factors were extracted with an eigenvalue greater than one that explains 88.27% 
of the total variance (see appendix D on table D. 1 1  ). On table D. 12 in appendix D, the 
results of rotated component matrix factor were presented. Factor 1 comprises 4 items 
with factor loadings ranging from 0.92 to 0.76. Factor 2 comp1 i ses two items with 
factor loadings 0.86. Factor 3 comprises two items with factor l0adings ranging from 
0.80 to 0.79. Factor 4 comprises four items with factor loadings ranging from 0.88 to 
0.40. Factor 5 comprises two items with factor loadings 0.84 and 0.72. Since all of 
these factor loadings are greater than 0.30 results are considered satisfactory in respect 
of internal vaJi.,jity. 
Budgetary Monitoring. It aims to asst::ss the respondent 's  budget variance analysis 
and personal attention to budget variances. This is done with the help of a seven point 
Likert-type scale ranging from one (strongly di:1agree) to sevel! (strongly agree). The 
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Cronbach Alpha coefficient of the instrument used is 0.67 which indicates an 
acceptable degree of reliability (table C . 11 in ..:ppendix C). The results from the 
factor analysis of :)�ven items revealed that three factors were extracted with an 
eigenvalue greater than one that explains 90.93% of the total variance ( see appendix 
D on table D. 15). On table D. 16 in appendix D, the results of rotated component 
matrix factor were presented. Factor I comprises 3 items with factor loadings ranging 
from 0.90 to 0.81. Factor 2 comprises two items with factor loadings 0.88 and 0.87. 
Factor 3 comprises two items with factor loadings 0.84 and 0.8�. Since all of these 
factor loadings are greater thrn 0.30 results are considered satisfactory in respect of 
internal validity. 
Budgetary Evaluation. It aims !o assess the respondent's evaluation of and reactions 
to expected budget overruns. This is done with the help of a seven point Likert-type 
scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). The Cronbach 
Alpha coefficient of the instrument used is 0.60 which indicates an acceptable degree 
of reliability (table C. 12 in appendix C). The results from the factor analysis of seven 
items revealed that three factors were extracted with an eigenvalue greater than one 
that explains 87.67% of the total variance (see appendix D on table D. 19). On table 
D.20 in appendix D, the results of rotated component matrix factor were presented. 
Factor I comprises 4 items with factor loadings ranging from 0.75 to 0.40. Factor 2 
comprises two items with factor loadings ranging from 0.93 to 0.68. Factor 3 
comprises one item with factor loading 0.95. Since all of these factor loadings are 
greater than 0.30 results are considered satisfactory in respect of internal validity. 
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3.5.2. Managerial Roles 
Managerial roles is defined as sets of managers' behaviours attributable to their jobs 
that are necessary to perform management functions - planning, organising, leading, 
and controlling in order to achieve the organisation goals (McKenna, 1 999; Vecchio 
et al, 1 997; Robbins, 1 993; Williams and Macintosh, 1992; and Mintzberg, 1973 ). 
Seven managerial roles were utilised following McCall and Segrist ( 1978), Tsui 
( 1 984), and Macintosh and William ( 1 992). Initially McCall and Segrist ( 1 973) 
designed a 46-item questionnaire to measure Mintzberg 's ten role categories. They 
found only six roles and concluded that these were generalisable across management 
levels, functional specialisations, and public and private sectors. Further Tsui ( l  984j 
confirmed a priory factor structure of the six managerial roles. Later Williams et al 
( 1 997) and Macintosh and William ( 1992) used the six managerial role variables; 
namely - leader, liaison, environmental monitor, spokeperson, entrepreneur, and 
resource allocator. As shown in Table 3 .2, this study used 15 of 2 1-items to construct 
the seven role variables. An extra characteristic of managerial roles was added, 
namely a negotiator role. The negotiator role strongly relates with the budget process 
outcome as a part of political characteristics (table 3.3). When unit managers conduct 
a negotiator role, they have to represent their own unit interests. In the budgeting 
process, unit managers have to bargain their own interest with other managers. The 
instrument attempted to assess managerial roles of respondents as leader, liaison, 
disseminator, spokesperson, environment monitor, resource allocator, and negotiator. 
To measure managenal roles, the study used a seven point Likert-type scale ranging 
from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). Previous studies (e.g. William 
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et al, 1 9(}0; Macintosh and William, ! 992) in this area have found the scale 
appropriate. For testing the reliability of the instrument, the Cronbach Alpha 
coefficient was 0.88 which indicates a high level of internal consistency (appendix C 
on table C . 13). The results from the factor analysis of fifteen items revealed that four 
factors were extracted with an eigenvnlue greater than one that explains 85.78% of the 
total variance (see appendix D on tabk D.23 ). On table D.24 in appendix D, the 
results of rotated component matrix factcr present. Factor I comprises 5 items with 
factor loadings ranging from 0.87 to 0.66. Factor 2 comprises 4 items with factor 
loadings ranging from 0. 77 to 0.57. Factor 3 comprises 4 item5 with factor loadings 
ranging from 0. 80 to 0. 56. Factor 4 comprisP.s 2 items with factor loadings ranging 
0.83 and 0.82. Since all of these factor loadings are greater than 0. 30 results are 
considered satisfactory in respect of internal validity. 
3.5.3. Politica. 
Pfeffer ( 198 1 )  provided the characteristics of politics . As described in table 3 . 3 ,  a 
question was asked about each of these characteristics to measure the extent to which 
politics influenced the budpeting process. Blair ( 1 988) measured politics based on the 
charncteristics of politics of Pfeffer's (1 981  ). Blair used a six-item questionnaire. But 
in this study, a seven-item questionnaire is used to measure the influence of politics. 
An extra characteristic of pol itics was added, namely budget ideology; because this 
characteristic is  very important to assess the influence of politics. Budget participantc; 
have to struggle to push their own values. aspirations, preferences, and goals in the 
budget decisions. The instruments are aimed at assessing political influence of 
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respondents, including ( 1) budget goals, preferences, aspirations, and beliefs; (2) 
budgeting process characteristics; (3) budget rules and nonns; (4) budget information 
use; (5) budget information requirements; (6) budgeting process outcomes; and (7) 
budget ideology. 
The variables of politics were measured using a seven point Likert-type scale rangiug 
from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). Ti: " Cronbach Alpha 
coefficient was 0. 7 1  indicating that the measure is reliable (table C. I 4 in appendix C). 
Testing validity of the seven items, factor loading revealed two factors (table D.28)  
with eigenvalues greater than one that explains 91  % of the total variance (table D.27) .  
Factor 1 comprises four items with factor loadings ranging from 0.95 to 0.36. Factor 2 
comprises three i tems with factor loadings ranging from 0.84 to 0.67. Again, these 
numbers lend support that the instrument is internally consistent. 
3.5.4. Structural and Individual Power 
This study presumes that political influence in budgeting process will differ 
depending on level of �wer. It used two variables: department/unit and educational 
qualification to assess the influence of structural and individual power in the 
budgeting process. These variables have been coded as follows: operational 
departments were assigned 1 and otherwise O; high educational background (b2chelor 
and postgraduate degrees) was assigned I and otherwise 0. 
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These variables have been used by prior studies ( e.g Brass, 1984; Brass and 
Burkhardt, 1992, l 994; Ibarra, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; French and Raven, 
1959; see also Merchant, 1984; and Pfeffer, 1981) 
3.6. Statistical Analysis 
The Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient is a parametric tech.'lique, 
which gives a measure of the strength of association between two variables. Sekaran 
(2000) notes that "the Pearson correlation coefficient is appropriate for interval-and 
ratio-scales variables" (p.3 15). Since the study used an interval scale with a 7-point 
Likert-type interval scale, the Pearson's product moment correl ation was employed to 
investigate the correlation among variables included in the study. This test indicates 
the significance of the correlation between variables. 
3.6.1. Test of the Hypotheses 
According to Cohen and Cohen ( 1983), path analysis deals with causal models of the 
kind we have been describing. The study used path analysis to determine whether the 
observed pattern of relation$'.--ips among the variables was consistent with the causal 
model presented in figure 2. l (page 66). Moreover, possible violations of the 
assumptions underlying path analysis were checked or were dealt with accordingly 
(Billings and Wroten, 1978; Heise, 1969). The omitted parameter test (James et al., 
1982) was used to determine whether paths predicted in figure 2. l were statistically 
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significant and whether the unpredicted paths were insignificant. This test involves 
the analysis of all direct paths among the variables in a model, whether predicted or 
unpredicted, and thereby facilitates identification of specific sources of confirmation 
and disconfinnation within a proposed model. 
The moderating regression analysis (hereafter MRA)  technique was used to detect the 
moderating effect (Arnold, 1982, 1 984 ; Stone and Hollenbeck, 1984; Champoux and 
Peters, 1987; and Hartmann and Moers, 1 999) and to test hypotheses. The moderating 
regression analysis technique indicates whether the relationship between X and Y 
changes for differing values of Z (called as moderating variable). For example, 
budgeting process and managerial roles relationship chahi;�S because of the existence 
of politics. Regarding to MRA, Arnold ( l  982) stated that: 
"ThP. relationship between Y and X may or may not remain the same with regard to both 
degree and form over variation in some third variable Z. If both the degree and form of 
the relationship of Y to X do remain constant across different values of Z. then the 
relationship is said to be constant or unconditional with regard to Z. I f, ,>n the other 
hand, either the degree or form of the relationship between Y and X ;s not constant but 
changes systematically across different values of Z, then the relationship is conditional 
upon z. If the degree of relationship varies with z. then a situation of differential 
validity obtains. If the form of the relationship varies with z. then X and Z are said to 
interact in determining Y (or equivalently, Y is said to be a joint .function of X and Z), 
and it can be said that the form of the relationship of X and Y is "conditioned by", 
"depend on", or "varies" with Z (p. 1 45 ). 
A the above statement indicates, use of the moderator variables falls into two major 
categories (see alsu Cohen and Cohen, 1975; Arnold, 1984; Stone and Hollenbeck, 
1984; and Champoux and Peters, 1987). First, the degree of association between two 
variables: for instance, the relationship between budgeting process and managerial 
roles may depend on politics. The incremental of R 2 is used to assess the presence of a 
- 1 14 -
moderating effect (Cohen and Cohen 1975 ;  Arnold, 1982, 1984; Stone and 
Hollenbeck, 1984; Champoux and Peters, 1987 ; and Hartmann and Moers, 1999) .  
Second, the form of relationship between two variables : for instance, the role of  
politics on budgeting process may o r  may not diftcr between two groups (e.g. 
operational departments and non-oper, .ional department, high and low indiv1dual 
qualification) .  The strcugth of the modern .or effects is shown by the rate of change in 
slope of the regression line (Arnold, 1982, 1984; Champoux and Peters, I 987; and 
Hartmann and Moers, 1999). 
This moderating regression analysis has been used in previous behavioural accounting 
research (e.g. Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; and Harison, 1992, 1993). 
3.6.2. Assumptic-ns of Moderating Regression Analysis 
It deals with a method for examining patterns of  causation among a set of variables 
(Pedhazur, 1982). Causal assumptions are a crucial role in  the application of 
moderating regression analysis. The structural equations presented in section 2.6 are 
subject to certain statistical assumptions. These assumptions ar� discussed in the 
following sections. 
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3.6.2.1. Zero Expected Values for Residuals 
One of the assumptions of regression analysis is that residuals have a zero mean. This 
situauon is produced by a residual statistics solution, as presented in appendix E, all 
means of residuals are close to zero. 
3.6.2.2. Normality 
This assumption states that residuals are normally distributed. The study used normal 
P-P plot of regression standardised residual to test the normality l Coakes and Steed, 
1999; and Neter, Wasserman and Kunter. 1985). It is assumed that the differences 
between the obtained and predicted dependent variable scores are normally 
distributed. If the residuals are from a normal distribution, the plotted values should 
fall  roughly along the line. All charts of normal P-P plot arc favourable in a normal 
distribution for most of the values. For example from the chart E .  l in appendix E, the 
most of values are plotted roughly along the l ine. Therefore the assumption of 
normality is satisfied. 
3.6.2.3. Linearity 
In assessmg whether linearity assumptions are satisfied, it is important to plot 
residuals against preJicted values and against the independent variable; namely 
scatterplots of residuals (McNemar. 1969; Neter, Wasserman, and Kunter, 1985). The 
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study used standardised residuals �md predicted value in the plots. From the 
scatterplots are presented in appendix E, there are a clear relationship that about the 
95% of the residuals fall between -2 and +2, therefore this assumption was not 
violated. 
3.6.2.4. Homoscedasticity 
This assumption requires that the residual variance around the line of regression be 
constant across all combinations of levels of independent variables. The validity of 
this assumption was assessed in regressin15 the absolute value of regression residuals 
on the value of the independent variable (Glejser, 1969; and Coakes and Steed, 1999). 
The F statistics is highly significant; it implies that eac .1 independent variable makes a 
meaningful contribution to the fit of the m0del. The results for identifying 
hornoscedascity are presented in appendix E, for example table E.3 ,  therefore this 
assumption was not violated. 
3.6.2.5. Auto-correlation of Residuals 
This assumption states that residuals are not correlated across equations. Auto­
correlation of the residuals usually occurs when regression analysis involves time 
series data (Berenson and Levine, 1996, 1983) which is not the case in this study. 
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3.6.2.6. Multicollinearity 
This assumption refers to a situation in which the independent variables are highly 
correlated with each other. Table 4.3 pre:,c:nts the results of the inter-correlations 
among variables in which the number of the coefficients are ranging from 0.43 to 0. 7. 
They indicate no evidence of extreme multicollinearity since the coefficient is less 
than .80 (Lewis and Beck, 1980, pp.59-6 1 see also Sekaran, 2000, p .3 16; and Hussey 
and Hussey, 1997, p.229). However, objects to this arbitrary value since it focuses 
only on the correlation among pairs of independent van ables and falls to consider how 
each independent vanable is related to all the other independent variable at once. 
According to Berry and Feldman ( l  985, p.43 ), "the most reasonable test for 
multicollinearity is to regress each independent variable in the equation on all other 
independent variables, and look at the R2s for these regressions; if «ny are close to 
1.00, there is a high degree of multicollinearity present". This latter procedure was 
used to assess the existence of multicollinearity in this study. 
The collinearity statistics - tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIP) are also used 
for identifying the multicollinearity.  Values of tolerance range from O to 1 .  When its 
value is small (close to 0), the variable is almost a linear combination of the otht:r 
independent variables; so the estimate of the variable 's  regression coefficient is 
unstable. The VIP is the reciprocal of tolerance. So, by definition the variable here 
with low tolerance have large variance inflation factors. As can be seen in appendix E, 
for example in table E.4, all the values of tolerance and VIP are favourable. In 
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addition the study also used the collinearity diagnostics for identifying the 
multicollmearity. As can be seen in table of col l ineairy diagnor;tics in appendix E, 
eigenvalues are in line with favourable number. Eigenvalues provide an indication of 
how many distinct dimensions there are among the independent variables. When 
several eigenvalues are close to 0, the variables are highly intercorrelated and the 
matrix is said to be ill-conditioned. From this table, the values of the condition 
indexes are less than 1 5. A condition index greater than 15 indicates a possible 
problem and an index greater than 30 suggests a serious problem with 
multicollinearity. 
The multicollinearity can also be seen from the variance proportions in collineairy 
diagnostics table. The variance proportions are the proportions of the variance of the 
estimate accounted for by each principal component associated with each of the 
eigenvalues. The collinearity is problem when a component associated with a high 
condition index contributes substantially to the variance of two or mnre variables. 
Again, the variance proportions for the variables indicate no violatiori of this 
assumption. 
3.6.2. 7. Interval Measure 
This assumption states that all measures have interval scale properties. The variab les 
of the study were measured using a seven-point Likert-type scale and multiple item 
instruments. According to Billing and Wroten ( 1978,p.684), " measures employing a 
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reasonable number of values and containing multiple items wil l  yiel<! data with 
sufficient interval properties". 
3.6.2.8. Low Measurement Error 
This assumption states that "the measuring instruments used to obtain empirical data 
have high rel iability" (Heise, 1 969, p.59) .  The alpha coefficients of the instrument in 
this study indicated satisfactory levels of imemal consistency and reliability among 
the multi-item scales (ranging from 0.60 to 0.88). 
3.6.2.9. One-Way Causality 
This assumption states that, wi thin each model ,  the direction of causality should be 
ordered in a recursive way (one way) for endogenous variables (Heist, 1 969, p.45) .  
Exogenous variables, however, may be allowed to reciprocal ly cause each other 
(Billings and Wroten, 1 978). According to Bi l lings and Wroten ( 1 978,p.678) :  
Exogenous variables are one or more variables whose causes l ie outside 
of the system. If there are two or more exogenous variables, they may 
be correlated, with no causal direction specified. Only the endogenous 
variables, whose causes lie within the system, must be ordered 
(emphasis in original) . 
This study assumes that the ordering of endogenous variables (i .e. polit ics) in the 
proposed model (figure 2 . 1 )  is recursive and correct. 
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3.6.2.10. Additivity 
This assumption states that there are no significant interaction effects. The conceptual 
model presented in figure 2. l ,  however, indicates that there should be significant 
interaction effects. Two procedures are used to deal with interactive path analysis. 
First, separate path analyses are conducted on the moderating effect of politics (see 
section 4.4). Sims and Szilagyi ( 1 975) and Dessler and Valenzi ( 1 977 J used this 
procedure ( l  977) for interactive path analysis. Second, the moderating effect of 
politics was divided into two groups depending on source of power; namely, structural 
and individual source of power. 
3.6.2.11. Outliers 
This assumption refers to extreme cases in which they have considerable impact on 
the regression equation and should be deleted or modified to reduce their influence. 
This study used the Mahalanobis' distance and the centered leverage value for 
identifying potential outliers amcng the independent variables (Neter et al. , 1 989; 
Coakes and Steed, 1 999; and Berenson and Levin, 1996). No one of the value of the 
Mahalanobis' distance is greater than the critical value of the chi-square at an alpha 
level of 0. 10, so have no outliers. The value of leverage various rules of thumb have 
been suggested. For example, values Jess than 0.20 appear safe, values between 0.20 
and 0.50 are risky, and values above 0.50 are to be avoided. As presented in appendix 
E, the value of centered leverage indicated that this assumption wa� not violated 
seriou.,ly. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 
The results of the statistical analysis are presented in this chapter. The first section 
summarizes the demographic data. An overview of the descriptive statistics is 
presented in the second section. The third section presents the Pearson correlation. 
Finally, the results with regard to the tests of the hypotheses are presented in section 
four. 
4.1. Summary of the Demographic Data 
The survey questionnaire provides demographic data beyond the r�uirements of the 
study. Several demographic characteristics of the respondents are sumrn2.rized in table 
4. 1 .  
Table 4. 1 :  Demographic Characteristics 
Demographic characteristics Percentage 
Gender 
o Male 94% 
o Female 6% 
Age 
o More than 40 years 73% 
e Less than 40 years 27% 
Qualification 
69% o Bachelor and Postgraduate 's degree 
3 1 % o Other I Department 
,, Operations 
79% 
o Services 2 1 %  
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Most respondents to the survey questionnaire - 95% (n= l 67) - in this study are male 
and 7J% of all respondents were more than 40 years old. Most respondents have an 
educaf 'Jnal standard of postgraduate either bachelor' s (63%) or master's (6%) 
degrees. None of the respondents holds a doctorate. Fifty one percent of the 
respondents (n= l60) are from operational departments (marketing, production, and 
engineering), with the remaining (49%) from non-operational departments (e .g. 
accounting, finance, public affairs, research and development, and personnel). 
Responden:.S ( n= 1 77) to the questionnaire were all middle managers, whereas the 
interview survey involved forty subjects, including middle managers (n=32) and 
department heads (n=1 2). 
4.2. D�criptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the variables examined in this study appear on Table 4.2. On 
the seven point Likert scale responses ranged between 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) with average actual range around 5.00. Minimum Responses indicate 
that most respondents tended to "agree" on the items of budgetary participation, 
budgetary communication, budgetary control, budgetary monitoring, budgetary 
evaluation, ma.,agerial roles, and politics. The mean values of all the items are above 
the median of the scale 3.5, the budgetary communication variable having the highest 
mean score. The variances for all those variables are high, showing a considerable 
measure of dispersion around the mt:._:n. Again, the budgetary communication variable 
has the highest variance score compared to other variables. Table 4.2 clearly indicates 
that most respondents tended to give a positive response to thz activities in the 
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budgeting process, managerial roles, and politics. Moreover, most respondents showed 
the most positive response to the activities of budgetary communication. 
N 
Budgetary Participation 1 77 
Budgetary 1 77 
Communication 1 77 
Budgetiry Control 1 77 
Budgetiry Monitoring 1 77 
Budgetary Evaluation 1 77 
Managerial Roles 1 77 
Politics 1 77 
Valid N ( listwise} 
T bl 4 2 D S a e escnpt1ve 
Theoretical Actual Minimum 
RanRC Rnnx. 
7 5.03 1 .97 
7 5 15 1 .25 
7 4 .69 2.00 
7 4.88 2.00 
7 4 .63 2.00 
7 ' 00  2.00 
7 5 .00 2.00 
4.3. Inter-correlation among Variables. 
tat1st1cs 
Maximum Mean Std. Variance 
Deviation 
7.00 4 34 1 8  9445 892 
7 .00 4-2 1 75 1 .2285 1 .509 
6.69 4 . 1 884 7054 .498 
6.88 4 .42 16  .8 1 5 3 .665 
6.63 3 .9553 '178 1 .605 
7.00 4 4 1 23 .8764 . 768 
7 00 4.4 1 89 . 8492 .72 1 
The Pearson correlation matrix obtained for the variables is shown on table 4.3. The 
Pearson correlation coefficient was appropriate since the study used ratio-scaled 
variables (Husey and Husey, 1997; Cooper and Emory, 1 995 ;  and Sekaran, 2000). 
The correlations between variables have proved positive and significant. The results 
reveal a high positive correlation between managerial roles and budgetary 
participation, budgetary communication and managerial roles, budgetary control and 
managerial roles, budgetary monitoring and managerial roles, and budgetary 
evaluation at the 10 per cent level with r = 0.839, r= 0.828, r= 0.860, r= 0.868, r= 
0.650 respectively. Other correlations are also positive and significant, including those 
between managerial roles and politics at the I O  per cent level with r = 0.667. The 
coefficients of correlation between budgetary participation and politics, between 
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budgetary c.ommunication and politics, between budgetary control and politics, 
between budgetary monitoring and politics, and between budgetary evaluation and 
politics are medium with r = 0.632, r=0.638, r=0.643, r-,=O. 700, r=0.432 respectively. 
The correlations between independent variables indicate there is no multicollinearity 
that had been violated (see also section 3.5.2 .7) .  
Tob!o 4.3: Peanion Com:letlon 
Budgetary 
Budgetary Communi Budgetary Budl;atary Budgetary Managsrial 
Particioolion cation Control Moortorino Evahrallon Roles Politlcs 
Budgetary Partlcipatlo Pearson CGrra!aoo 1 .000 .873" .716" .671 "  .594" .839" .632" 
Sig. (2·tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 1 77 1 77 1 77 1 77 1 77 1 77 177 
Budgatruy Pearson Correla!io< 973• 1 .000 697" _709• 521 '  1328" .638" 
Communication Sig. (2-talled) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 1 77 1 77 1 77 ,n 1 n  1 77 1 77  
Budge!ary Control Pearson Com!!a!io< .716� .697" 1 .000 .891" .sao· .880' .643" 
Sig. (2-lallod) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 1 n  ,n 1 n  177 1 n  1 77  1 77 
Budgetary Monitoring Pearson Corm!atlol .671 " .709" .89 1 '  1 .000 .568" .868" 700' 
Sig. (2-talled) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 1 n  1 77 1 77 1 77 177 1 77 1 77  
Budgr;tary EvabJatlon Pearson Correlatlol .594" .52 1 "  .880" .568' 1 .000 .650" 432• 
�- (2-talled) .000 .000 .000 000 .000 .000 
N 1 77 1 77 1 77 1 77 1 77 177 1 77 
Managortal Roles Pearson Corre!allOt .839• .s2a· 1360· .868" 650' 1 .000 .667" 
Sig. (2-talled) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 1 77 1 77 1 77 1 77  1 77 1 77 1 77 
Politics Pearson Corralatiol .632' .638' .643" .100· .432' .667' 1 .000 
Sig. (2-talled) .000 .000 000 .000 .000 .000 
N 1 77 177 1 77 1 77 1 77 1 77 1 77 
... Correlation is slgnffi.canl at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
4.4. Results. 
This section presents the results of statistical tests and an analysis of results relating to 
the hypotheses. Subsection 4.4. l describes the results of statistical tests for direct 
associations. Subsection 4.4.2 describes the results of statistical tests for influence of 
politics on the budgeting process; subsection 4.4.3 explains the results of statistical 
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tests for influence of structural power on the budgeting process and subsection 4.4.4 
explains the results of statistical tests for the influence of individual power. 
4.4.1 .  Analysis of Direct Correlation. 
These hypotheses are: 
H l :  There is a significant relationship between budgetary participation and 
managerial roles 
H2: There is a significant relationship between budgetary communication and 
managerial roles 
H5: There is a significant relationship between budgetary control and managerial 
roles 
H5a: There is a significant relationship between budgetary monitoring and managerial 
roles 
H5b: Thete is a significant relationship between budgetary evaluation and managerial 
roles. 
The results of a statistical test using moderating regression analysis to obtain the 
coefficients of the equation 1 discussed in chapter 2, section 2.6 can be seen in 
appendix E.  For multiple regression analysis, R is the correlation between the 
observed and predicted values of the dependent variable. For this study, the 
correlation between managerial roles and budgetary participation, between manageriaJ 
roles and budgetary communication, between managerial roles and budgetary control, 
between managerial roles and budgetary monitming, and between managerial roles 
and budgetary evaluation. In other words, the strength of a relationship between two 
variables is measured by the coefficient correlation (R). The results of direct 
correlation between two variables provide evidence of strong correlation between 
- 126 -
these variables. The R·value of the coefficient correlation between budgetary 
participation and managerial rol es is significant, with R =0.839. A higher level of 
budgetary participation iR strongly associated with higher managerial roles. R2 is the 
square of this correlation. For this correlation, R2 0 ·o. 704. Meaning budgetary 
participation explains almost 70% of the variability of managerial roles. The F 
statistics is highly significct11t, indicating that the simultane.ous test that each 
coefficient i s  O is rejected. F is large when the independent variable (budgetary 
participation) helps to explain the variation in the dependent variable (managerial 
roles). Here, F value is strongly high (F:::::4 1 5 .9 1 9) and the l inear relation is 1 tighly 
significant {the p value for the F is less than<0.0005, see table E.3 ). As presented in 
table  E.4, the estimate of the model coefficients �o (imercept) and � 1 (slope) are, 
respectively, 1 .032 and 0. 778. Next are t statistics The first t statistics (6.087) tests 
the significance of the constant. The second t statistics (20.394) tests the significance 
of the s lope, which is equivalent to testing the significance of the correlation between 
bu<lgetary participation and managerial roles. 
The coefficient correlations between budgetary communication and managerial roles, 
between budgetary control and managerial roles, budgetary monitoring and 
managerial roles, and budgetary evaluation and managerial roles are R = 0.828, R= 
0.860, R =0.868, R=0.650 at p<0.05 respectively. All the resdts of the coefficient 
correlation are very strong, except the coefficient correlation between budgetary 
evaluation and managerial roles, which shows a medium correlation (R=0.650). The 
values of R2 are, respectively, 0.685,  0.740, 0.753, and 0.423 . Furthermore the F 
values are strongly high (38 1 . 1 43, 497 . 1 0 1 ,  533 .638, and 1 28 . 1 53)  and the l inear 
relations are highly significant (the p values for the F are less than<0.0005, see table 
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E.10, E.171 E.24, and E.31). As presented in the tables* coefficient in appendix E, the 
estimates of the f3o (constant) are 1.992, -0.0062, 0.288, and 1.516. The estimates of 
the 131 (slope) are, respectively, 0.591, 1.068, 0.933, and 0.732. Next are t statistics. 
The values of first t statistics show the significance of the constant. The values of 
second t statistics indicate the significance of the slope. ln addition, the results of the 
t-test indicate that the slope coefficient of the equation models is significant. The 
correlations between budgetary communication and managerial roles, between 
budgetary control and managerial roles, between budgetary monitoring and 
managerial rol� and between budgetary evaluation and managerial roles are 
t=I9.523, t=22.296, and t=23.101, and t=l l .320 respectively. Similarly, the constant 
values are also significant (at -r<0.05) except for budgetary control and budgetary 
monitoring: these values are t=14.465, t=-0.307, t=l .586, and t=S.813 respectively. 
The results of the statistical tests above provide evidence that there is a strong 
correlation between budgeting process and managerial roles - budgetary participation 
and managerial roles, between budgetary communication and managerial roles, 
between budgetary control and managerial roles, between budgetary monitoring and 
managerial roles, and between budgetary evaluation and managerial roles. Therefore, 
they support HI, H2, HS, HSa and H5b: thus, it can be concluded that greater 
involvement in the budgeting process in the organisation is strongly associated with 
higher managerial roles. The budgeting process was seen as an important means for 
assisting the managers to perform the managerial roles. If political influence is 
ignored, managers tend to use the budget to collect, store, and disemminate the 
important information that helps them perform their management roles in pursuing the 
organisational objectives. The results of the statistical test also provide substantial 
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support for previous findings in respect of the relationship between budget-related 
behaviour and managerial roles (Macintosh and Williams, 1992; and Williams et al., 
1997). 
4.4.2. Analysis of Moderating Effect 
Hypothesis 3 stated that: 
H3: The relationship between budgetary participation and managerial roles is 
moderated by politics. 
This hypothesis was tested using the equation model ( 1) presented in chapter 2, 
section 2.6. The moderating regression model was used to generate the coefficient of 
the equation model. As can be seen in appendix E, the results indicated that the 
interaction term was significant and provided support for H3 The effect of interaction 
is indicated by R2 change from direct effect to moderating effect (Cohen and Cohen, 
1975; Arnold, 1982,1984; Stone and Hollenbeck, 1984; Champoux and Peters, 1987; 
and Hartman and Moers, 1999). The incremental of R2 is 0.031 and significant (table 
E.2). The value of R2 becomes stronger comp!'lred to direct correlation, from 0.704 to 
0.735 (the incremental ofR2 is 0.031) at p<OOS level. It means that evidence is found 
in support of the hypothesis in which the influence of politics on the budgetary 
participation can be seen. The relationship between budgetnry participation and 
managerial roles is significantly moderated by politics. It is supported by the results of 
survey interviews (see discussion in 4.5.2). The results of survey interview serve to 
provide further evidence that there is a substantial influence of politics in the process 
of budgetary participation as whole. The managers have a variety of interests in the 
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outcome of their own budgets; they seek to gain political power to expand their 
bargaining ability. The managers do not see that the budgetary participation as an 
important means for assisting them to carry out the managerial roles in order to fulfil 
the organisational objectives. The managers do not focus on the budgetary 
participation for collecting, storing, and disseminating the right information that help 
them in formulating the right budget. The findings of the study are consistent with 
prior studies that found the process of budgetary participation was influenced by 
politics (Wildavsky, 1968, 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Pfeffer and Moore, 
1980; Hac!onan, 1985; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; see also Hopwood, 1974; Burcheli 
et al, 1980; Jonsson, 1982; Sisaye, 1995; Mintzberg, 1976; and Preston, 1986). 
The influence of politics on budgetary participation is depicted in figure 4.1. The 
slope (P1 see in table E.4) of the correlation between budgetary participation and 
managerial roles becomes smaller compared to direct correlation with p, -value from 
.778 to 0.645. Results of the t statistics (see in table E.4) show the significance of the 
Pt (t=I3.802 and at 't<0.05 level) and the Po {t=3.009 and at 't<0.05 level). Therefore, 
as can be seen in figure 4.1, the effect of budgetary participation on managerial roles 
is stronger when the effect of politics is ignored. When the moderating effect of 
politics is taken into account the slope of the line flattens considerably. It means that 
unit managers involved in the budgetary participation are not encouraged to improve 
the managerial roles effectiveness. By the same level of participation (Po), the 
managerial roles effectiveness decreases from Ro to R1. 
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Figure 4.1: 
Moderating Effect of Politics 
On the Relationship between Budgetary Participation and Managerial Roles 
Managerial 
Roles 
J::Iyp,othesis 4 stated that: 
Po 
Direct effect line 
Moderating effect line 
Budgetary Participation 
H4: The relationship between budgetary communication and managerial roles is 
moderated by politics. 
Table E.9 presents the results of statistical tests to assess the moderating effect of 
politics on the relationship between budgetary communication and managerial roles. 
The value of R2 becomes stronger compared to direct correlation, from .685 to . 718 
where R2 change is 0.033 and significant at p< 0.05. There is evidence that the 
relationship between budgetary communication and managerial roles is strongly 
moderated by politics. It means that politics moderates the correlation between 
budgetary communication and managerial roles. The managers seem to be reducing 
the role of budgetary communication as an important tool to perform the managerial 
roles in attaining the organisational objectives. They tend to use more the budgetary 
communication to promote their own interests rather than the organisational 
objectives. In other words, managers involved in the budgetary communication will 
not be held to managerial roles effectiveness. As the results of the survey interviews, 
the managers resort to high-sounding rhetoric in communicating with superiors and 
other parties in order to convince the superiors for getting their own budget goals, 
purposes, and aspirations (see discussion section 4.5.2). This finding, which provides 
support for H4, is similar to those of previous studies (Marginson, 1999; Bruns and 
Williams, 1993; Mintzberg, 1973 see also Hopwood, 1974; Burchell et al, 1980; 
Jonsson, 1982; Sisaye, 1995; and Preston, 1986). 
The slope (�1) of the correlation between budgetary communication and managerial 
roles becomes flatter compared to direct correlation as reflected by changes on �1-
values from 0.591 to 0.484 (table E.11). The results oft statistics are also significant 
either �1 or �o (constant). As can be seen in figure 4.2, budgetary communication has 
a strong direct effect on managerial roles, but when the moderating effect of politics is 
taken into account the correlation drops significantly. In other words, the managerial 
roles effectiveness will decrease when politics appears in the budgetary 
communication. 
Figure 4.2: 
Moderating Effect of Politics 
On the Relationship between Budgetary Communication and Managerial Roles 
Managerial 
Roles 
Direct effect line 
Moderating effect line 
Po Budgetary Communication 
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Hypothesis 6 stated that: 
H6: The relationship between budgetary control and managerial roles is moderated 
by politics. 
This hypothesis was tested using the equation model {1) presented in section 3.6.1. 
Table E.16 presents the results of a moderating regression model used to obtain the 
coefficient of the equation model indicated by changes on R2• The R2 change is .022 
and it is significant at p<0.05. Thus, there is evidence to support that politics 
influences the relationship between budgetary control and managerial roles. The 
moderating effect of politics on the relationship between budgetary control and 
managerial roles is significant. It is supported by the findings of survey interviews. 
The man�gers do not use the budget infonnation and do not analyse in-depth the 
budget variance reports for controlling their activities and coordinating functional 
activities within the organisation. The managers emphasise their own infonnation 
based on the internal operational reports for controlling their activities. They may still 
need to read the budget reports to make sure whether their operational targets can be 
achieved or and whether any inaccuracies in their activities have to be corrected under 
current budget condition. However the budget reports were not used to improve unit 
efficiency in line with organisational objectives: rather each manager tries as much as 
possible to spend their entire allocation of funds and to acquire more funds if possible. 
The influence of politics on budgetary control can be seen in figure 4.3. The slope of 
the correlation (�1) between budgetary control and managerial roles becomes flatter 
compared to direct correlation (� 1-value from 1.068 to 0.913 at t<0.05 see in table 
E.18). Therefore, it can be seen that politics has the effect of weakening the 
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relationship between managerial roles and budgetary control. This finding provides 
support for H6 and consistent with those of previous studies (Covalesky and Dirsmith, 
1986; Fernandez and Perez, 1999; Marginson, 1999; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; 
Kurunmaki, 1999; see also Christensen, 1982; Kanodia, 1993; Mintzberg, 1976; 
Preston, 1986). 
Figure4.3: 
Moderating Effect of Politics 
On the Relationship between Budgetary Control and Managerial Roles 
Managerial 
Roles 
Hypothesis 6a stated that: 
Dirc:ct effect tine 
Moderating effect line 
Po Budgetary Control 
H6a: The relationship between budgetary monitoring and managerial roles is 
moderated by politics. 
The value of R2 for budgetary monitoring becomes slightly stronger compared to 
direct correlation, from .753 to .760. In other words, even though the R2 change is 
0.007, it is still significant at p=025 (ta�le E.23). In addition, the slope of the 
correlation (�1) between budgetary monitoring and managerial roles becomes flatter 
compared to direct correlation, as reflected by the change in �1 from 0.933 to 0.844 
and it is significant at t<0.05 (table E.25). As shown in figure 4.4, the influence of 
politics weakens the relationship between budgetary monitoring and managerial roles. 
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. As discussed in section 4.5.3, the findings of survey interviews indicate that the 
organisational objectives are not seen as a reason for managers to be involved in the 
budgetary monitoring. Most managers do not have the same perceptions about the 
important role of budgetary monitoring, especially with regard to act tht,: managerial 
roles to contribute the coordination of functional activities for directing the way of 
attaining the organisational objectives. The managers tend to respond to changes in 
the environment by focusing on individual interests rather than the organisational 
interest as a whole. This finding provides support for H6a and is consistent with the 
previous studies (Covalesky and Dirsmith, 1986; Fernandez and Perez, 1999; 
Marginson, 1999; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Kurunmaki, 1999; see also Christensen, 
1982; Kanodia, 1993; Mintzberg, 1976; Preston, 1986). 
Figure 4.4: 
Moderating Effect of Politics 
On the Relationship between Budgetary Monitoring and Managerial Roles 
Managerial 
Roles 
Hypothesis 6b stated that: 
Direct effect line 
Moderating effe.:t line 
Po Budgetary Monitoring 
H6b: The relationship between budgetary evaluation and managerial roles is 
moderated by politics. 
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Table E.30 presents the results of statistical tests to assess influence of politics on 
budgetary evaluation. The value of R2 for budgetary evaluation is stronger, compared 
to direct correlation, rising from 0.423 to 0.606 and it is significant at p<0.05. There 
is evidence that the relationship between budgetary evaluation and managerial roles is 
significantly related to politics, as hypothesised. The slope of the correlation (fj1) 
between budgetary evaluation and managerial roles becomes flatter compared to 
direct correlation, which is reflected by a change of the �1-value from 0.732 to 0.501, 
and it is significant at t<0.05 level. Figure 4.5 shows how politics moderates the 
relationship between budgetary evaluation and managerial roles. The result of the 
statistical test is similar with the findings of survey interviews. The managers do not 
see the role of budget performance as important mean for evaluating subordinates to 
encourage the managerial roles. The success or failure in attaining budget turgets does 
not relate to the performance appraisal and reward system. This finding provides 
support for H6b and is consistent with previous studies (Covalesky and Dirsmith, 
1986; Fernandez and Perez, 1999; Marginson, 1999; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; 
Kurunmaki, 1999; see also Christensen, 1982; Kanodia, 1993; Mintzberg, 1976; 
Preston, 1986). 
Figure 4.5: 
Moderating Effect of Politics 
On the Relationship between Budgetary Evaluation and Managerial Roles 
Managerial 
Roles 
Po 
Direct effect line 
Moderating effect line 
Budgetary Evaluation 
4�4.3.'Analysis of Structural Power 
Hypothesis seven stated that: 
H7: The moderating effect of politics on the relationship betwe�n budgetary 
participation and managerial roles differs depending on unit manager's power. 
The study finds that there is a positive moderating effect of politics on the relationship 
between budgetary participation and managerial roles in both operational and non­
operational units, where it is indicated by incremental of R2-values. As presented in 
table F.2, the in�remental value of R2 of the operational units is equal to 0.007 and it 
is insignificant (p=l.18). However, the incremental value of R2 of non-operational 
units is 0.067 and it is significant (p<0.05). 
There is evidence to support that the moderating effect of politics in the relationship 
. between budgetary participation and managerial roles will depenc on structural 
power. In figure 4.6, the units show a difference in their slope coefficients ((3 1 - see 
table F.3). The values of (31 are 0.717 for the operational units and 0.583 for non­
operational units. In addition, all values of the t-statistics are favourable {table F .3). 
The second t statistics (I 1.116 at i<O.OS) indicates the significance of the slope, 
which presents the significance of the correlation between budgetary participation and 
managerial roles under the operational units, whereas the second t statistics (9.010 at 
1:<0.05) is under non-operational units. 
As can be seen in figure 4.6, when the effect of unit's power is taken into account, f31 
of the operational units is slighter than in non-operational units. As mentioned before
> 
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; evidence is fCl�t1d in support of the hypothesis that the moderating effect of politics is 
.signifi*8ntly clifferent depending on a unit's power (or structural power). From figure 
4,6, it .can be seen that involvement of operational units' managers in budgetary 
participation indicates a better of managerial roles effectivem.,ss, as compared to non­
operational units. The results of statistical t qts were supported by the findings of 
survey interviews as discussed in section 5.2. AU parties involved in the budgetary 
participation have to be able to bargain their demands, and this bargaining is very 
much dependent on the structural power. In regard to structural power, most managers 
believe that operational unit managers tend to be in a better position than others to get 
their demands. Also, this finding is consistent with those of prior studies (Brass and 
Burkhardt, 1992,1994; ibarra, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik, 19'14). 
Figure4.6: 
The Effect of Structural Power in Budgetary Participation 
-Operational uni managm 
Managerial 
Roles Ro R, 
- Non-operational unit managers 
Po Budgetary Participation 
Hypothesis eight stated that: 
HS: The moderating effect of politics on the relationship between budgetary 
communication and managerial roles differs depending on unit manager's power . 
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The sta�stical tests indicate that there is a positive moderating effect of politics on the 
relationship between budgetary communication and managerial roles in both 
operational and non-operational units, where it is indicated by incremental of R2 -
values. As presented in table F.6, the incremental value of R2 of the operational units 
is equal to 0.012 and it is significant (p=0.68). The incremental value of R2 of non­
operational units is 0.062 and it is also significant (p<0.05). 
From the table F.7, there is evidence to support that the influence of politics on the 
relationship between budgetary communication and managerial roles will depend on 
dq.,artmental/unit power, as hypothesised. As depicted in figure 4.7, the slope 
coefficient (�1) of the operational units is greater than the slope coefficient of non­
operational units (0.538 and 0.0.432 see table F. 7). The slope coefficients are positive 
and significant at -r<0.05 (t-values are 9.523 and 8.677 - see table F.7). This finding 
was supported by the findings of survey interviews as discussed in section 5.2. 
Operational unit managers seem to be in better position when all units communicate 
with superiors or the budget committee for deciding the budget allocation. The finding 
of survey questionnaires is also consistent with earlier studies (Brass and Burkhardt, 
1992,1994; Ibarra, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). 
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Figure4.7: 
The Effect of Structural Power in Budgetary Communication 
Managerial 
Roles 
Hypothesis nine stated that: 
- Operational unit managers 
� 
- Non-operational unit mamgcrs 
Po Budgetary Communication 
H9: The moderating effect of politics on the relationship between budgetary control 
and managerial roles differs depending on unit manager's power. 
As can be seen in table F.10, there is a positive moderating effect of politics on the 
relationship between budgetary control and managerial roles in both operational and 
non-operational units, where it is indicated by incremental of R2-values. The 
incremental value of R2 of the operational units is equal to 0.031 and it is significant 
(p=0.02). Whereas the incremental value ofR2 of non-operational units is 0.017 and it 
is insignificant (p=O. l 0). 
Evidence is found to assess the effect of structural power in the budgetary control. 
Figure 4.8 describes differences in the degree of influence of unit's power between 
the slope coefficients (�1) of the operational units and non-operational units. The �1 
of the operational units is smaller than �o of non-operational units (�1=0.896 and 
�o=0.921 see table F.l I). Next the values of the t-statistics are favourable. The second 
'.' 140.-
t statjsµcs (10.459 at 1:<0.05) indicates the significance of the slope-� 1, which 
presents the significance of the correlation between budgetary control and managerial 
roles under the operational units, whereas the second t statistic ( 10. 773 at -r<O.OS) is 
under non-operational units. Therefore, there is evidence that the influence of power 
in non-operational units is greater in its effects on the relationship between budgetary 
control and managerial roles than it is in operational units. In other words, the 
influence of politics in operational units has a lesser effect on managerial roles 
effectiveness thsn it does in non-operational units. As discussed in section 5.3, 
operational unit managers tend to not use the budget reports compared to other units 
for controlling their activities because of the success or failure in attaining the budget 
targets does not relate to the performance appraisal. Unfortunately, the measurements 
of perfonnance appraisal are mostly based on attaining the operational targets. Thus 
they will· have political gain for using their internal operational reports instead of 
budget reports. In contrast, non-operational unit managers tend to use more the 
budget reports because they have no substantial reasons to go away from the budget 
reports. Non-operational unit managers view the budget reports as an important 
means for spending all funds allocated through current information about their 
budgets position. This finding supports H9, and is also consistent with those of 
previous studies (Brass and Burkhardt, 1992, l 994; Ibarra, 1993; Pfeffer and Salanci� 
1974). 
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Figure 4.8: 
The Effect of Structural Power on Budgetary Control 
Managerial 
Roles 
Hypothesis H9a stated that: 
- Non-operational unit managcn 
-Operational unit managers 
Po Budgetary Control 
H9a: The moderating effect of politics on the relationship between budgetary 
monitoring and managerial roles differs depending on unit manager's power. 
Table F.14 indicates that there is a positive moderating effect of politics on the 
relationship between budgetary monitoring and managerial roles in both operational 
and non-operational units, where it is indicated by incremental of R2-values. The 
incremental value of R 2 of the operational units is equal to 0.014 and it is significant 
(p=0.025). But the incremental valu'.! of R 2 of non-operational units is 0.002 and it is 
insignificant (p=0.452). 
As depicted in figure 4.9, the units show a difference in their slope coefficients 
(�1). The slope coefficient - � 1 of the operational units is smaller than �1 of the 
non-operational units (0.837 and 0.879 see table F.15). Furthermore the values of 
the t-statistics are satisfied. The second t statistics ( 11. 707 at -c<0.05} indicates the 
significance of the slope-� 1 , which presents the significance of the correlation 
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between budgetary monitoring and managerial roles under the operational units, 
whereas the second t statistics (9.213 at ,;<0.05) is under non-operational units. 
Therefore, there is evidence that the moderating effect of politics is significantly 
related to the unit's power. The influence of political power in operational units 
has a lesser effect on the relationship between budgetary monitoring and 
managerial roles than it has in non-operational units. This finding supports H9a, 
and is also consistent with findings of previous studies (Brass and Burkhardt, 
1992,1994; Ibarra, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). 
Figure4.9: 
The Effect of Structural Power in Budgetary Monitoring 
Managerial 
Roles 
Hypothesis H9b stated that: 
- Non-operational unit managers 
- Operational unit managers 
Po Budgetary Monitoring 
H9b: The moderating effect of politics on the relationship between budgetary 
evaluation and managerial roles differs depending on unit manager's power. 
Table F.18 indicates that there is a positive moderating effect of politics on the 
relationship between budgetary monitoring and managerial roles in both operational 
and non-operational units. The incremental value of R2 of the operational units is 
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equal to 0.177 and it is significant (p<O. 0005). Whereas the incremental value of R 2 of 
non-operational units is 0.187 and it is significant (p<0.005). 
Figure 4.9 presents that the units show a difference in their slope coefficients (J3 1). 
The slope coefficient - f31 of the operational units is smaller than (} 1 of the non­
operational units (0.477 with t=S.278 at 't<0.05 and 0.536 with t=7.062 at t<0.05 
see table F .19). Therefore, there is evidence to support that a stronger the 
moderating effect of politics in the relationship between budgetary monitoring and 
managerial roles will lead to degree of unit's power. The influence of political 
power in operational units has less effect on the relationship between budgetary 
evaluation and managerial roles than it does in non-operational units. This finding 
of the study supports H9b and is also consistent with findings of previous studies 
(Brass and Burkhardt, I 992, 1994; Ibarra, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). 
Managerial 
Roles 
Figure4.l0: 
The Effect of Structural Power in Budgetary Evaluation 
- Non-operational unit managm; 
- Operational unit managers 
Po Budgetary Evaluation 
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4.4.4. Analysis of Individual Power 
Hypothesis ten stated that: 
HlO:The moderating effect of politics on the relationship between budgetary 
participation and managerial roles differs depending on individual unit 
manager's qualification. 
The study extends .ts hypoilieses to examine the influence of the power of 
individual's qualifications on the relationship between budgeting process and 
managerial roles. The study posits that an individual's educational qualifications 
detennine the degree of his or her political influence on the budgetary participation. 
The results of statistical tests indicate that influence of individual qualification on the 
relationship between budgetary participation and managerial roles is positive as can 
be seen in the incremental value ofR2 (table G.2). The incremental value ofR2 of the 
high individual qualification is 0.046 and it is significant (p<0.0005). But the 
incremental value of R2 of low individual qualification is 0.06 and it is insignificant 
(p=0.332). 
Table G.3 clearly indicates that there is evidence to support that the level of individual 
qualification will influence the moderating eftect of politics in the relationship 
between budgetary participation and managerial roles. As depicted in figure 4.11, the 
relationship between budgetary participation and managerial roles is different between 
individuals with high qualifications and their less well-qualified colleagues as 
reflected by the slope coefficients - �1(0.599 and �o=0.745). The values of the t­
statistics are favourable. The second t statistics (10.728 at t<0.05) indicates the 
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significance of the slope-�1, which presents the significance of the correlation 
between budgetary participation and managerial roles under high individual 
qualification, whereas the second t statistics (8.736 at t<0.05) is under low individual 
qualification. In regard to individual qualifications, survey interviews served evidence 
that individual qualifications are an important factor in determining the budget 
decision. A manager with a sound educational background can be expected to enjoy 
greater bargaining power. The result provides evidence to support H l O and supports 
the findings of previous studies (see discussion in section 5.2 and Hackman, 1985). 
Figure 4.11: 
The Effect of Individual Power in Budgetary Participation 
Managerial 
Roles 
Hypothesis eleven stated that: 
Po 
- Low individual unit manager's 
qualification 
- High individual unit manager's 
qualification 
Budgetary Participation 
HI I: The moderating effect of politics on the relationship between budgetary 
communication and managerial roles differs depending individual unit manager's 
qualification. 
Table G.6 indicates that there is a positive moderating effect of politics on the 
relationship between budgetary communication and managerial roles in both high 
individual qualification and low individual qualification situations. The incremental 
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value ofR2 of the high individual qualification is 0.51 and it is significant (p<0.0005). 
But the incremental value of R2 of low individual qualification is 0.002 and it is 
insignificant {p=0.554). 
The influence of individual qualifications in budgetary communication can be seen in 
figure 4.12. The figure 4.12 shows a difference in their slope coefficients (�1). The 
slope coefficient - �1 of the high individual qualification is smaJler than �1 of the low 
individual qualification (0.449 and 0.556 see table G.7). The values of the t-statistics 
are favourable. The second t statistics (9.667 at -c<0.05) indicates the significance of 
the slope-�1. which presents the significance of the correlation between budgetary 
communication and managerial roles under high individual qualification, whereas the 
second t statistics (8.986 at -c<0.05) is under low individual qualification. Therefore 
there is evidence to support that the influence of politics in the budgetary 
communication process will be directly associated with the level of individual 
qualification. The results provide evidence to support H 11 and the finding of previous 
studies (see discussion in section 5.2 and Hackman, 1985). 
Managerial 
Roles 
Figure 4.12: 
The Effect oflndividual Power in Budgetary Communication 
Po 
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Budgetary Communication 
Hypothesis twelve stated that: 
H 12: The moderating effect of politics on the relationship between budgetary control 
and managerial roles differs depending on individual unit manager's 
qualification. 
The results of statistical tests indicate that the influence of individual qualification 
power on the relationship between budgetary control and managerial roles is positive 
for high and low individual qualifications. As presented in Table G. l 0, the 
incremental value of R2 of the high individual qualification is 0.036 and it is 
significant (p<0.0005). But the incremental value of R2 oflow individual qualification 
is 0.004 and it is insignificant (p>0.05). 
The influence of the power of individual qualification in the budgetary control can be 
seen in figure 4.13. This figure clearly indicates that the relationship between 
budgetary control and managerial roles varies according to individual qualifications, 
as reflected by the slope coefficients - �1 (0.829 and 1.101 see table G.11). From table 
G.11, the values of the t-statistics are favourable. The second t statistics (11.036 at 
,;<0.05) indicates the significance of the slope-�1, which presents the significance of 
the correlation between budgetary control and managerial roles under high individual 
qualification, whereas the second t statistics (11.494 at ,;<0.05) is under low 
individual qualification. Therefore there is significant evidence to support that the 
moderating effect of politics in the relationship between budgetary control and 
managerial roles is depending on level of individual qualification. The result provides 
evidence to support Hl2 and also supports the findings of previous studies (see 
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discussion in section 5.2 and Brass, 1984 see also Merchant, 1984; Brass and 
Burkhardt, 1993; French and Raven, 1959). 
Figure 4.13: 
The Effect of Individual Power in Budgetary Control 
Managerial 
Rol� 
The Hypothesis Hl2a stated that: 
Po 
- Low individual unit rnanaga's 
qualification 
- High individual unit manager's 
qualification 
Budgetary Control 
Hl2a: The moderating effect of politics on the relationship between budgetary 
monitoring and managerial roles differs depending on individual unit 
manager's qualification. 
Table G.10 indicates that the influence of individual qualification power on the 
relationship between budgetary monitoring and managerial roles is positive for both 
high and low individual qualifications. The incremental value of R2 of the high 
individual qualification is 0.012 and it is significant (p=0.015). But the incremental 
value ofR2 oflow individual qualification is 0.0009 and it is insignifi�t (p>0.05). 
As can be seen in table G.15, the coefficients indicate there the differemce in the 
influence of individual qualification power on the relationshif betwee,� budgetary 
monitoring and managerial roles is positive when comparing high and low individual 
qualifications. The influence of individual power on budgetary monitoring can be 
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shown in figure 4.14. This figure indicates that the relationship between budgetary 
monitoring and managerial roles is slightly different between highly qualified 
individuals and their less well-qualified colleagues, as reflected by the slope 
coefficients-(3, (0.813 and 0.905 see table G.15). The values of the t-statistics are 
favourable. The second t statistic ( 11. 708 at -c<0.05) indicates the significance of the 
slope-(31, which presents the significance of the correlation between budgetary 
monitoring and managerial roles under high individual qualification, whereas the 
second t statistics (9.406 at ,:<0.05) is under low individual qualification. Therefore 
there is evidence to support H 12a and also supports the findings of previous studies 
(see discussion in section 5.3 and Brass, 1984 see also Merchant, 1984; Brass and 
Burkhardt, 1993; French and Raven, 1959). 
Figure4.14: 
The Effect of Individual Power in Budgetary Monitoring 
Managerial 
Roles 
The Hypothesis Hl2b stated that: 
Po 
- Low individual unit man!lger's 
qualification 
- High individual wtit manager's 
qualification 
Budgetarf Monitoring 
Hl2b: The moderating effect of politics on the relationship between budgetary evaluation and 
managerial roles differs depending on individual unit manager's qualification. 
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Table G.18 clearly indicates that the influence of individual qualification power on the 
relationship between budgetary monitoring and managerial roles is positive for high 
and low individual qualifications. The incremental value of R2 of the high individual 
qualification is 0.222 and it is significant (p<0.05). Whereas the incremental value of 
R 2 of low individual qualification is 0. l 05 and it is also sipificant (p<0.05}. 
The results of statistical tests in table G.19 indicate that the difference in the influence 
of individual qualification power on the relationship between budgetary evaluation 
and managerial roles is positive when comparing high and low individual 
qualifications. From the table G.19, there is evidence to support that the moderating 
effect of politics on the relationship between budgetary evaluation and managerial 
roles will depend on the level of individual qualification. The influence of individual 
qualification power 011 budgetary evaluation is shown in figure 4.15. This figure 
indicates that the relationship between budgetary evaluation and managerial roles is 
slightly different between highly qualified individuals and their less well-qualified 
colleagues, as reflected as reflected by the slope coefficients - JJ 1 (0.435 and 0.662 see 
table G.19}. The values of the t-statistics are favourable. The second t statistics { 6.217 
at 1:<0.05} indicates the significance of the slope-�1, which presents the significance 
of the correlation between budgetary evaluation and managerial roles under high 
individual qualification, whereas the second t statistics (5.860 at 1:<0.05) is under low 
individual qualification. Again, the result provides evidence to support H 12b and is 
consistent with previous studies (see discussion in section 5.3 and Brass, 1984 see 
also Merchant, 1984; Brass and Burkhardt, 1993; French dllO �dven, 1959). 
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Figure 4.15: 
The Effect oflndividual Power in Budgetary Evaluation 
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CHAPTERS 
INTERVIEW RESULTS 
This chapter describes the findings of interviews conducted with managers for the 
purpose of assessing the role of politics in the budgeting process. The format of this 
chapter is as follows: The first section provides a brief introduction to the Industry 
and the sample companies. The rest of this chapter analyses the role of politics in the 
process of budgetary participation, budgetary control, budgetary monitoring, and 
budgetary evaluation. 
5.1. Some Facts About the Fertiliser Industry 
In line with the second five-year development plan (Repelita II, 1974-1979), the 
Indonesiar, government was planning to execute an Agricultural Development 
Program, with the aim ·of making the country self sufficient in food production, 
especially rice. To make the program successful, fertiliser was considered as the most 
essential input. The national requirements for fertiliser by the end of the 2nd Five 
Year Development Plan had been estimated at 570.000 tons Near (Kujang's annual 
report 1999). At that time, only one fertiliser factory was in existence - Pupuk 
Sriwijaya PT. Since then, the Indonesian government has concentrated on 
encouraging the local fertiliser industry to serve domestic markets, thus supporting the 
Agricultural program in rice self-sufficiency. Following the discovery of several 
natural gas wells in different parts of Indonesia, the Government decided to take 
advantage of these resources to support the Agricultural Development Program. Since 
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natural gas is the main raw material for urea fertiliser production, establishing 
fertiliser factories attained prime importance. The government developed several new 
fertiliser companies in areas close to natural gas resources. 
The government had already established Pupuk Sriwijaya 1959 to cover the demand 
for fertiliser within Indonesia. As mentioned before, the government realised the 
necessity to establish more such companies in order to sustain the agricultural 
program to become self sufficient in food, especially in rice. Most Indonesian people 
work in the agricultural sector, which was coming under pressure with population 
increases, and this was another reason for establishing more fertiliser companies. The 
new companies operate in different places within the Indonesian archipelago. Three 
companies, Pupuk Sriwijaya, Pupuk Kujang, and Petrokimia Gresik, aim to serve 
fertiliser markets in western and middle Indonesia. Surplus production of these 
companies feeds eastern Indonesian markets. Pupuk Kaltim serves the eastern areas 
exclusively, including Borneo, Sulawesi, Maluku, Papua, and other smaller islands. 
General information regarding companies can be seen in table 5.1. 
The main activity of the companies is the production of fertilisers, including urea, 
ammonia, ZP, and SP 36. The Indonesian government strictly regulates urea 
production: urea must be sold to the domestic markets first in order to support the 
agricultural program of self-sufficiency, described earlier. The companies are allowed 
to export surplus production of urea. The·government does not regulate the market for 
ammonia, ZP, and SP 36: the companies are allowed to sell these products both 
locally and overseas. The ammonia is not produced directly, but as a by-product of 
fertiliser. The companies have developed several subsidiaries to utilise idle facilities 
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Established 
Location 
Production 
capacity/year 
• Ammonia 
• Urea 
• ZA 
• SP-36 
Production 
• Ammonia 
• Urea 
• ZA 
• SP-36 
Sales (millions) 
Net Profit (millions) 
Total assets (millions) 
Number of employees 
Table 5.1: General Information on Companies 
Year Ended 1999 
PUPUK PETRO KIM IA PUPUK KUJANG 
SRIWIJAYA GRESIK 
Dec 1959 May 1975 June 1975 
Palembang, South Gresik, East Java Kerawang, West 
Sumatera Java 
1,499,000 tons 445,000 tons 383,000 tons 
2,262,000 tons 462,000 tons 587,000 tons 
- 650,000 tons -
- 1,000,000 tons -
1,342,410 tons 332,680 tons 367,686 tons 
I, 997,260 tons 271,122 tons 560,142 tons 
- 457,401 tons 
- 854,060 tons 
Rp 1,477,925; Rp 1,635,258; Rp452,622; 
Rp 1,189,008; Rp 324,904; Rp 93,841; 
Rp 6,497,058; Rp 1,965,381; Rp624,353; 
5,351 3,927 1,219 
Source: annual report, I 999. 
PUPUK 
KALTIM 
Dec 1977 
Bontang, East 
Borneo 
1,419,000 tons 
2,4!0,000 tons 
-
-
1,407,772 tons 
1,904,300 tons 
Rp 722,528; 
Rp 327,605; 
Rp 2,601,465; 
2,519 
(e.g. an industrial park) and materials (e.g. melamine). The international fertiliser 
price is generally much higher than the domestic market price, but as mentioned 
earlier, the production of fertiliser must first fulfil the demands of the domestic 
market: only the surplus can be sold to international markets. The Indonesian 
government determines the domestic fertiliser price. In 1999, the four sampled 
companies controlled .± 90% of the total market share of fertiliser in Indonesia. 
As state owned enterprises, the companies have a dual mission, namely, as profit­
making organisations and as agents of regional development (Annual Report, 1999). 
As agents of regional development, the companies bear social responsibilities towards 
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their surrounding environment. Therefore, they are continually required to make 
efforts to create an environment conducive to regional development, by providing 
various means of support and assistance to local communities. Human resource 
development programs centre on practical training and research, including apprentice 
training and the running of vocational courses. Companies are also involved in the 
development of public infrastructure such as religious centres, roads, bridges and 
street lighting. They also establish and maintain sporting and arts facilities. Lastly, 
they are actively involved in programs designed to help the poor and empower under­
developed villages. The companies are also responsible for fostering small businesses 
and co-operatives. This includes assistance in technical know-how, management, 
capital and marketing. 
The organisational structure of each company consists of five Directorates (with the 
exception of Kujang, which has four), each headed by a director. The leading stratum 
of the structure i s  the Board of Directors; under them are assistant leaders of 
compartments, then executives and operations managers who g1wern the 
departments/divisions. Below that level is the supporting elements which comprise the 
bureaux, and the functionaries of control who lead Internal Supervisory Units. 
The study mvo!ved respondents who come from several 1mits both operational and 
non-operational, with current positions as head or middle managers. 
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5.2. Effect of Politics on Budgeting Process 
This subsection describes the role of politics on the budgeting process, baseci on the 
findings ot interviews. It has been found that political power has influence on many 
budget-setting activities. Moreover, political influence also plays a role throughout the 
process of budgetary control. The sampled companies set their own detailed 
procedures for the development of the budget. 
The next section will describe the role of politics during several activities m the 
budgeting process, namely : ( I )  formulation of budget parameters, (2) unit budget 
formulation, (3) budget consolidation, (4) budget approval, ( S )  budget monitoring, 
and (6) budget evaluation. Activities I to 4 involve bi..ldgetary participation, whilst 
activities 5 and 6 are part of the process of budgetary control. 
5.2.1. Political Power in the Proress of Budgetary Participation 
This section describes the role of politics in the process of budgetary participation, 
which starts with the process of determining budget parameters and ends with the 
approval of the budget. It has been found that managers ' involvement in the process 
of budgetary participation does not encourage the production of a "right budget" 
which is in line with the company objectives. Managers involved in the process of 
budgetary participation mostly strive to promote their own particular interests, which 
often deviate from the organisational objective as a whole. 
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The findings of the survey interviews provide evidence that the effect of politics on 
the process of budgetary participation is substantial. These findings support the results 
of statistical tests (see section 4.3.2) and prior studies (Fernandez et al, 1 999; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1976; Pfeffer and Moore, 1980; Hackman, 1985; see also Burchell et al, 
1980; Hopwood, 1976; Lukka, 1988; Pettigrew, 1972 ; Pfeffer, 1981 ). The process of 
budgetary participation is shown in figure 5. 1 
Figure S . I  
The Process o f  Budgetary Participation 
F onnulation of Budget 
Parameters 
Formulation of Unit 
Budget 
Consol idauon of lhe 
Budget 
Approval of Budget 
5.2.1.1. Formulation of Budget Parameters 
The first step in the process of budgetary participation is the determination of budget 
parameters that will be used by the company as a basis for the budget figures. Budget 
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parameters include, for example, production targets, interest rate, exchange rate3, and 
the inflation rate. The Budget Committee will meet to propose items of budget 
parameters4 . Based on the proposed budget parameters, the department in charge 
calculates the exact figures for every singk item of the budget parameters. After every 
item in the budget parameters has been calculated, the Budget Committee will 
evaluate the feasibility of every item prepared and submitted by the departments. The 
Budget Committee always considers general questions, such as the possibility of the 
marketing department being able to sell the proposed production target, or the 
engineering department being able to support speci fie proposed production targets. 
The department heads explained that all participants connected with the prodL .;tion 
targets would compromise to determine the "right" production target. However, i t  
quickly became apparent that in most cases, each department head wi ll focus on 
furthering their own proposals rather than the interests of the orga.,isation as a whole, 
and each department head will exercise whatever power they have to influence the 
Budget Committee to accept their proposed budget parameters. 
The interviewees believe that the detennination of budget parameters plays a critical 
part in determining budget a llocations. In other words, department heads act in 
accordance with their realisation of the importance of budget parameters as a basis for 
determining budget allocations: furthermore, they know it will link directly tc, 
department performance appraisal. The participants view the conflict of interest in 
regard to the proposed budget parameters as a normal part of determining budget 
1 The company is concerned with the exchange rate because the companies make substantial 
international transactions such as fertiliser export and raw materials import. 
4 The company, as a matter of policy, puts together an activity plan and a budget plan, collectively 
known as RKAP. These activities are the responsibility of the budget committee: therefore, in this 
study, the term RKAP is interchangeable with " budget committee". The members of trus committee 
(abbreviated in this study to BC) are all department. bureau, and internal supervisory heads. The 
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parameters. The conflicts of interest are usually triggered by differences in purpose, 
aspiration, and beliefs of each department. These conflicts of interests inherent in the 
process of budget parameter setting have to be settled by compromise, involving all 
the participants. The Budget Committee has to come up with the final budget 
parameters. As all department heads are keen to obtain their own desired results, there 
will be a process of bargaining with the Bwiget Committee to resolve these 
conflicting demands. Most interviewees reveal that political power possessed by 
individual department heads is an important factor in bargaining during the process of 
determining the budget parameters. 
One department head described the process a:, follows: 
''When I ' m  appointed by the Budget Committee to develop a specific budget 
parameter, I will  carefully formulate this with my subordinates, based on an in-depth 
evaluation of my department 's goals and aspirations. As leader of my department, I 
am responsible for maintaining and promotmg my department 's  image and 
reputation. Therefore, while the Budget Committee is evaluating the proposed budget 
parameters, I will try to persuade the Budget Committee to accept my proposals, by 
giving them a strong argument that explains how every detail of my proposed budget 
parameters will contribute to the achievement of the organisation ' s  obJect1ves. I f  
there i s  an adjustment from the Budget Committee with regard to  my proposed 
budge� parameters, my personal reputation as a leader m my departmenl and the 
overall performance of my department can be affected I bel ieve that department 
heads in my organisation do not want their proposed budget parameters to be reJected 
by the Budget Committee before they themselves have had chance to argue their 
positions. Because of conflicts of interest among department heads. the Budget 
Committee has to create a compromise solution when deciding budge, parameters. 
As a department head, I will exercise my power to influence the P •1dgct Comrmttee ·s 
decisions. 
According to the economic theory of the budgetary process, the objectives of 
department heads during the process of budget parameter setting is to come up with a 
better quality budget parameter with the use of proper information and clearer task co-
chairman of the BC is head of the financial and administration compartment (a compartment head co-
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ordination, in order to achieve the organisation's  objectives. However, based on the 
discussion above, it would appear that the department heads' involvement in the 
process of budget parameter setting has little to do with the welfare of the whole 
organisation: rather, the emphasis is more on the interests of his own department. 
The complexity of task interdependency among departments does not facilitate a 
process of information sharing for creating better budget parameters in line with 
organisational objectives. Moreover, limited information regarding the external 
environment does not encourage them to search for and distribute more information to 
facilitate the production of a better budget. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
involvement of department heads in the process of budget parameter decision-making 
is more consistent with social theory, in particular, political activity, which reflects the 
dominance of individual or group interests rather than the organisation · s interests. 
Furthermore, the involvement of the department heads in the process of budget 
parameter setting is not fully consistent with psychological theory. The reason all 
department heads are equally dissatisfied with the outcomes of budget parameter 
setting is that the outcome is dominated by political power. Even though all 
department heads have an equal opportunity to explain their proposed budget 
parameters, all department heads cannot exercise equal power to influence budget 
parameter decisions. Consequently, the department heads do not trust the budget 
parameters, which leads to a reduction in their commitment to the process. These 
conditions are reflected in the number of budget revisions at each budget-monitoring 
meeting (see section 5.2). 
ordinates departments) .  
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5.2.1 .2. Formulation of Unit Budget 
After budget parameters have been decided, all units are expected to r,repare 
individual proposed unit budgets, which have to be ba5ed on the budget parameters 
and the general budget assumption. The rule-of-thumb regarding the general budget 
assumption is that the previous budget realisation is added to the expected inflation 
rate for the follo"'ing period. The proposed unit budget may not always be consistent 
with this general budget assumption, in which case the chance of getting approval 
from the Budget Committee is very small. Therefore, a special µroposal has to be 
developed to back up an uncommon proposed unit budget. The explanation of the 
interviewed manager regarding the rule-of-thumb is as follows: 
Basically, a unit may create a proposed unit budget higher than the rule-of-thumb. 
However, unit managers have to put extra effort into getting approval for such a 
proposed unit budget from the Budget Committee. There are a lot of things that have 
to be completed to obtain the Budget Committee· s approval, and supportmg 
documents also have to be submitted. Therefore, I can conclude that although the 
chances of approval are there, they are relati·Je]y small . 
Researchers indicate that inconsistency of ideology regarding budget parameters and 
the rule-of-thumb of budget assumption may detract from the ends of the budget 
objectives {see Hopwood, 1 976; Fernandez et al . ,  1 999). The company regards the 
budget parameters and the rule-of-thumb as the maximum amount of available 
resources for the proposed budget. Therefore, when asked to develop a proposed unit 
budget, most unit managers develop a higher proposed budget than the previous 
budget realisation. Most managers usually try to use up the maximum amount of 
available resources. In this case, the purpose of the budget as a mechanism of 
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efficiency in the organisation may not be realised. Managers do not make an 
evaluation as to whether or not an increase in the proposed budget is real ly needed by 
the organisation to achieve its obj ectives. 
The process of unit budget setting within the company is as follows: unit managers 
request their sub-units to identify their budget requirements, based on their 
operational targets and considering the budget parameters and budget assumption 
rule-of-thumb. Unit managers are very concerned with their operational targets, since 
their rewards and their performance appraisal are based on their achievement of 
operational targets rather than the achievement of their budget targets {see subsection 
5.2.2. ) .  As one respondent puts it: 
I express my proposed budget plan based on my unit's requirements and purposes. I 
also consider the budget parameters and the budget rule-of-thumb. I request my 
subordinates to prepare the sub-unit's budget requirements in order to support our 
operational activities. 
Unit managers will usual ly accommodate a sub-unit 's proposed budget after they have 
evaluated its features in l ine with the expected performance of the sub unit. Several 
uuit managers said that they did not have enough information about their sub-units ' 
activities; therefore they are obliged to gamer information from their sub-unit r 
explanations regarding their proposed budgets. On the sub-unit level. it is possible for 
one-unit manager to allocate his/her sub-unit budget in a manner inconsistent with the 
rule-of-thumb: however, overal l ,  proposed unit budgets have to be in l ine with the 
rule-of-thumb. 
Inconsistency of a sub-unit 's proposed budget with the rule-of-thumb would be 
accepted, as long as the workings of the sub-unit concerned are critical to the unit 's 
- 1 63 -
overall operational activities. Therefore. sub-units have to be able to convince their 
managers that their proposed budgets have a considerable contribution to make to the 
overall operational unit performance. As a result, unit managers sometimes have to 
sacrifice allocations for other sub-units ' budgets. In most cases, sub-units will try as 
much as possible to protect their interests and goals with respect to budget re­
allocation. Therefore, all parties involved in the process have to be able to negotiate 
their demands, and this negotiation process is very much dependant on the individual 
and unit bargaining power of each party. Information transfer from unit manager to 
sub-units or vice versa and information transfer among sub-units have to be addressed 
in order to strengthen the quality of the overall unit budget. 
As the leader of the unit, a unit manager may make a biased budget allocation, since 
unit managers often use subjective judgement of individual and structural factors to 
evaluate a sub-unit 's proposed budget. "Individual factors" refer to persons with 
superior attributes in the realms of skill, k11owledge, and information, perhaps because 
they have higher formal qualifications and more experience than their colleagues. It 
can readily be seen, also, that such individuals have a bargaining advantage in the 
negotiation process. "Structural factors" usually have to do with the degree of 
importance the sub-unit has with regard to the support of the overall unit operation: 
important sub-units tend to have superior bargaining power in comparison with 
others. 
Clearly, this study has found that one effect of politics on the process of unit budget 
setting is that the intentions of individuals are often ignored. Certainly, it would seem 
that that middle managers frequently show a bias when evaluating their sub-unit's 
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proposed budgets. In an attempt to salvage their goals, sub-units may resort to high­
sounding rhetoric to try and convince middle management about the appropriateness 
of their proposed budget figures. For example, in the interview one manager indicated 
that: 
I v.111 examine whether my sub-unit 's  proposed budget significantly supports our 
unit' s  operational activities. I will also consider the consequences on my unit ' s  
performance of a delay caused by lack of agreement. I will focus on the unit 's 
operational targets, because this might give me an advantage in subsequent 
performance evaluation. 
Individual factors also influence my decision on budget allocation to subordinates. 
My subordinates with higher educational qualifications and a proven skill base will 
be entrusted with more resources than their less educa• .d colleagues. Another 
important factor affecting this allocation is the convincing power of the subordinate, 
which in most cases depends on his or her educational background. 
There i s  an indication that unit managers' motivation for close involvement in the 
process of unit budget setting is to defend their own uni t ' s  interests. Most individual 
units try to influence budget al location decisions by presenting supporting arguments 
in favour of their own unit's particular aspirations and goals. 
In the words of a manager: 
So far, as a representative of my unit, my involvement in budget setting has meant 
that I have to concentrate on the interests and aspirations of my own unit rather than 
those of the organisation as a whole. I oelieve that my actions are reasonable, since I 
have to base my appraisal of my subordinates' performances on their achievement of 
operational targets. Moreover, my unit 's performance will be appraised by my 
superior, based on my unit 's achievement c f  operational targets. If a unit manager is 
unable to present, ancl/or convincingly defend, their own unit 's  aspiratioru in the 
process of budget setting. there is a big chance that thei1 umt 's proposed budget will 
be sacrificed in favour of other units. As a result of that, unit operation will 
deteriorate. 
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5.2. t .3. Consolidation of the Proposed Budgets 
The Budget Committee will examine a unit 's overall proposed budget, evaluating 
whether or not it is in line with budget parameters and the budget assumptions' rule­
of-thumb. As a starting point for evaluation, the Budget Committee will exarninr 
overall profit targets. Giving regard to the budget rule-of-thumb, the Budget 
Committee will examine whether the profit target is higher than previous budget 
realisation. Generally, the first overall picture of a unit 's proposed budget is not 
appropriate to the desired target profit. In fact. in most cases, it tends to indicate a 
lower profit target, because increases in expenses in the proposed budget are often 
higher than revenue budgeted. This condition has been mentioned by one of the 
respondents, as follows: 
Then, the entire department's proposed budget would be evaluated m the department 
heads ' budget meeting, ar.d the entire department ' s  proposed budget consolidated. 
Based on this consolidated budget, the BC wil l  evaluate whether the overall proposed 
budget is in line with budget policy and whether the proposed budget shows some 
improvement over the previous budget realisation. In most cases. the consolidated 
department proposed budget (especially expense budgets) shows an increase over the 
previous budget realisation. As a consequrnce of these factors, the expected 
profitability of the company in the fol lowing year will be reduced. However, as we 
know, the rule-of-thumb is that the expected profitability of the company has to 
increase over that of the previous year. Therefore, to improve the expected 
profitability of the company, and to achieve the rule-of-thumb, the BC wil l  try to find 
alternative means of improving efficiency of the company's  activities through 
reducing what they perceive to be unnecessary expenses. 
If the profit target does not come up to expectations, the Budget Committee will make 
several adjustments. Firstly, unit managers will be asked to voluntarily revise their 
proposed budgets. If the improved proposed budget still does not meet with the 
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expected target profit, unit managers will be asked by the Budget Committee to 
explain how they arrived at the figures in their proposals. Because of factors 
discussed earlier - placement cf  unit aspirations and goals above those of the 
company as a whole, and poor communication between uni ts and between managers 
and sub-managers within a unit - conflict is likely to arise as a result of inconsistency 
between individual unit target budgets. One of the respondents mentioned that: 
Every unit has a specific goal, and units are not likely to have similar goals. As 
managers, we are often faced by difficulties in trying to reconcile each individual 
unit's target with al l the others, in order to produce an optimal budget. Since 
available funds are limited, it is impossible to accept each unit 's proposed budget in 
its entirety. Unit managers have to start to bargain with each other, and with the 
Budget Committee, to reach a compromise budget. As a manager. I have to present 
evidence of my own abilities and my unit's capabilities, in order to gain stronger 
bargaining power, if I want to get full approval of my proposed budget. 
Finally, the Budget Committee has to bargain with the individual units, resolve all 
conflicts and decide on a budget allocation for each unit, by deciding whether the 
units' proposed budgets will be accepted, adjusted or delayed. Before the Budget 
Committee makes these decisions, unit managers are asked by the Budget Committee 
to explain their proposed budget objectives. !n reality, most managers believe that 
their abi l i ty to sway the Budget Committee is a substantial factor in the acceptance of 
their proposed budget. Unit managers 3.fe thus motivated to put extra effort into 
attaining their proposed budget, since acceptance of the budget affirms their 
legitimacy in regard to decision making. In a similar vein to the manager quoted 
above, another manager said :  
Like every other manager, I try t o  present a proposed budget that I think has the 
potential for getting approval while promising the best possible resource outcome to 
my department. Then superior managers will !'valuate my proposed budget. How 
does my department 's budget look? How does my unit 's budget look? How are the 
figures in my budget, compared to my previous budget realisation? 
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After hearing explanations from unit managers, the Budget Committee will evaluate 
the viability of unit's proposed budget. Two criteria are used by the Budget 
Committee to determine the acceptance of the proposed budget, namely, structural 
and individual power (see section 4.4. 1 .2). 
In regard to structural power, operational units• proposed budgets have a better chance 
of being accepted. Operational 1.mits have a better chance of receiving the full 
allocation of their proposed budget, since their units' performance is relevant to the 
evntinuity of overall organisational operations. For example, if the Budget Committee 
does not agree to meet the full allocation for repair costs, the manager-in-charge will 
argue that the machines cannot be operated properly, and production targets wil l  be 
difficult to achieve as a result. Moreover, if production targets are not met, there will 
automatically be a reduction in sales and cash flow, and in the end overall 
performance will deteriorate. Most managers agree that operational unit managers 
tend to be in a better position Luctn others to get their demands met. This superiority of 
operational units over other units was al luded to by one senior manager from a 
supporting unit: 
The chance of being accepted by the Budget Committee (BC). will be greater for 
operational units. The BC will look on the situation as a series of "levels of urgency". 
For instance, in the case of the factory's proposed budget, the BC cannot easily 
reduce the factory's proposed budget plans, since whatever happens in the factory 
will affect the overall operation of the company. For example, say the ZA factory 
needs a huge plant overhaul. If there is no budget to meet these needs, there will be a 
serious impact on production, with resultant reductions in sales and cash flow. Thus, 
in most cases, production unit managers will always mention the possibility of "a 
serious impact on production" as a weapon to get their desired budget allocation. 
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Moreover. some managers said that budgeting is directly related to production 
activities. These activities enjoy priority during budget allocatiun, because the 
activities of supporting departments rely on production budgets. For example, a too­
low spare parts' budget could provide a convenient excuse for shop floor workers to 
down tools whilst sti l l  getting paid. 
Besides structural power, individual power also plays an important role in 
determining the acceptance of the proposed budget. For example, the quality of a 
manager 's presentation of a pr0posed budget is one of the most important points to be 
evaluated by the Budget Committee. As previously stated, a unit manager with a 
sound educational background and experience can be expected to enjoy greater 
bargaining power. Interviews seem to indicate that unit managers who have a good 
formal educational background, such as a bachelor's degree, wi l l  have greater 
bargaining power with the Budget Committee compared to less well-formal 
educational background. Moreover, those who have been working for a long period of 
time in the organisation will also have more bargaining power. One of the 
respondents made this comment on Budget Committee evaluations: 
I 've seen that the Budget Committee evaluations of budget al location are biased. 
Individual factors can hav� a huge influence on the BC's budget allocat10ns to units. 
I belief that a unit manager with highet educational qualifications and a proven skill 
ba<;e will be entrusted with more resources than less well-educated colleagues. 
Another important factor affecting tl1is allocation is the convincing power of the sub­
unit manager, which in rr.ost cases correlates directly with his or her experience in the 
company. 
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5.2.1.4. Approval of Budget 
After all these steps have been completed. the last step uf the process of budgetary 
participation is approval from the Board of Commissioners (hereafter BOC) as a 
representative of the owner. BOC is mainly considered with two issues. First, wht:ther 
the government's programs (external programs), have been taken into account, such 
as whether the company's fertilisers are available throughout Indonesia, and whether 
the proposed budget includes funding for small enll.:rprises and local government in 
the surrounding area. Second. whether the proposed target profit shows an increase. 
compared to previous profit realisation. Both the issues are very important for the 
BOC: they are the main indicators related to management status. Regardless of how 
good the internal performance of the organisation might be. if the external program 1s 
not fulfilled. performance evaluation will he 10\ver or will receive negative feedback. 
On the other hand, 1f the company has been successful with its external programs. 
regardless of how bad their internal operation might be. it \viii in most cases have a 
significant impact on reward evaluations. In the words of a senior manager: 
The Board of Comm1ss1oners always asks whether external programs have been 
included m the proposed budget As a government m\11ed orgamsat,on. we carry 
responsibility for the success of the gnvcmmen(s programs For example. to support 
the government program for ach,evmg sclf-suffic1ency m nee. our company has to 
support this program by focusmg our fcrt1liser supply on the k>eal market. even 1f II 
means that we reduce our compan) profits This does happen. smce the mtemat10nal 
market price is usually much higher than the local market pnce. Moreover. we have 
contributed to the development of pubhc amemt1es and the welfare of people m my 
factory's area of operation For example. my company builds public health centres 
and public schools. In sum, if all the external programs have been mduded m 
proposed budget. then the BOC will pos1t1vely evaluate the proposed profit targets 
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In most cases, the BOC will ask the Budget Committee to increase the profit targets. 
The BOC is concerned with the profit target hccausc the amount of dividend and the 
BOC's bonuses arc dirco..:!ly related to profits. One of the interviewees said: 
The most importanl pomt that 1hc BOC will consider with regard to internal value 
factJrs 1s profit target. As for a!> I know. at any R UPS (Owners· General Mcetmg). 
the BOC will always request us to increase �··1r profit 
During the approval process. the BOC is likely to demo:i<;trate their superior position 
of power: there is unlikely to be two-way communications between the BOC and 
other participants. All the decisions made during this pror,ess will be based on the 
BOC's purposes and beliefs. The Budget Committee will accept all BOC requests. 
Even though all the participants know that targets given by the BOC will be very 
difficult to achieve, ail the participants will accept the BOC's decisions without 
question. As the representative of the company. the Budget Committee has a vested 
interest in getting BOC approval tor their proposed budget. The propo'>ed budget. 
once approved by the BOC, will be used as a basis for legitimating their decisions. 
Furthermore, the Budget Committee is invariably reluctant to question BOC 
suggestions, since there is a chance for them to make revisions during budget 
implementation (See section 4.4.2). Therefore. the process of budget approval is more 
of a ceremonial activity than a co-ordinated meeting to achieve organisational 
objectives. As one department head puts it: 
Never argue in the RUPS� meeting' The BOC views that the proposed budget plans 
must be adjusted to get more profits. whether through cuttmg the expense budget. 
increasing production or raising marketing targets. Participants m this meeting. such 
as managers. department heads and members of the Board of Directors seldom 
disagree with BOC's suggestions eve:i though we know that such suggestions are 
5 RUPS stands for a general meeting of owners in which the budget is accorded final approval by the 
BOC. 
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impract1cablc and will have a clc-mo11vat1ng effect on the employees. The 
participants arc reluctant to give counter argumcni'i to our BOC. 
Therefore, it can be seen that Budgetary Participation involves the parties concerned 
in various activities including fonnulation of hudget parameters, budget unit 
formulation, consolidation of the hudget and budget approval. Because the 
participants have a variety of vested interests in the outcome of these activitie!>. they 
seek to gain power in order to expand their bargaining ability. 
5.2.2. Effect of Political Power in the Process of Budgetary Control 
Budgetary control, including monitoring and evaluation bnng out various struggles 
for power amongst the participants because of their various vested interests. 
Budgetary monitoring is largely used to gain and hold power v.·ithin a unit, rather than 
for the attainment of organisational objectives. Budget monitoring is not used to 
improve unit efficiency in line with organisational objectives: rather. each unit tries to 
spend their entire allocation of funds and to acquire more funds if possible. A unit 
manager is likely to use budgetary monitoring to control the activities of their 
subordinates in line with his own ambitions for the unit. At higher levels within an 
organisation, the power struggles between department heads seem to have little to do 
with co-ordinating activities of the various departments in favour of setting the right 
budget for attaining the organisational objectives: here again, the protagonists are 
mainly concerned with furthering their own interests. 
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For evaluation purposes, production targets take precedence over budget targets. As 
long as the required amount of work is done and the operational targets are met, it 
hardly seems to matter whether or not the budget:iry targets are achieved. 
There is, it would seem, a negative correlation between the above activitiec, (which 
can only be described 1s political) and the roles of managers at all levels in the 
attainment of organisational objectives. 
S.2.2.1. Effect of Politics on the Process of Budgetary Monitoring 
The organisation monitors the budget realisation at regular intervals, such as monthly, 
quarterly, and annually. Reports are produced by the accounting unit and distributed 
to every unit in the organisation. Based on the :1udget realisation report. unit managers 
will be able to monitor how much of their budget resources have been used and how 
much is still available. Every unit has been pressured by tPe Budget Committee not to 
spend more than their annual budget allocation. It follows. therefore. that every unit 
has the flexibility to adjust their monthly budget allocation. as long as their annual 
budget allocation is not exceeded. 
The survey interviews found that most managers use politics in the process of budget 
monitoring. Managers do not rely on budget information to control their operational 
activities. They believe that budget information is not relevant as a basis of control 
since it only describes the financial position. Unit managers prefer to use information 
gathered from operational reports as control tools, because their unit and individual 
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appraisals and rewards will be based mainly on operational target achievement. 
More-0ver, the achievements of their budget targets are not directly relevant to the 
appraisal and reward systems. The findings of this study support those of prior 
studies, in which the effect of politics on the process of budget monitoring was seen to 
be substantial (Marginson. 1999; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1986; Otley and Berry. 
1980; Hoque and Hopper, 1994: see also Hayes. 1977; Amey, 1979: Preston, 1986). 
One of the interviewees has explained the role of budget information m the 
organisation, as follows: 
My unit gets budget vanance reports regularly l need this report to monitor how 
much of my budget resources have been used and how much resources are still 
available. If my available budget resources do not cover all operational acuvi!les. I 
have to ask my supcnor to give me additional budget resources. If I can·t get 
additional budget resources. I have w adJust my un11's planned act1vi11es. I beheve 
that most unit managers do not use the budget as a mechanism of control. especially 
in regard to improving their efficiency. In most cases. by the end of the day. every 
unit manager will use all the budget resources available to them. 
The organisation's policy is to monitor the realisation of budget at the unit level and 
the organisational level, monthly and quarterly. The monthly budget-monitoring 
meeting focuses on the general picture of the budget realisation. while in-depth 
analysis will be conducted in the quarterly budget-monitoring meeting. The budget­
monitoring meetings usually have two agendas, namely; (I) to evaluate b1.1dget 
realisation and (2) to develop a quarterly budget forecast0 . 
6 If there is a proposed budget revision in the budget-monitoring meeting, the budget conunittee will 
construct a budget simulation for the coming three months. The outcome of the budget revision will be 
called an operational budget. TI1e realisation of the operational budget will be one of the main issues to 
be discussed at the next budget-monitoring meeting. Meanwhile. an approved budget realisation will be 
covered and will be evaluated at the annual budget meeting. 
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At the unit level, the unit manager liaises with his/her subordinates to evaluate budget 
realisation and to forecast budget requirements for the next three months. The budget 
requirements will be based on evaluation of the operational activities plan. 
In the budget-monitoring meeting, unit managers have opportunities to acquire extra 
budget resources: adjustments to the operational activity plan can affect the 
availability of budget resources. If additional resources are not available, adjustments 
to operational activities might not be realised. In a budget-monitoring meeting, every 
manager has the opportunity to adjust his/her budget allocation and propose budget 
revision, as long as it is supported by strong arguments. All units want to achieve their 
targets, because the achievement of targets relates directly to performance evaluation 
and reward systems. Therefore. most managers view the budget monitoring meetings 
as an important medium for realising their aspirations, purposes. and beliefs. 
Moreover, most managers seem to believe that they need to legitimate their budget 
through approved budget revision. As a result of adjustment of the budgets of several 
units, it is likely that there will be several others \vhose budgets will be reduced. 
However, extra efforts have to be made by every unit that aims to get additional 
resources. Managers collect all information relevant to their operational activities in 
order to provide arguments for proposed budget revision. Similarly. units that expect 
to have their budgets reduced will struggle to keep their existing budget. Managers 
indicated that political power play as a dominant factor in determining the 
achievement of unit interests. One manager worded it thus: 
If I believe thal my available budget is not sufficient to cover all unit activities, then I 
will propose a budge! revision for my unit. However, before I make a decision to 
propose such a revision, I have to have enough information to support my budget 
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revision proposal. How urgenl 1s It to my unll'1 What are the benetiL<; of the addnwnal 
budget in auaining my opernt1onal target? The approval of the proposed budget v.111 
not be easily obtained. smce there will be counter arguments fr•J1n opposing units. I 
believe that many factors influence budget rev1swn dec1s1ons Besides the level of 
urgency for each umt and Its 1mphcat1on for operational performance of the 
organisation as a whole. md1v1dual factors such as knowledge and skill also receive 
specml attention from the Budget Committee. 
At the organisallonal level, a department head has the opportunity to propose budget 
revisions at a budget revision meeting. Such budget revisions are usually triggered by 
assun.ptions relevant to current environmental conditions. Based on an evaluation of 
internal operations, department heads may conclude that the available budget is 
insufficient to cover remammg operational activities. Apart from current 
environmental conditions, budget revision could be triggered by an absence ot activity 
in regard to the proposed budget. 
In general, budget revision will be accepted if there is a connection between the 
additional funds required and the operational activities of the organisation as a whole, 
or if there is perceived to be a possible effect on the company's image. For example, 
there are certain places in Indonesia where fertiliser is in short supply. Say the 
Marketing Unit needs extra funds to enable the shortfall to be met: in such a case. the 
proposed budget revision will be accepted and the required capital will be taken from 
the budget of other departments. Based on the interviews. it seems that department 
heads are unwilling to sacrifice their budget to cover other department's budgets. Here 
again, department heads always concentrate on the interests of their own department 
rather than consolidating the interests of the organisation. 
- 176 • 
The bargaining process is one of the mechanisms used to resolve this problem of 
conflicting interests. All department heads will defend their interests by attempting tu 
show the impcrtance of their operational activities to the performance of the 
organisation as a whole. Most of the department heads stated that if their operational 
budgets were to be reduced, they would have difficulty in achieving their operational 
targets, and as a consequence, company performance as a whole would also 
deteriorate. One department head states: 
I will reject all sugge�tions of re-allocauon of my department's budget resources to 
other departments. My department budget allocat1ons that have been approved should 
not be tak<.'n away from me. smce they were worked out by the Budget Committee. I 
will try to convince the Budget Comm11tcc that 1f my department budget is reduced. 1t 
will affect the achievement of my operntional targets and II will de-mouvate my 
subordinates. Moreover. II will affe1:l the performance of the organisation as a whole . 
. :rom the statement quoted above, it is clear that one of the functions of the budget. 
that of co-ordinating functional activities, has not had the desired effect of reducing 
information asymmetry. Harmonisation of task interdependency between sub-units or 
units for achieving organisational objectives is not seen as a reason for individuals to 
be involved in the process of budget monitoring. All individuals do not have the same 
perception about the budget's functions. especially with regard t0 performing their 
managerial roles to c0n.t, ibute to the achievement of organisational objectives. In the 
process of budget monitoring, all individuals tend to respond to changes m the 
environment by focusing on individual interests rather than the interest of the 
organisation as a whole. The findings of survey interview pwvide evidence to support 
the results of statistical tests (s.:c sect1Pn 4 .. �.2). 
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5.2.2.2. Effect of Politics on the Process of Budgetary Evaluation 
It was found that the success or failure in attaining hudget targets does not relate to 
the perfonnance appraisal and reward systems. The organisation has its own specific 
fonnula for nerfonnance appraisal and reward. All individuals in the organisation are 
entitled to equal bonuses regardless of the achievement or otherwise of their budget 
targets. Based on the survey interviews, most managers said that there is no incentive 
for individuals to achieve their budget targets and there is no punishment for those 
who failed to do so. These findings are consistent with previous studies (Kurunmaki, 
1999; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Covale� Ki and Dirsmith, 1986: sec also Comerford 
and Abernethy. 1999: Preston, 1986: Hopwood, 1976: Hopstede, 1968). Managers, 
superiors, subordinates. and the BOC do not appear to use budget performance 
infonnation as a basis for performance evaluation and reward. Most managers believe 
that budget perfonnance does not contribute to their perfonnance appraisal. One of 
the managers stated: 
There is no relationship between the achievement of budget target and performance 
and reward measurements. The organisation has a specific model for performance 
and reward evaluation. based on operational md1cators. There are no budget 
indicators in that formula. nr: the n,,itrary. employees are entitled to receive equal 
re\\-'llfds regardless of how successful or otherwise their umts or departments have 
been m achievmg their budget target,;. In fact. most managers believe that it would be 
unfair if the organisation were to use budget a.::hievement as a parameter for 
performance and reward systems. Their reasoning 1s that umt managers might 
propose budget revisions at several or all budget monitoring mectmgs. In addition to 
that, there is no disincentive towards failure of budget target achievement. In most 
cases. supervisors only remind their subordinates and warn them to achieve their 
budget target for the following period. 
The survey interviews indicated that supervisors at no level include the achievement 
of revenue budget targets as an evaluation indicator for their subordinates. As 
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suggested above, supervisors will simply remind unit managers that they have failed 
to achieve their revenue budget target and ask them to commit to achieving 
subsequent budget targets. In practice, superiors are more concerned about their 
expense budgets and usually try to control them tightly. However, they do not try to 
ensure unit managers' efficiency. In the opinion of most superiors, tight control means 
unit managers cannot use more budget resources than they were allocated. Usually, 
unit managers will use all available budget resources without considering whether 
they really need them or not. They know that they might be able to spend more than 
their budget allocation, if it is accepted as important for the organisation ( see 
subsection 5.J. l ). Attitudes towards the achievement or otherwise of the revenue 
budget seem to be much more flexible than towards the expense budget. 
The Board of Commissioners, as the owner's representative, does not seem concerned 
with the achievement of the overall of budget targets within the organisation. The 
BOC's main concern is only with bottom line performance - profit achievement: if the 
organisation fails to achieve their profit target, it will be asked by the BOC to explain 
it. However, the failure to achieve profit targets does not relate to performance 
evaluation and reward systems. The researcher found that the B0Cs are more 
focussed on macro measurements, such as whether there are any areas of the country 
that have been short of fertiliser. If fertiliser shortage5 have been experienced by an 
area, the organisation concerned will get attentioP. from external parties (e.g. 
President, vice President, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Industry and Trading. 
Parliament, Minister of State Owned Enterprises, etc). One of the managers stat�d: 
In the annual budget meeting, after discussion on macro measurements. furthermore 
the BOC only focuses on how much profit has been earned by the organisation as a 
whole. If the profit target has been achieved, other factors will not be considered by 
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the BOC. In practice. the BOC will n�,t consider the achievement or otherwise of 
budget target by each individual unit and department. regardless of individual uniL5 
being over or under budget. In contrast. if the organisation fails to achieve their target 
profit, an explanation for the failure will be demanded. 
It might be said that the underlying explanation for "playing politics" in regard to 
budgeting seems to be connected to the attitude of BOCs, as outlined in this last 
section: viz, the fact that the BOC is only concerned with macro-targets such as 
dissemination of the product and overall profit. As a result, departments, units and 
sub-units, not being answerable for their profit budgets, have nothing to lose by over­
running expenses if they can get away with it. They tend to use the expense budget as 
a means of gaining and holding power in relation to other departments, units and sub­
units, and do not see any necessity to relate expenses tu profits at departmental level 
and lower, because these factors are not taken into consideration in performance 
evaluation and rewards systems. The ingrained attitudes and behaviours connected 
with political power play can only be detrimental to organisational objectives. This 
supports the results of statistical tes .. s as discussed m section 4.3.2. 
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CHAPTER6 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, AND SCOPE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the study and offer suggestions for future 
research. First, the conclusions of the study are stated. Then the limitations are 
identified and described. Finally, the scope for future research is outlined. 
6.1 Summary and Conclusions 
This study has investigated the role of politics in the budgeting process. A conceptual 
framework developed from the accounting, organisational behaviour and management 
literature identified the variables and generated hypotheses about the relationship 
among variables, including budgetary participation, budgetary control, budgetary 
monitoring, budgetary evaluation, budgetary communication, managerial roles, 
politics, and sources of power including structural and individual of power. 
Measurement of the conceptual variahles was effected by means of a survey 
questionnaire, designed to address the various aspects outlined above. and in 
interviews where questions were developed to shed further light on the issues raised in 
the questionnaire. One hundred and seventy seven middle managers from four large 
public companies in the Indonesian fertiliser industry responded to the questionnaire. 
Sixty managers, including thirty-two middle managers and ei5ht senior managers 
participated in the interviews. 
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Statistical tests confinned all hypotheses for which this study obtained evidence, 
demonstrating that the role of politics on the budgeting process is significant. The role 
of politics on the budgeting process differs across the sources of power. The findings 
of the statistical tests were supported by the interviews findings. The study indicates 
that operational units are in a better position for bargaining in the budgeting process 
than other the units, especially in budget allocation decisions. The study also indicates 
that individuals who have specific attributes such as strong educational qualifications 
hel<l advantages over others. Individuals involved in budgetary participation appear to 
be motivated mainly by their own unit interests, rather than budgetary objectives. 
Differences in interests should be solved by the bargaining mechanism. Most of the 
managers said that sources of power play a dominant role ir. maintaining th("ir own 
interests. The findings of the interviews indicate that interactions benveen a manager 
and subordinates or a manager and his/her superior did not seek to address 
information asymmetry in order to formulate an appropriate budget. Rather, budget 
participants focused on how to support their own particular purposes. aspirations, and 
bel.iefs through formulation of the budget. In addition, budget participants. especially 
superiors, did not view involvement in the budgeting process as a means of a-::quiring 
information for deeper understanding of organisational objectives. 
Similarly, the findings of the interviews indicate that the ;::,olitical influence on 
budgetary control is substantial. Most unit managers said that they need the budget 
variance reports in order to maintain information about budget re;-;ources available for 
their units: however, they did not use the budget reports as a tool to control efficiency 
in their unit activities. U�it managers believe it legitimate to use all budgetary 
resources, because the budgets have been approved. Changing environments 
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encouraged the revision of the budget to assist in attaining unit operational targets. 
Unit managers find it necessary to revise their budgets in order to support attainment 
of operational targets, because such attainment is strongly related to the perfonnance 
evaluation and reward system. 1 lowever, the attainment of budget targets is not 
considered in relation to perfonnance evaluation and reward. 
The results of the study contain basic validation for viewing the budgeting process 
from a manageme:it accounting perspective, which may include consideration of 
political influence. This conceptual framework cc,ntrasts with one which views the 
budgeting process as purely technically or economically dett;rrnined. 
The study also contributes to the management accounting literature. The results 
support the perspective that a consideration of the social contingency variable of 
politics is essential in dealing with the budgeting process. A broader viewpoint, which 
allows for the interaction of 0perating context and behaviour. is a more appropriate 
and comprehensive way of considering the budgeting process configuration. From a 
management accounting viewpoint, the results point to a clear conclusion: that the 
role of political behaviour in the overall proces� of budgeting, such as budgetary 
participation, budgetary communication and budgetary control including budgetary 
monitoring and evaluation is significant. The moderating effect of politics in the 
relationship between the budgeting process and managerial roles differs apprcc,ably 
depending on the sources of power. 
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6.2 Limitations 
The findings in this study should be viewed in the light of certain limitations. First 
there is the poss!bility that dependent and independent variables are contaminated by 
uncontrolled extraneous environmental variables. As a result, the measures of the 
independent variables may not be sufficiently sensitive to capture all the effects on the 
dependent variables. Measurement of the dependent variables also may fail to capture 
all the variance caused by the independent variables. 
Second, inferences of causality have been suggested in the theory and were used as 
the basis for development of this study: however, it is plausible for the causal linkage 
to be in the reverse direction. Specifically, it is possible that units with high political 
power choose to be extensively involved in the process of budgetary participation in 
order to maintain their own interests and then, in contrast, encourage a low level of 
participation in the process of budgetary control in an attempt to deemphasize the 
budget in evaluating their performance and determining their reward. 
Third, the data used in this study was elicited by a questionnaire survey. The Likert­
type scales used to measure budgetary participation, budgetary communication., 
budgetary control, budgetary monitoring, budgetary evaluation, managerial roles, and 
politics assume that identi".al scores across respondents are indications of identical 
characteristic values. It seen,:, unlikely that this is absolutely true, even though the 
�xamination of correlations of item scores and found no evidence to the contrary. 
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Fourth, respondent selection within the companies sampled for this study was not 
random, because it was conducted through the internal mailing system of the 
company, which may have biased the sample. Bias may have resulted from the fact 
that companies selected the respondents for the questionnaire survey. 
Fifth, another possible source of bias is in the fact that the researcher found it was not 
possible to control the size of units involved in the study, resulting in a greater 
variation in unit size than was initially desired. 
Next, organisations in different industries may have different effect of politics on the 
budgetary process than those indicated here. However, to determine this, the use of 
organisations across industries would be necessary; the present study was completed 
within a single industry. Therefore, any generalisation about the role of politics on the 
budgeting process may be statistically and logically unjustifiable. 
Finally, previous studies of politics in budgeting might be seen as limited, being, for 
most part, based on the interview method. Therefore, it was not possible to draw on 
prior studies regarding the investigation of the role of politics as a variable by means 
of a survey questionnaire. Moreover, no known research has addressed the effect of 
politics on the relation between managerial roles and the whole budgeting process. 
6.3 Scope of Future Research 
Future research should be directed toward improving the deficiencies of this study and 
extending the conceptual framework. An understanding of the moderating effect of 
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politics on the relationship between managerial roles and budgeting process is in the 
embryonic stage of development. The conceptual process has been defined, yet there 
is little empirical evidence that directly supports its premises. 
This study was an attempt to bring together theoretical underpinnings and empirical 
data. The progression of the model was an explanatory process that built the concept 
of the moderating effect of politics in the relationship between managerial roles and 
the budgeting process. Consideration of moderating variables as a driving force in the 
relationship between managerial roles and the budgeting process is well established in 
the literature. Hopefully, this study will advance the thinking of scholars in this 
direction and create interest in replicating this method of analysis and validating the 
findings. 
The conceptual model should also be applied to the role of politics on the budgeting 
process in other industries. This would provide the information needed to assess the 
external validity of the model. The data for this study was collected from public 
enterprises, future investigation should be extended to private enterprise and not-for­
profit organisations to provide bases for comparison. Such comparisons would 
question the origins of the contingency theory as grounded in the works of Thompson 
(1967), which suggests that whether or not a profit motive is pursued is not of concern 
to contingency theory. 
The effect of politics in the budgeting process may display different patterns across 
cultural norms such as organisation type and size. This study's evaluations were based 
on a questionnaire survey of middle managers and interviews with middle and senior 
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managers. A more diverse range of responses might be forthcoming in a study using 
mangers in a wider cross-section of hierarchical positions as respondents. It is to be 
hoped that other scholars will take up the baton and pursue these avenues in future 
research. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
'We would like to ask you some questions about specific conditions such as the budgeting process 
(section 1), managerial roles (section 2), politics (section 3) in your organisation. Please answer the 
following in terms of how it is in your organisation, NOT how you would prefer It to be. Please be as 
candid as possible, remember, all your responses will remain strictly anonymous and will NOT be 
revealed to anyone in your organisation•. 
"Kami ingin menanyakan beberapa pertanyaan mengenai kondisi tenentu seperti proses anggaran (bagian 1), 
peran manajerial (bagian 2), po/itik (bagian 3) dalam perusahaan anda. Jawablah berdasarkan bagaimana 
kondisi sesungguhnya da/am perusahaan BUKAN berdasarkan bagaimana seharusnya. Silahkan jawab semua 
pertanyaan yang ada dengan sejujur- jujumya, semua jawaban akan dijaga kerahasiaannya dan tidak akan di 
ungkapkan kepada siapapun". 
The scale is descnbed as follows/ Skalanya digambarkan sebagai berikut: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 
sangat tidak agak netral agak setuju sangat 
tidak setuju setuju tidak setuju setuju 
setuju 
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GENERAL INFORMATION/ INFORMASI UMUM 
Company Name /nama perusahaan 
Your Department lnama departemen 
Your Unit lnama bagian 
Your Position /jabatan 
Your age lumur 
Your Gender /jenis kelamin 
Your educational background 
Jenjang pendidikan 
Number of subordinates working under 
your supervision 
Jumlah bawahan di bawah supervisi anda 
Length of time with the company 
Lama bekerja di perusahaan 
Length of time in your present position 
Lama menduduki jabatan sekarang 
years /tahun 
1) Male /Pria, 2) Female lwanita 
1) Diploma/DJ ·, Major /jurusan: 
2) Bachelor degree /SJ 
3) Master degree IS2 
4) Doctoral degree IS3 
5) Others/ lain-lain 
persons /orang 
years I tahun 
years ltahun 
Do you have experience in budget setting process 1) Yes /ya, 2) No ltidak 
Apakah anda mempunyai pengalaman dalam proses anggaran 
Have you taken budget course 
Pernah kah anda mengikuti kursus anggaran 
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1) Yes /ya, 2) No ltidak 
Section I Bagian l: Budgeting Process / Proses Anggaran 
In this section, we would like to ask you to assess the budgeting process in your organisation. Budget process is defmed 
as managerial activities, actions, attitude, and interactions amongst managers Wld their tasks which relate to the 
budgeting system. 
Di bagian ini, kami ingin meminra anda untuk melakukan penilaian terhadap proses anggaran dalam peru.sahaan 
anda. Proses anggaran di definisikan sebagai akJivitas-aktivitas, kegiatan-kegiatan, dan sikap manajeria/, serta 
interaksi antar manajer dan tugas mereka yang berhubungan dengan sistem anggaran .. 
Influence in Budget Setting/ Pengaruh dalam Penyusunan Anggaran 
2 3 1 4 5 6 7 
1. The budget setting for my unit is not finalised until I am satisfied with it 
Penyusunan anggaran wituk unit kami tidak akan se/esai jika saya be/um p.1as. 
2. New budgets include changes I have suggested. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Anggaran yang baru memasukkan perubahan-perubahan yang te/ah saya usulkan. 
Involvement in the Budgeting System/Keterlibatan dalam Sistem Anggsran 
3. I express my opinions on budget matters j 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Saya mengemukakan pendapat saya dalam penyusunan anggaran. 
4. I offer suggestions for the improvement of budget systems. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Saya memberikan saran-saran untuk perbaikan sistem anggaran 
5. The budgeting system is changed in accordance with my suggestion. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sistem anggaran dirubah I direvisi sesuai dengan saran yang saya berikan. 
Interactions with Subordinates/ lnteraksi dengan bawahan 
6. I work with my subordinates in preparing the budget for my unit 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 
Saya beke,jasama dengan bawahan saya dalam menyiapkan anggaran untuk unit 
kami. 
7. I discuss budget items when problems occur. 
l 2 3 4 s 6 7 
Saya mendiskusikan item-item anggaran dengan bawahan saya ketika te,jadi 
masalah da/am anggaran.. 
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Interactions with Superiors/ lnteraksi dengsn Atasan 
8. I work with my superior in preparing the budget for my unit 
Saya bekerja sama dengan arasan saya dalam menyiapkan anggaran untuk unit 
kami. 
9. I go to my superior for advice on how to achieve my budget targets. 
Saya menemui atasan soya untuk mendapalkan masukanlsaran tentang bagaimana 
cara un:uk mencapai target anggaran unit kami. 
Budget Variance Analysis/ Ana/Isis Penyimpsngan Anggaran 
10. I am required to submit an explanation in writing about causes of large budget 
variances. 
Saya di minta untuk me/ampirkan penje/asan secara tertu/is mengenai penyebab 
terjadinya penyimpangan anggaran. 
11. I am required to report actions I take to correct causes of budget variances. 
Saya diminta untuk mdaporkan tindakan-tindakan yang saya ambi/ untuk 
memperbaiki penyebab terjadinya penyimpangan anggaran. 
12. I am required to prepare reports comparing actual results with budget 
Saya diminta untuk menyiapkan laporan perbandingan antara rea/isasi anggaran 
dengan rencana anggaran. 
13. I am required to trace the cause of my budget variances to groups or individuals 
within my unit 
Saya diminta untuk mene/usurilmencari penyebab terjadinya penyimpangan 
anggaran kepada ke/ompok atau individu dalam unit saya. 
Personal Attention to Budget Variances/ Perhatlan secara prlbadl terhadap 
Penylmpangan Anggaran 
14. I investigate favourable as well as unfavourable budget variances for my unit 
Saya me/akukan penelitianlkajian atas penyimpangan anggaran bailc penyimpangan 
positive atau negalfve untuk unit saya. 
15. Preparing the budget for my unit requires my attention to a great number of details. 
Persiapan ariggaran untuk unit saya, membutuhkan perhatian saya secara rinci. 
16. I personally investigate budget variances in my unit 
Saya secara pribadi akan me/akukan pene/itianlkajian terhtidap penyimpangan 
anggaran da/am unit saya. 
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1 23456 7 
1 2 34 56 7 
1 2 3 456 7 
1 2 3 4 56 7 
1 23 4 56 7 
1 2 3 456 7 
1 2 3 456 7 
1 2 3 456 7 
1 23456 7 
17. I conduct coordination with other managers to monitor the overall orgari.isation's 
goals by means of the budget variances. 
Saya melakulcan koordinasi dengan manajer yang lain untuk melakukan 
pemantauan terhadap pencapaian tiyuan organisasl secara menye/un,h 
berdasarkan penyimpangan anggaran. 
Evaluation by BudgeV Eva.luasi Berdasarksn Anggsran 
18. I am evaluated on my ability to meet the budget for my unit. 
Sa_va di evaluasi berdasarkan berdasarkan kemampuan saya untuk memenuhi 
anggaran yang telah di tetapkan untuk unit kami. 
J 9. My superior expresses dissatisfaction to me about results in my unit when the 
budget has not been reached. 
Atasan saya menunjuklcan ketidakpuasannnya kt!pada saya terhadap hasil unit saya 
KETIKA anggaran tidak tercapai. 
20. My superior mentions budgets when talking to me about my efficiency as a 
manager. 
Atasan saya akan berbicara tentang anggaran ketika membahas efisiensi dengan 
saya, saya sebagai seorang manajer. 
21. I evaluate my subordinates' reward based on whether the budget has been met. 
Saya memberikan penilaian terhadap ldne,ja bawahan saya berdasarkan 
pencapaian rencan.a anggaran. 
Reactions to Expect1 td Budget Overruns/ Resksi terhadap Penyimpangan 
Anggarsn 
22. I find it necessary to charge some activities to other accounts when budgeted funds 
for these activities have been used up. 
Saya menganggap penting untuk membebankan beberapa kegiatan kepada JJOS 
onggaran lain KET/KA dana untuk kegiatan tersebut sudah habfs terpakal. 
23. I have to shift·figures relating to operations to reduce budget variances. 
Saya harus melakukan penggeseran anggaran yang berhubungan dengan operasi 
unit saya dalam rangka mengurangi penyimpangan anggaran. 
24. I find it necessary to stop some activitfes in my unit when budgeted funds are used 
up. 
Saya menganggap penting untuk tidak melanjutkan beberapa kegiatan dalam unit 
kamf KETIKA anggaran yang tersedia sudah habfs terpakai. 
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1234 56 7 
123 4 56 7 
123 4 56 7 
12 3 4 56 7 
12 3 4 56 7 
123 4 56 7 
123 4 56 7 
123 4 56 7 
Section /Bagian 2: Managerial Roles/ Peran Manajerial 
In this section, we would like to ask you the following questions to assess your managerial roles in the organisation in 
relation to achieving the organisation's goals. Managerial roles is defined as sets of managers' behaviour attributable to 
their jobs to perform the management functions - planning, organising, leading, and controlling in order to achieve 
organisation's goals. 
Dalam bagian ini, kami meminta anda untuk menilai peran manajerial ands dalam rangka mencepai tujuan 
perusahaan •. Peran manajerial di definisikan sebagai sekumpulsn tingkah Jaku manager yang berhubungan 
dengan pekerjaaan mereka untuk melaksanakan fungsi..fungsi manajemen - perencanaan, pengorganisaslan, 
pengarahan, dan pengendalian dalam rangka mencapai tu]usn perusahaan. 
Leader/ Sebagai Pemimpin 
l. I forward important information to subordinates. I 2 3 4 s 6 7 
Saya meneruskan informasi penting kepada bawahan 
2. I s.Jlocate human resources to tasks in my unit 
l 3 4 5 6 7 
Saya mengalokasikan sumber daya manusia kepada tugas-tugas da/am unit kami. 
. 3. I resolve conflicts between subordinates . 
2 3 
Saya menye/esaikan konflilc yang terjadi di antara bawahan 
4 s 6 7 
4. I always alert subordinates to problems. 
Saya selalu mengingatkan masalah yang mungkin te,jadi kepada bawahan saya.. l 2 3 4 s 6 7 
5. I evaluate the quality of subordinate's job performance 
Saya melakukan peni/aian terhadap kualitas "kinerja" bawalum.. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Liaison/ Sebagai Penghubung Unit 
6. I attend social functions as a representative of my unit to keep up contacts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Saya menghadiri kegiatan-kegiatan sosia/ sebagai waldl dari unit saya dalam 
rangka menjaga hubungan .. 
7. I develop contacts with importaut outside people. 
1 2 3 4 s 6 
Saya membina hubu11gan dengan orang-orang penting di /uar unit kami. 
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2 
7 
Disseminator/ Sebagai Penyebar Jriformasi 
8. I always transmit inf onnation received from outsiders to members of unit 
Saya se/alu mengkomunikasikan irifonnasi yang saya terima dari /uar unit kepada 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
bawal,an saya. 
Spokesperson/ Sebagai Jun, Dicara Unit 
9. I answer inquires about my unit as a representative of the unit. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Saya memberikanjawaban sebagai ,11akil dari unit atas pennintaanlpertanyaan 
mengenai unit kami. 
10. l provide information to others about the unit's activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Saya menyediakan infonnasi kepada pihak-pihak lain mengenai kegiatan-
kegiatan unit kami. 
Environment Monitor/ Sebagai Pemantauan Lingkungan 
11. I always keep up with the environment such as collecting information about 
I 2 3 4 5 6 
customers and competitors for identifying opportunities 
Saya se/alu memantau lingkungan seperti mengumpulkan infonnasi mengenai 
pelanggan dan pesaing da/am rangka mencari peluang. 
12. I always attend meetings in other units. 
Saya se/a/u menghadiri pertemuan-pertemuan dengan unit-unit yang lain. 
l 2 3 4 s 6 7 
13. Other managers always attend meetings in my unit 
Manager-manager lain se/alu menghadiri pertemuan-pertemuan dengan unit I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
kami. 
Resource Allocator/ Sebagai Pembagi Sumber daya Unit 
14. 1 distnlmte budgeted resources for example monies within sub-unit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Saya mendistribusikan sumher-sumber daya seperti uang yang telah di anggarkan 
kepada seluruh sub-unit lcami. 
Negotiator/ Sebagai Negosiator Unit 
15. I am responsible for representing the unit at major negotiations over resources. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sa/ah satu tanggungjawab saya adalah mewakili kepentingan unit kami lretika 
negosiasi sumber daya di dalam perusahaan. 
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Section /Bagian 3: Influence of politics on the budgeting decision makJng/ Pengnrub politlk dalam pengambllao 
keputusan nnggaran 
The following questions relate to your assessment of the influence of politics on the budgeting system in your organisation. 
Politics is defined as exercise of power or influence tc get something accomplished. 
Pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut inf berhubungan d�ngan penilalan anda terhadap pengaruh polltlk terhsdap slstem 
anggaran dalam perusahaan anda. Politik dideflnisikan sebagai pelaksanaan power {kekussan) atau pengsruh 
untuk mendapatkan sesuatu yang ingln dicspsi. 
l. Heterogeneous goals and preferences among managers which tend to be mutually conflicting, I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
change .1Ssumptions/policies in the setting of budget targets. 
Banyaknya tujuan dan preferensi yang ada di antara manajer dalam anggaran yang mana 
cendenmg berbeda satu dengan yang Jainnya., merubah asumsi atau kebijakan dalam 
menyusun target-target anggaran .. 
2. Budgeting decision making is characterised by the ''push and pull" of different interests. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Peengambilan keputusan anggaran bercirikan dengan "tarik dan ulur" dan· berbagai 
macam kepentingan yang berbeda. 
3. Conflicts of interest are an accepted action during budget decision making. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Perbedaan-perbedaan kepentingan adalah sebuah tindakan yang dapat diterima selama 
pengambilan keputusan anggaran. 
4. Budget performance is not used as a dominant indicator in evaluating my unit's performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
and reward. 
Pencapaian target anggaran tidak digunakan sebagai sebuah indikator pokok dalam 
per.ilaian prestasi atau balas jasa unit kami. 
5. There is no systematic effort for searching in depth information from budget variance reports 
during the monitoring of my unit activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tidak ada suatu usaha yang sistimatis untuk mencarl informasi yang mendalam terhadap 
/aporan penyimpangan anggaran selama melakukan pematauan terhadap kegiatan-kegiatan 
unit kami. 
6. Budget decision making (budget plan, budget control, budget evaluation) in my company can 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
be characterised as an exercise in the process of bargaining, negotiating, end compromising. 
Pembuatan keputusan anggaran (penyusunan, pengenc!alian dan penilaian anggaran) dalam 
perusahaan bercirikan sebagai pelaksanaan proses tawar-menawar, negosiasi, dan 
kompromi. 
7. Must there be a significant effort to defend suggestions/proposals of my budget in trying to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
achieve the desired either for budget allocation? 
Haros ada suatu usaha yang keras untuk mempertahan usu/an yang telah dibuat dalam 
rangka mendapatkan alokasi anggaran, yang di inginkan ? 
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Table B.2: 
Stem-and Leaf Plot 
Bl Stern-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
9.00 1 000000000 
,00 1 
16.00 2 0000000000000000 
.00 2 
34.00 3 0000000000000000000000000000000000 
. 00 3 . 
45.00 4 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
34.00 5 0000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
28.00 6 0000000000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
11.00 7 00000000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 1 case(s} 
B2 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
17.00 2 . 00000000 
. 00 2 . 
29.00 3 . 00000000000000 
.00 3 
52.00 4 00000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
56.00 5 0000000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
22.00 6 00000000000 
.00 6 
1.00 7 & 
Stern width 1 
Each leaf 2 case(s) 
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B3 Stem�and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stern & Leaf 
10. 00 2 . 00000 
.oo 2 . 
21.00 3 0000000000 
.oo 3 . 
37.00 4 000000000000000000 
.oo 4 
60.00 5 000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 . 
38.00 6 0000000000000000000 
.00 6 
11.00 7 00000 
Stern width 1 
Each leaf 2 case(s) 
B4 Stern-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
6.00 2 . 000 
.00 2 . 
21.00 3 0000000000 
.00 3 . 
43.00 4 000000000000000000000 
.00 4 . 
52.00 5 00000000000000000000000000 
.oo 5 . 
43.00 6 . 000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
12.00 7 000000 
Stem width l 
Each leaf 2 case(s) 
BS Stern-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
11.00 
.00 
41.00 
.00 
47.00 
.00 
46.00 
.oo 
24.00 
.00 
8.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
Stern & Leaf 
2 . 00000000000 
2 
3 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 00000000 
l 
1 case(s) 
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BG Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
15.00 
.00 
36.00 
.00 
47.00 
.00 
42.00 
.00 
25.00 
.00 
12.00 
Stem width 
Each leai 
Stem & Leaf 
2 . 000000000000000 
2 
3 000000000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 0000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 000000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
B7 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
12.00 
.00 
19.00 
.00 
.HJ. 00 
.00 
13.00 
.00 
35.00 
.oo 
28.00 
.00 
10.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
Stam & Leaf 
1 . 000000000000 
1 
2 0000000000000000000 
2 
3 000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 . 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 00000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 .  0000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 0000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
BS Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
6.00 
.00 
20.00 
. 00 
31.00 
.00 
38.00 
.00 
44.00 
.00 
28.00 
.00 
10.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
1 000000 
1 
2 00000000000000000000 
2 • 
3 0000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 0000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 0000000000 
1 
1 case{s) 
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B9 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
8.00 
.00 
12.00 
.00 
34.00 
.00 
46.00 
.00 
43.00 
.00 
29.00 
.00 
5.00 
Stern width: 
Each leaf: 
Stem & Leaf 
1 00000000 
1 
2 000000000000 
2 
3 0000000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 00000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 00000 
1 
1 case(s) 
BlO Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
14.00 
.00 
25.00 
.00 
45.00 
.00 
45.00 
.00 
34.00 
.00 
14.00 
Stern width 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
2 00000000000000 
2 
3 0000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 • 0000000000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 00000000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
Bll Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
16.00 
.00 
20.00 
.00 
31. 00 
.00 
46.00 
.00 
45.00 
.00 
19.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
2 0000000000000000 
2 
3 00000000000000000000 
3 
4 0000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 • 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 0000000000000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
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B12 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
7.00 2 000 
.00 2 
15.00 3 0000000 
.oo 3 
57.00 4 0000000000000000000000000000 
.oo 4 
41.00 5 00000000000000000000 
.00 5 
40.00 6 00000000000000000000 
.oo 6 
17.00 7 00000000 
Stern width: 1 
Each leaf: 2 case(s) 
B13 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
19.00 2 000000000 
.00 2 
29.00 3 00000000000000 
.00 3 
34.00 4 00000000000000000 
.00 4 
52.00 5 00000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
25.00 6 000000000000 
.oo 6 
18.00 7 000000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 2 case(s) 
Bl4 Stem-and-T,eaf Plot 
Frequency 
7.00 
.00 
11.00 
.00 
35.00 
.00 
44.00 
.00 
47.00 
.00 
17.00 
.00 
16.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
1 0000000 
1 
2 00000000000 
2 
3 00000000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 00000000000000000 
6 
7 0000000000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
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B15 Stern-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stern & Leaf 
13.00 1 0000000000000 
. 00 1 
16 .00 2 0000000000000000 
.00 2 
35.00 3 00000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 3 
41. 00 4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
31. 00 5 0000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
30. 00 6 000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
11. 00 7 
Stern width 
Each leaf 
B16 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
00000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
Stem & Leaf 
1 00000000000 
1 
Frequency 
11.00 
.00 
20.00 
.00 
32.00 
.00 
41.00 
.00 
35.00 
.00 
28.00 
.00 
10.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
2 00000000000000000000 
2 
3 00000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 . 00000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 0000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 0000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
B17 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stern & Leaf 
6.00 1 . 000000 
.00 1 
20.00 2 00000000000000000000 
.00 2 
30.00 3 000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 3 
40.00 4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
46.00 5 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
26.00 6 00000000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
9.00 7 000000000 
Stern width 1 
Each leaf 1 case(s) 
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B18 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Stem & Leaf 
1 000000 
1 
Frequency 
13.00 
.oo 
64.00 
.00 
51.00 
.00 
35.00 
.00 
14.00 
2 00000000000000000000000000000000 
2 
3 0000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 00000000000000000 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
4 
5 . 0000000 
1 
2 case(s) 
B19 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
9.00 1 000000000 
.00 1 . 
20.00 2 00000000000000000000 
.00 2 
34.00 3 0000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 3 
39.00 4 oooooooooooooooooooooooooocoooooooooooo 
. 00 4 
37.00 5 0000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
27.00 6 000000000000000000000000000 
.00 6 . 
11.00 7 00000000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 1 case(s) 
B20 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
15.00 2 000000000000000 
. 00 2 
31.00 3 0000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 3 
48.00 4 
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
47.00 5 . OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOJOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
. 00 5 
29.00 6 00000000000000000000000000000 
. 00 6 
7.00 7 0000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 1 case(s) 
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B21 Stern-and-Leaf Plot 
Stem & Leaf Frequency 
29.00 
.00 
42.00 
.00 
44.00 
.00 
38.00 
.00 
15.00 
.00 
9.00 
Stern width 
Each leaf 
1 00000000000000000000000000000 
1 
2 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
2 
3 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 000000000000000 
5 
6 000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
B22 Stern-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
1.00 2 0 
.00 2 
23.00 3 00000000000000000000000 
.00 3 
43.00 4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
50.00 5 
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
44.00 6 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
. 00 6 
16.00 7 0000000000000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 1 case(s) 
B23 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
12.00 
.00 
18.00 
.00 
27.00 
.00 
44.00 
.00 
32.00 
.00 
30.00 
. 00 
14.00 
Stern width 
Each leaf 
Stern & Leaf 
1 000000000000 
1 
2 000000000000000000 
2 
3 000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 00000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 000000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 00000000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
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B24 Ste.m-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
12.00 
.00 
27.00 
.00 
34.00 
.00 
44.00 
.00 
29.00 
.00 
18.00 
.00 
13.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
1 000000000000 
1 
2 000000000000000000000000000 
2 
3 0000000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 00000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 000000000000000000 
6 
7 0000000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
Ml Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
18.00 2 000000000 
.00 2 
36.00 3 000000000000000000 
.00 3 
57.00 4 . 0000000000000000000000000000 
. 00 4 
40.00 5 00000000000000000000 
.00 5 
15.00 6 0000000 
.00 6 
11.00 7 00000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 2 case(s) 
M2 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
17.00 2 00000000 
.00 2 
29.00 3 00000000000000 
.00 3 
53.00 4 00000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
55.00 5 000000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
22.00 6 00000000000 
.00 6 
1. 00 7 & 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 2 case(s) 
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M3 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Stern & Leaf 
2 00000 
2 
3 0000000000 
3 
Frequency 
10.00 
.00 
21.00 
.00 
31.00 
.00 
62.00 
.00 
38.00 
.00 
15.00 
4 000000000000000 
4 
5 0000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 0000000000000000000 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
6 
7 0000000 
1 
2 case(s) 
M4 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
6.00 2 000 
.00 2 
18.00 3 000000000 
.00 3 . 
40.00 4 00000000000000000000 
.00 4 
51.00 5 0000000000000000000000000 
.OD 5 
50.00 6 0000000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
12.00 7 000000 
Stern width 1 
Each leaf 2 case(s) 
MS Stern-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
11.00 2 00000000000 
.00 2 
39.00 3 000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
. 00 3 
49.00 4 
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
45.00 5 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
25.00 6 0000000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
8.00 7 00000000 
Stern width 
Each leaf 
1 
1 case(s) 
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M6 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
15.00 
.00 
36.00 
.00 
47.00 
.00 
41.00 
.00 
25.00 
.00 
13.00 
Stem widc.h 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
2 . 000000000000000 
2 
3 000000000000000000000000000000000000 
3 . 
4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 0000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 0000000000000 
1 
1 case(s} 
M7 Stern-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
13.00 1 0000000000000 
.00 1 
16.00 2 0000000000000000 
.00 2 
34.00 3 0000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 3 
40.00 4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
34.00 5 oooooocooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 
.00 5 
29.00 6 00000000000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
11.00 7 00000000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 1 case(s) 
MB Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
11.00 
.00 
20.00 
.oc 
32.00 
.00 
40.00 
.00 
38.00 
.00 
26.00 
.00 
10.00 
Stem width: 
Each leaf: 
Stem & Leaf 
1 00000000000 
1 
2 00000000000000000000 
2 
3 00000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 00000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 00000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 0000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
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M9 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Stem & Leaf 
1 000000 
1 
Frequency 
6.00 
.00 
20.00 
.00 
30.00 
.00 
38.00 
.00 
44.00 
.00 
28.00 
.00 
11.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
2 00000000000000000000 
2 
3 000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 • 00000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 0000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 00000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
MlO Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
8.00 1 00000000 
.00 1 
13.00 2 0000000000000 
.00 2 
32.00 3 00000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 3 
41.00 4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
46.00 5 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
. 00 5 
31.00 6 0000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
6.00 7 000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 1 case(s) 
· Mll Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
9.00 1 000000000 
. 00 1 
16.00 2 0000000000000000 
.00 2 
34.00 3 0000000000000000000000000000000000 
. 00 3 • 
44.00 4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
. 00 4 
34.00 5 0000000000000000000000000000000000 
. 00 5 • 
29.00 6 00000000000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
11.00 7 00000000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 1 case(s) 
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Ml2 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
1.00 2 . & 
. 00 2 
21. 00 3 0000000000 
.00 3 
39.00 4 0000000000000000000 
.00 4 
55.00 5 000000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
45.00 6 0000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
16.00 7 . 00000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 2 case(s) 
Ml3 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
9.00 1 000000000 
.00 1 
18.00 2 000000000000000000 
.00 2 
29.00 3 00000000000000000000000000000 
.00 3 
37.00 4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
38.00 5 00000000000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
31.00 6 0000000000000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
15.00 7 000000000000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 1 case(s) 
M14 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
21.00 
.00 
27.00 
.00 
43.00 
.00 
40.00 
.00 
37.00 
.00 
9.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
2 000000000000000000000 
2 
3 000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 0000000000000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
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M15 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
14.00 
.oo 
20.00 
.00 
30.00 
.00 
43.00 
.00 
50.00 
.00 
20.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
2 00000000000000 
2 
3 00000000000000000000 
3 
4 000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 00000000000000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
Pl Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
7.00 2 . 000 
.00 2 
16.00 3 00000000 
.00 3 
58.00 4 00000000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 . 
41.00 5 00000000000000000000 
.00 5 
�8.00 6 . 0000000000000000000 
. 00 6 . 
17.00 7 00000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 2 case(s) 
P2 Stern-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stern & Leaf 
6.00 2 . 000 
.00 2 
18.00 3 000000000 
.00 3 
41.00 4 . 00000000000000000000 
. 00 4 
55.00 5 . 000000000000000000000000000 
. 00 5 
45.00 6 0000000000000000000000 
.00 6 
12.00 7 . 000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 2 case(s) 
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P3 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem & Leaf 
7.00 2 000 
.00 2 
16.00 3 00000000 
.00 3 
58.00 4 00000000000000000000000000000 
.00 4 
42.00 5 000000000000000000000 
.00 5 
38.00 6 0000000000000000000 
.00 6 
16.00 7 00000000 
Stem width 1 
Each leaf 2 case(s) 
P4 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
13.00 
.00 
16.00 
.00 
35.00 
.00 
44.00 
.00 
30.00 
.00 
28.00 
.00 
11.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
1 0000000000000 
1 . 
2 0000000000000000 
2 
3 00000000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 0000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 00000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
P.5 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
21. 00 
.00 
39.00 
.00 
46.00 
.00 
43.00 
.00 
18.00 
.00 
10.00 
Stem width 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
2 000000000000000000000 
2 
3 000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 000000000000000000 
6 
7 0000000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
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P6 Stern-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
8.00 
.00 
13.00 
.00 
32.00 
.00 
43.00 
.00 
44.00 
.00 
31.00 
.00 
6.00 
stern width 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
l 00000000 
1 
2 0000000000000 
2 
3 00000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 0000000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
P7 Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency 
12.00 
.00 
19.00 
.00 
32.00 
.00 
42.00 
.00 
35.00 
.00 
29.00 
.00 
8.00 
Stern width 
Each leaf 
Stem & Leaf 
1 000000000000 
1 
2 0000000000000000000 
/, . 
3 00000000000000000000000000000000 
3 
4 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
4 
5 00000000000000000000000000000000000 
5 
6 00000000000000000000000000000 
6 
7 00000000 
1 
1 case(s) 
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Table B,4: Skewness and Kurtoale 
N �kA1.1ness I(, ,rl �c,la 
Statistic Statlstlc Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
B1 1n •.100 .183 •,600 .363 
'82 1n ·.256 .183 ·.605 .363 
B3 1n ·.325 .183 ·.388 .363 
B4 1n ·.221 .183 ·.514 .363 
85 1n .161 .183 •.625 .363 
86 1n .142 .183 ·.693 .363 
87 1n ·.150 .183 ·.694 .363 
88 1n ·.160 .183 ·.681 .363 
89 1n ·.285 .183 -.376 .363 
810 1n ·.101 .183 ·.699 .363 
811 1n ·.378 .183 -.718 .363 
812 1n ·.075 .183 -.539 .363 
813 1n -.056 .183 -.810 .363 
814 1n ·.062 .183 ·.319 .363 
815 1n ·.118 .183 -.725 .363 
816 1n ·.116 .183 -.729 .363 
817 1n -.175 .183 -.613 .363 
818 1n .337 .183 -.633 .363 
819 1n -.085 .183 -.725 .363 
820 1n -.039 .183 -.657 .363 
821 1n .338 .183 -.598 .363 
B22 177 -.047 .183 ·.805 .363 
823 177 ·.167 .183 -.723 .363 
B24 177 .144 .183 -.683 .363 
M1 177 .301 .183 -.335 .363 
M2 177 -.244 .183 -.599 .363 
M3 177 -.353 .183 -.394 .363 
M4 177 -.352 .183 -.432 .363 
M5 1n .147 .183 ·.613 .363 
MS 177 .153 .163 -.710 .363 
M7 177 -.144 .183 -.707 .363 
MB 177 ·.123 .183 -.703 .363 
M9 177 ·.164 .183 -.681 .363 
M10 177 ·.329 .183 -.443 .363 
M11 177 ·.111 .183 -.624 .363 
M12 177 ·.117 .163 -.696 .363 
M13 177 ·.196 .163 -.743 .363 
M14 177 ·.114 .183 -.887 .363 
M15 177 ·.431 .183 -.692 .363 
Pl 177 -.035 .183 -.546 .363 
P2 1n -.303 .183 -.376 .363 
P3 177 ·.041 .183 -.516 .363 
P4 1n ·.088 .183 -.673 .363 
P5 177 .221 .183 -.605 .363 
PS 1n -.309 .183 -.439 .353 
P7 177 ·.156 .183 -.709 .363 
Valid N (llstwlse) 1n 
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APPENDIXC 
SPLIT-HALF METHOD AND CRONBACH ALPHA 
Coefficient Correlation of Split-Half (n) 
Managerial Roles 
Politics 
Budgetary Participation 
Budgetary Communication 
Budgetary Control 
Budgetary Monitoring 
Budgetary Evaluation 
Spearman Brown (rb): 
Managerial Roles 
Politics 
Budgetary Participation 
Budgetary Communication 
Budgetary Control 
Budgetary Monita,ring 
Budgetary Eval11r,�tion 
2 . fj 
Spearman Brown, rb = "- --c­
l + fj 
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0.906 
0.48) 
0.666 
0.788 
0.698 
0.699 
0.432 
0.950 
0.649 
0.799 
0.881 
0.822 
0.822 
0.603 
Spllt-Half Method 
Table C.1: Budgetary Participation 
Budget Budget 
Total Budget Participation Participation 
Partlcioatlon -Even -Odd 
Total Buaget Participation Pearson Correlation 1.000 .876"' _943• 
Sig. (2-talled) .000 .000 
N 1n 1n 1n 
Budget Participation-Even Pearson Correlation .876"' 1.000 .666" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 1n 1n 
Budget Participation-Odd Pearson Correlation .943"' .66s·· 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 1n 1n 
••. Correlation Is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table C.2: Budgetary Communlcauon 
Budget Budget 
Total Budget Communication Communication 
Communication -Even -Odd 
Total Budget Pearson Correlation 1.000 .942"' .949* 
Communication Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 1n 1n 
Budget Pearson Correlation .942*' 1.000 .788· 
Communication-Even Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 1n 1n 
Budget Pearson Correlation _949•• .788'"' 1.000 
Communication-Odd Sig. (2-tai!ed} .000 .000 
N 1n 1n 1n 
.... Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table C.3: Budgetary Control 
Total Budget Budget Control 8udge1 Control 
Control -Even -Odd 
Total Budget Control Pearson {.;Orrelation 1.000 .909"' .933" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 1n 177 
Budget Control-Evs;; ::>�arson Correlation .9mr· 1.000 .698* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 1n 1n 
Budget Control-Odd Pearson Correlation .933'"' .698°' 1.000 
Sig. (2-ta!led) .000 .000 
N 177 177 177 
••. Correlation is slgnlfk Jnt at the 0.01 level (2-talled). 
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Table C.4: Budgetary Monftorfng 
Budget Budget 
Total Budget Monitoring Monitoring 
Monltorina -Even -Odd 
Total Budget Monitonng Pearson correlation 1.000 .901·· .940· 
Sig. (2·tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 177 177 
Budget Monitoring-Even Pearson Correlation .001·· 1.000 .699" 
Sig. (2-talleo) .000 .000 
N 177 177 177 
Budget Monitoring-Odd Pearson Correlation .940'' .699"" 1.000 
Sig. (2-talled) .000 .000 
N 177 177 177 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2·tailed). 
Table C.5: Budgetary Evaluation 
Budget Budget 
Total Budget Evaluation Evaluation 
Evaluation -Even -Odd 
Total Budget Evaluation Pearson Correlation 1.000 .855' .. .83r 
Sig. (2-taifed) .000 .000 
N 177 177 177 
Budget Evaluation-Even Pearson Correlation .855*' 1.000 .432' 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 177 177 177 
Budget Evaluation-Odd Pearson Correlation . 837"' .432 .. 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 177 177 
.. - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table C.6: Managerial Roles 
Total Total 
Total Roles Roles-Even Roles-Odd 
Total Roles Pearson Correlation 1.000 .971'"" .981' 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 177 177 
Total Roles-Even Pearson Correlation .971 .. 1.000 .906"' 
Sig. (2-talled) .000 .000 
N 177 177 177 
Total Roles-Odd Pearson Correlation .981*" .906 .. 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 177 177 177 
... Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table C.7: Polltlcs 
TotaJ Total 
Total Politics Politics-Even Politics-Odd 
Total Politics Pearson Correlation 1.000 .035•• .884"' 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 1n 1n 
Total Politics-Even Pearson Correlation .835 .. 1.000 .481"' 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 177 177 
Total Politics-Odd Pearson Correlation .884 .. .481*' 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
N 1n 1n 1n 
••. Correlation is significant at the O.o1 level (2-tailed). 
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Cronbach Alpha 
Table C.8: 
Budgetary Participation 
REL I AB I L  I T"Y AN A LYS IS - S C A L E 
Statistics for 
SCALE 
Mean Variance 
N of 
Std Dev variables 
Item-total 
Bl 
B2 
B3 
B4 
BS 
22.2260 21.7555 
Statistics 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
18.0565 15.4741 
18.0000 15.3750 
17.5028 14.5923 
17.4294 14.0532 
17.9153 14.2144 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 177.0 
A1pha = 0.7649 
Table C.9: 
4.6643 5 
Corrected 
Item-
Total 
Correlation 
.3214 
.5461 
.5792 
.6742 
.6224 
N of Items = 5 
Budgetary Communication 
(A L P H A) 
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted 
.8110 
.7199 
.7070 
.6750 
.6916 
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S -S C A L E (A L P H A) 
Statistics for 
SCALE 
Mean 
16.8701 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
B6 12.5198 
B7 12.7740 
B8 12.6"384 
B9 12.6780 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 177.0 
A1pha = 0.8544 
Variance 
24.1478 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
15.9783 
12.4714 
13 .1640 
15.3559 
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N of 
Std Dev Variables 
4.9140 4 
Corrected 
Item-
Total 
Correlation 
. 5830 
.8084 
.7940 
.6135 
N of Items = 4 
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted 
.8587 
.7638 
.7716 
.8478 
Table C.10: 
Budgetary Control 
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A) 
Statistics for 
SCALE 
Mean Variance 
57.8757 105.2004 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale Scale 
Mean Variance 
if Item if Item 
Deleted Deleted 
B10 53.2994 94.1314 
Bll 53.0791 92.1301 
B13 53.3729 97.5420 
B14 53.5876 92.7551 
B15 53.7740 89.6532 
B16 53.7853 85.1923 
B17 53.6667 87.1780 
B18 55.0282 97.3912 
B19 53.7458 84.7930 
B20 53.5085 95.0695 
B21 54.9040 94.9510 
B22 52.9661 95.5784 
B23 53.6780 91.8900 
B24 53.9887 93.8067 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 177.0 
Alpha = 0.7733 
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N of 
Std Dev Variables 
10.2567 14 
Corrected 
Item-
Total 
Correlation 
.3466 
.3950 
.1921 
.3592 
.4198 
.5942 
.5712 
.3141 
.6186 
.3364 
.3092 
.3514 
. 3353 
.2776 
N of Items = 14 
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted 
.7635 
.7592 
.7776 
.7626 
.7568 
.7385 
.7421 
.7663 
.7361 
.7644 
.7668 
.7633 
.7657 
.7714 
Table C.11: 
Budgetary Monitoring 
R E L I A B I L I T Y 
Statistics for 
SCALE 
Mean 
30.5650 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
B10 25.9887 
Bll 25.7684 
B13 26.0621 
B14 26.2768 
B15 26.4633 
B16 26.4746 
B17 26.3559 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 177.0 
AJ.pha = 0.6758 
A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E {A L P H A) 
Variance 
37.2244 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
30.5112 
29.0540 
32.0245 
29. 7013 
27.7160 
26.0235 
26.7533 
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N of 
Sta Dev Variables 
6.1012 7 
Corrected 
Item-
Total 
Correlation 
.3205 
. 3894 
.1862 
.3300 
.4018 
.5331 
. 5390 
N of Items = 7 
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted 
.6576 
.6397 
.6928 
.6559 
.6361 
.5948 
.5962 
Table C.12: 
Budgetary Evaluation 
R E L I A B I L I T Y 
Statistics for 
SCALE 
Mean 
27.3107 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Bl8 24.4633 
B19 23.1808 
B20 22.9435 
B21 24. 3390 
B22 22. 4011 
B23 23 .1130 
B24 23.4237 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 177.0 
Alpha = 0.6025 
A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A) 
Variance 
28.9427 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
24.2387 
20.4103 
23.2922 
23.2594 
23.9348 
22.3735 
21. 2001 
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N of 
Std Dev Variables 
5.3798 7 
Corrected 
Item-
Total 
Correlation 
.3359 
.4258 
.3199 
.2825 
.3070 
.2471 
.3402 
N of Items = 7 
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted 
.5642 
.5228 
.5648 
.5767 
.5597 
.5950 
.5576 
Table C.13: 
Managerial Roles 
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H A) 
Statistics for 
SCALE 
Mean 
66.1977 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Ml 62.0226 
M2 61. 9774 
M3 61. 3955 
M4 61.3107 
MS 61.8701 
M6 61.8362 
M7 62.0847 
M8 62 .1130 
M9 61.9435 
MlO 61.9492 
Mll 62.0169 
M12 61. 2373 
M13 61.8983 
M14 61.7910 
M15 61.3220 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of cases = 177.0 
Alpha ... 0.8811 
Variance 
167.3073 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
155.3631 
152.6359 
148.5813 
148.3063 
145.8296 
143. 5810 
138.4757 
138. 4190 
139 .1900 
142.8440 
141. 8122 
152.8638 
146.8987 
157.0754 
152.8446 
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N of 
Std Dev Variables 
12.9347 15 
Corrected 
Item-
Total 
Correlation 
.3135 
.4607 
.5390 
.5896 
.6515 
.6649 
.6875 
.7076 
.7186 
.6462 
.6261 
.4521 
.4521 
.2329 
.3490 
N of Items = 15 
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted 
.8827 
.8768 
.8737 
.8719 
.8692 
.8681 
.8661 
.8652 
.8648 
.8686 
.8694 
.8771 
.8783 
.8868 
.8820 
-
Table C.14: 
Politics 
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H JI.) 
Statistics for 
SCALE 
Mean 
30.9322 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Pl 26.1525 
P2 26.0791 
P3 26.1638 
P4 26.8588 
PS 26.7740 
P6 26.6949 
P7 26.8701 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 177.0 
Alpha = 0.7161 
Variance 
35.3363 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
27.9368 
28.3801 
27.6037 
24.2129 
29.:i.077 
28 .1337 
24.9546 
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N of 
Std Dev Variables 
5.9444 7 
Corrected 
Item-
Total 
Correlation 
.4328 
.4279 
.4666 
. 5386 
.3001 
.3332 
.5005 
N of Items = 7 
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted 
.6827 
.6845 
.6752 
.6520 
. 7131 
.7071 
.6635 
-
APPENDJ:X D 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Budgetary Participation 
Table 0.1: KMO and Bartlett's Teat11 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 
df 
Sig. 
a. Based on correlations 
.766 
2ss.n4 
10 
.000 
Table 0.2: Anti-Image Matrices 
81 82 
Anti-Imago Covananca B1 .878 -9.54E-02 
B2 ·9.54E-02 .675 
B3 -4.86E-02 -.166 
84 2.861E-02 -.111 
85 -.137 -3.98E-02 
Anti-image Correlation 81 .809'1 -.124 
B2 -.124 .8478 
83 -6.70E-02 ·.261 
84 4.675E-02 ·.206 
85 -.203 -6.73E-02 
a. Moasuras of Sampling Adequacy(MSA) 
83 
-4.86E-02 
-.166 
.598 
·.180 
·2.31E-02 
-6.70E-02 
-.261 
.805° 
·.357 
-4.15E-02 
Table D3: Totnl Variance Explained 
Initial Eioenvalu�s bctraction sums of Souared Loadinc 
Comoone Total • of Variano �umulaUve<; Total � of Variano 'umulative '} 
Raw 1 4.371 51.769 51.769 4.371 51.769 51.789 
2 1.921 22.752 74.521 1.921 22.752 74.521 
3 .959 11.363 85.884 
4 .746 8.836 94.720 
5 .446 5.280 100.000 
Rescale< 1 4.371 51.769 51.769 2.670 53.407 53.407 
2 1.921 22.752 74.521 .900 18.002 71.409 
3 .959 11.363 85.884 
4 .746 8.836 94.720 
5 .446 5.280 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysls. 
84 85 
2.B61E-02 -.137 
-.111 -3.98E-02 
-.180 -2.31E-02 
.427 -.249 
-.249 .519 
4.675E-02 -.203 
-.206 -6.73E-02 
•.357 -4.15E-02 
.7088 -.528 
-.528 .7378 
lwtation Sums of Snuarad Loadino 
Total (,ofVariano umulatlve '} 
3.847 45.566 45.566 
2.445 28.956 74.521 
2.512 50.248 50.248 
1.058 21.160 71.409 
a.When analyzing a covariance matrix, the initial eigenvalues am the same across tho raw and rescaled solution. 
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!, 
_J 
Raw 
Comrnru,nt 
1 2 1 
B4 1.076 
B3 1.004 
85 .979 
82 .814 
81 1.521 
Extraction Mothod: Principal Component Analyals. 
Rotation MattlOd: Vatltrlax with Kaiser Normalii:Olloo. 
a. Rolalion conwrged In 3 Uarallons. 
Budgetary Communication 
Rescalocl 
l".Nnr -n1 
.878 
.797 
.773 
.696 
Table 0.5: KMO and Bartlett's Test8 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 
df 
Sig. 
a. Based on correlations 
2 
.988 
.766 
351.903 
6 
.000 
Table 0.6: Anti-Image Matrices 
B6 87 
Anli.jmage Covariance B6 .579 -.188 
67 -.188 .327 
88 -5.30E-02 -.169 
89 4.873E-02 -8.02E-02 
Anti-image Correlation 86 .797° -.433 
87 -.433 .7378 
88 -.119 -.506 
B9 8.664E-02 -.190 
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA} 
B8 89 
-5.30E-02 4.873E-02 
-.169 -8.02E-02 
.343 -.176 
-.176 .547 
-.119 8.664E-02 
-.506 -.190 
.7508 -.408 
-.408 .8118 
Table 0.7: Total Variance Explnlned 
Initial Eitmnvah ,ru:4 �vtraction Sumc of �uared Loadinos 
Comoonenl Total % ol Variance Cumulative% Tola! % of Variance Cumulative % 
Raw 1 6.177 71.210 71.210 6.177 ! 71.210 71.210 
2 1.295 14.932 86.142 
3 .687 7.921 94.063 
4 .515 5.937 100.000 
Rescaled 1 6.177 71.210 71.210 2.781 69.536 69.536 
2 1.295 14.932 86.142 
3 .687 7.921 94.063 
4 .515 5.937 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When analyzlng a covariance matrix. the lnflial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescaled solution. 
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Tabla 0.4: Rotllt:d Component Mwlx • 
) ___ _ 
1 1  
I _J 
Tabfe D.8: Component MatrlR 
Raw Rescaled 
Component Comoonent 
1 1 
B7 1.471 .920 
68 1.366 .905 
B9 1.083 .766 
B6 .987 .727 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
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Budgetary Control 
Table 0.9: KMO and Bartlett's Tefft 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 
df 
Sig. 
a. Based on correlations 
B10 
Anti-Image fN: B10 .703 
B11 
B24 
Anti-Image Corr B 10 
B11 
B13 
817 
B18 
B19 
B20 
B21 
B22 
B.23 
.710 
775.448 
91 
.000 
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Table D.11: Tot.ti V1ttlllnca l!xplalmtd 
lnhlllt EIOOnval, ..'l, l=rlmtetlnn i,:,..,,. nl E;rnu tRd • ""·«- Rotation ::;.,,,,,. ol Rnu:, ,rut I ""'1lntu 
l".nmnnrmn Total o/o ol Variance ICumulalJvo ,:, Total 11, or vananee Cumulallvo 'II Total Ir.of Variance 
Raw 1 8.613 29.043 29.043 8.613 29.043 29.043 7.117 23.008 
2 4,027 13.577 42.620 4.()27 13.577 42.620 3A9D 11.797 
3 2.974 10.028 52.848 2.974 10.028 52.648 3.204 10.804 
4 2.585 8.717 61.365 2.585 8.717 61.365 3A46 11.620 
5 2.351 7.926 69.291 2.351 7.926 69.291 3284 11.072 
6 1.677 5.654 74.945 
7 1.544 5.204 00.149 
e 1.318 4.443 84.593 
9 1.090 3.677 118270 
10 .945 3.186 91AS6 
11 .825 2.782 94.238 
12 .755 2.546 116.784 
13 .661 2.229 99.013 
14 .293 .987 100.000 
Rsscaled 1 8.613 29.043 29.043 3.725 26.607 26.607 2.910 20.788 
2 4.027 13.577 42.620 1.890 13.500 40.107 1.637 1Ul94 
3 2.974 10.028 52.648 1.370 9.785 49.891 1.636 11.687 
4 2.585 8.717 61.365 1.154 8244 58.135 1.588 11.343 
5 2.351 7.926 69291 1.142 8.159 66294 1.509 10.781 
6 1.677 5.654 74.945 
7 1.544 5.204 80.149 
8 1.318 4.443 84.593 
9 1.090 3.677 88270 
10 .945 3.186 91.456 
11 .825 2.782 94238 
12 .755 2.548 96.784 
13 .li81 2.229 99.013 
14 .293 .987 100.000 
Ex!radlon Melhod: Principal Companem Analysis. 
a. Wien analyz!ng a covariance matrix. lhe Initial eigenvalues are Iha same across Iha raw and rescaled SOlullOn. 
Table D.12: Rotated Component Matr'lx 
Raw 
Comoonent 
1 2 3 4 
616 1.475 
619 1.2n 
617 1.187 
815 1235 
614 1281 
613 1259 
811 1.164 
610 1.080 
624 1.446 
618 .532 
621 .433 .656 
620 .403 .526 
623 
622 
Extractloo Method: Prloclpal Componenl Analysls. 
Rotallon Method: Vartmax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. RotaUon converged In 9 lterauons. 
5 1 
.926 
.811 
.800 
.761 
1.385 
.862 
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Rescaled 
Comoonent 
2 3 4 
.865 
.B63 
.804 
.790 
.889 
.495 
.313 .474 
.312 .408 
Cumulallvo 'Ii 
23.900 
35.795 
46.599 
58.219 
69291 
20.788 
32.482 
44.169 
55.513 
66294 
5 
.841 
.723 
Budgetary Monitoring 
Tablo D.13: l<MO and Bllrtlett'a Teal • 
Bartlett's Tast of 
Sphoricity 
a. Based on correlations 
Antl-lmage Covariance 810 
611 
013 
814 
815 
B16 
017 
Ami-imago Correlation B10 
811 
813 
814 
Approx. Chi-Square 
di 
Sig. 
.636 
364.208 
21 
.000 
Tabla 0.14: Anti-Image Matrices 
B10 B11 013 614 
.757 ·.328 -3.69E-02 -3.34E-03 
·.328 .730 -3.76E-02 .S.29E-02 
-3.69E-02 -3.76E-02 .659 •.368 
-3.34E-03 .S.29E-02 •.368 .653 
6.089E-02 -8.90E-02 7.042E-02 -5.28E-02 
-6.51E-02 3.472E-02 1.599E-02 -8.11E·03 
7.330E-03 -5.7BE-02 2.57BE-03 ·2.15E-02 
.599" ·.442 -5.23E-02 -4.75E-03 
-.442 .6318 .S.42E-02 -7.67E-02 
·523E-02 .S.42E-02 .5218 -.562 
-4.75(-03 -7.67E-02 ·.562 ,554a 
015 016 817 
6.089E-02 -6.51E-02 7.330E-03 
-8.00E-02 3.472E-02 .S.78E-02 
7.042E-02 1.599E-02 2.578E-03 
.S.28E-02 -8.11E-03 -2.15E-02 
.637 -.166 -4.B7E-02 
-.166 .357 ·.252 
-4.87E-02 ·.252 .400 
a.n2E-02 -.125 1.332E-02 
-.131 6.B04E-02 ·.107 
.109 3.297E-02 5.020E-03 
-8.19E-02 -1.68E-02 -4.20E-02 
B15 a.n2e-02 -.131 .109 -8.19E-02 .1aa• ·.349 ·9.64E-02 
B16 •.125 6.804E-02 3.297E-02 ·1.68E-02 ·.349 .63l8 •.656 
B17 1.332E-02 -.107 5.020E-03 -4.20E-02 ·9.64E-02 ·.666 .668• 
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA) 
Tabla D.15: Total Vertance Explained 
lnlUal Eloanvalu'lis ltaCUon Sums ol Sauared Loadln �tatlonSumsclSnuaredloadl™ 
Comnt1nA Total ,of Varlanc umulalive 'l Total b of Varlanc umulativo � Total • or Varianc ;umutativo • 
Raw 1 5.913 37.752 37.752 5.913 37.752 37.752 5.508 35.172 35.172 
2 3.599 22.979 60.731 3.599 22.979 60.731 3.384 21.605 56.ne 
3 2.326 14.849 75.580 2.326 14.849 75.580 2.945 18.804 75.580 
4 1.395 8.910 84.490 
5 1.010 6.446 90.936 
6 .895 5.713 96.649 
7 .525 3.351 100.000 
Rescale, 1 5.913 37.752 37.752 2.483 35.477 35.477 2.249 32.133 32.133 
2 3.599 22.979 60.731 1.668 23.827 59.303 1.567 22.379 54.512 
3 2.326 14.849 75.560 1.141 16.297 75.601 1.476 21.088 75.601 
4 1.395 8.910 84.490 
5 1.010 6.446 90.936 
6 .895 5.713 96.649 
7 .525 3.351 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a,When analyzing a covariance matrix, the lnfUal elgenvatuas are the same across the raw and rescaled solution. 
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Table D.16: Rotated Component Matr& 
Raw 
Comnnnent 
1 2 3 1 
816 1.437 
B17 1.262 
815 1.322 
B14 1.308 
B13 1.278 
B11 1.235 
810 1.144 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation convorgecl in 5 iterations. 
Rescaled 
Comoonent 
2 
.902 
.851 
.814 
.883 
.876 
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3 
.853 
.836 
I -- I I 
Budgetary Evaluation 
Table 0.17: KMO and Bartlett's Tedi 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkln Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
Bartlett's Test ot 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 
df 
Sig. 
a. Based on correlations 
818 819 B20 
Anti-Image covariance 618 .822 -6.75E-02 -6.42E-02 
B19 -6.75E-02 .803 ·.173 
B20 -6.42E-02 -.173 .850 
B21 -.205 •.107 -.157 
822 ·7.71E-02 -1.23E-02 -1.0lE-02 
B23 6.072E-02 •.165 1.311E-02 
B24 ·.151 -.104 -6.44E-02 
Anti-Image Correlation 818 .6928 -8.30E-02 •7.69E·02 
B19 -8.30E-02 .7188 -.210 
.632 
150.578 
21 
.000 
821 
-205 
•.107 
-.157 
.805 
.123 
-3.62E-02 
-7.51E-02 
-.252 
-.133 
820 ·7.69E-02 -.210 .7338 ·.H:O 
B21 ·.252 -.133 -.190 .65011 
822 -.100 -1.61E-02 •1.28E-02 .162 
B23 7.766E-02 -213 1.649E-02 -4.68E-02 
B24 -.183 ·.127 •7.65E-02 -9.16E-02 
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA) 
Table 0.19: Total VorlanC1! Explalll8d 
822 823 824 
-7.71E-02 6.072E-02 -.151 
·123E-02 •.165 •.104 
-1.0lE-02 1.31 lE-02 -6.44E-02 
.123 ·3.62E-02 -7.51E-02 
.722 -.330 ·.173 
-.330 .744 6.184E-02 
•.173 6.184E-02 .835 
·.100 7.766E-02 ·.183 
·1.61E-02 -.213 ·.127 
·1.2BE-02 1.649E-02 -7.65E-02 
.162 -4.68E-02 -9.16E-02 
.522" •.450 ·223 
-.450 .51B8 7.850E-02 
•.223 7.BSOE-02 ,590a 
lnltla! An<,nvaJuls l'=rlraction Sums of Snu red Loadirns Rotation Sums of�"' rad Loadlnos - Total � ol Varla"".,, "umulatlve 0-< Total �of Variara Cumulative "J: Total � of Var!ancl; '"'umulaliva 'll 
HaW 1 4.426 31.624 31.624 4.426 31.624 31.624 3.333 23.814 23.814 
2 2.928 20.919 52.543 2.928 20.919 52.543 3.421 24.443 48.257 
3 2.132 15.231 67.n4 2.132 15.231 67.774 2.731 19.516 67.774 
4 1.535 10.970 78.744 
5 1.250 8.929 87.672 
6 .956 6.830 94.503 
7 .769 5.497 100.000 
Rescaled 1 4.426 31.624 31.624 2.037 29.096 29.096 1.677 23.958 23.958 
2 2.928 20.919 52.643 1.348 19.260 48.356 1.497 21.392 45.350 
3 2.132 15.231 67.n4 .928 13.264 61.620 1.139 16.270 61.620 
4 1.535 10.970 78.744 
5 1.250 8.929 87.672 
6 .956 6.830 94.503 
7 .769 5.497 100.000 
Extraction Method: Prlnclpat Conwnent Analysis. 
a. When analyzlng a covariance matrix, the Initial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescakKi solution. 
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Table D.20: Rotated Component Matrfi 
Raw 
Comoonent 
1 2 3 1 
B19 1.192 .536 
B21 .982 
820 .809 
818 .438 .365 
B23 1.542 
B22 .812 
B24 1.556 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Rescaled 
Comoonent 
2 
.757 .341 
.710 
.627 
.408 
.936 
.681 
3 
.340 
.957 
Managerial Roles 
Table 0.21: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser•Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling 
Adequacy. 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 
df 
Sig. 
a. Based on correlations 
&Measures of Sampling Adoquacy(MSA) 
.839 
1568.130 
105 
.000 
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Tablo D,23: Total Varlanco Ellpll!lned 
Initial Eioanw 1,/bs rtraclion ,ums of �nt: nrnd Lnndin ntaUon " urns of !C:1111, rnl'f r ""dint 
Comoone Total 1> of Varianc �umulalivo 0 Total ,of Varianc umulatlve 0 Total of Var!anc :umulatlvo • 
Raw 1 12.356 41.565 41.565 12.356 41.535 41.565 8.681 29.203 29.203 
2 3.821 12.854 54.419 3.621 12.854 54.419 4.389 14.697 43.900 
3 2.996 10.078 64.497 2.996 10.078 64.497 5.285 17.780 61.680 
4 2.204 7.416 71.913 2.204 7.416 71.913 3.042 10.2.33 71.913 
5 1.687 5.675 n.588 
6 1.356 4.563 62.151 
7 1.079 3.629 85.780 
8 .892 3.001 68.781 
9 .772 2.599 91.380 
10 .696 2.341 9'J.720 
11 .538 1.804 95.524 
12 .474 1.594 97.118 
13 .389 1.309 98.427 
14 .249 .838 99.265 
15 .219 .735 100.000 
Rescale 1 12.356 41.565 41.565 5.002 39.346 39.346 3.973 26.484 26.484 
2 3.821 12.854 54.419 1.912 12.745 52.092 2.714 18.092 44.576 
3 2.996 10.078 64.497 1.700 11.331 63.423 2.363 15.754 60.330 
4 2.204 7.416 71.913 1.052 7.012 70.435 1.516 10.104 70.435 
5 1.687 5.675 n.saa 
6 1.356 4.563 82.151 
7 1.079 3.629 85.780 
8 .892 3.001 88.781 
9 .772 2.599 91.380 
10 .696 2.341 93.720 
11 .538 1.804 95.524 
12 .474 1.594 97.118 
13 .389 1.3CID 98.427 
14 .249 .838 99.265 
15 .219 .735 100.000 
Extraction Mathod: Principal Comp/llnont Analysis. 
a.When analyzing a covariance matrix, tho initial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescaled solution. 
Tabla D..24: Rotated Component Mattix • 
Raw 
Comr.onent 
1 2 3 
Ml 1.421 
MB 1.332 
M6 1.099 .528 
M9 1.137 .703 
M£ .837 .706 
M3 .416 1.005 
M4 .524 .924 
M2 .874 
M1 .746 
M13 1.313 
M11 .659 1.189 
M10 .862 .871 
M12 .659 
M15 
M14 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varlmax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged In 11 Iterations. 
4 1 
.an 
.841 
.801 
.747 
.683 
.321 
.430 
.425 
.595 
1.193 
1.158 
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Rescaled 
Ct>mronont 
2 3 4 
.385 
.462 
.559 
.n5 
.758 
.748 
.570 
.809 
.767 
.601 
.564 
.831 
.821 
i----..... -----+1 .,.-=-- --- ! 
1 
- - -�·-
Politics 
Table D.25: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kalser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. .640 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 
df 
453.686 
21 
.000 Sig. 
a. Based on correlations 
Table 0.26: Anti-Image Matrices 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
Anti-Image Covariance Pl .198 -2.37E-02 ·.172 ·9.37E-03 
P2 ·2.37E-o2 .804 ·2.30E-02 ·.147 
P3 •.172 ·2.30E-02 .192 -4.17E-03 
P4 -9.37E-03 •.147 -4.l7E-03 .608 
PS 4.836E-02 -6.68E-02 -7.56E-02 ·2.63E-02 
P6 •2.23E-o2 -4.68E-02 2.201E-02 ·.141 
P7 1.625E-02 ·2.SSE-02 ·1.07E-02 ·.258 
Anti-image Correlation P1 .545• -5.95E.Q2 -.883 -2.70E-02 
P2 -5.95E-02 .an• ·5.SSE-02 ·.210 
P3 ·.883 ·5.SSE-02 .551" ·1.22E-02 
P4 -2.70E-02 ·.210 -122E-02 .121• 
PS .118 -8.09E-02 ·.188 -3.66E-02 
P6 -5.67E-02 ·5.SSE-02 5.673E-02 ·.204 
P7 4.681E-02 -4.11E-02 -3.13E-02 -.424 
a. Measures of Samp!lng Aoequacy(MSA) 
Table D.27: Total Variance Explained 
PS P6 P7 
4.S36E-02 -2.23E.Q2 1.625E.Q2 
-6.68E-02 -4.68E-02 -2.88E-02 
•7.56E-02 2.201E-02 ·1.07E-02 
-2.63E-02 -.141 ·.258 
.848 7.257E-02 -.158 
7.257E-02 .785 ·.174 
-.158 •.174 .610 
.118 -5.67E-02 4.681E-02 
-8.09E-02 -5.89E.-02 -4.11E-02 
•.188 5.673E-02 -3.13E-02 
·3.66E-02 •.204 -.424 
.6938 8.898E-02 ·.220 
8.898E-02 .750• ·.252 
-.220 -.252 .6904 
Initial EioenvaliRls <traction Sums of Souared Loadin elation Sums of Souared Loadinc 
� "" Total pofVariano ;umulative � Total "of Varianc �ulative-, Total F> of Varianc umulative • 
Raw 1 5.406 39.607 39.607 5.406 39.607 39.607 3481 25.508 25.508 
2 2.875 21.064 60.671 2.B75 21.064 60.671 4.799 35.162 60.671 
3 1.768 12.951 73.621 
4 1.317 9.646 83.268 
5 1.139 8.343 91.611 
6 .981 7.189 98.800 
7 .164 1.200 100.000 
Rescale, 1 5.406 39.607 39.607 2.522 36.026 36.026 2.152 30.739 30.739 
2 2.875 21.064 60.671 1.679 23.991 60.017 2.049 29.278 60.017 
3 1.768 12951 73.621 
4 1.317 9.646 83.268 
5 1.139 8.343 91.611 
6 .981 7.189 98.800 
7 .164 1.200 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a.When analyzing a covariance matrix, Iha initial eigenvalues are the sama across Iha raw and rescaled solution. 
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Table D.28: Rotated Component Matrlt 
Raw Rescaled 
Comoonent Comnonent 
1 2 1 2 
P3 1.193 .950 
Pl 1.185 .935 
P2 .527 .437 .437 
PS .490 .361 
P7 1.32d 
P4 1.319 
P6 .975 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
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.362 
.841 
.819 
.674 
APPENDIX E 
MODE RA TING REGRESSION ANAL VSIS (MRA) 
Budgetary Participation 
Table E.1: Variables Entered/Remove& 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Budgetary Participatiorr Enter 
2 Politics8 Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.2: Model Summafy 
Chanoa Statislics 
Adjusted Std. Error of A Square 
Model R A Sauare RSauare the Estimate Chanqe FChanoe df1 dl2 Sia. F ChanQe 
.8398 .704 .702 .4783 .704 415.919 1 175 .000 
2 .857b .735 .732 .4535 .031 20.608 1 174 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Participation 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Participation, Politics 
c. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.3: ANOVA c 
Sumo! 
Model Souares di Mean�uam F Sia. 
1 RegreSSJon 95.143 1 95.143 415.919 .oooa 
Residual 40.032 175 .229 
Total 135.174 176 
2 Regression 99.382 2 49.691 241.563 .OO()b 
Residual 35.793 174 .206 
Total 135.174 176 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Participation 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Participation, Politics 
c. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.4: Coofflclonti 
Standard! 
zed 
Unstandardized Coelficien 
Coefficients ts Collineariti Statistics 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 {Constant) 1.032 .170 6.087 .000 
Budgetary Particll)<ltion .na .038 .839 20.394 .000 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant) .572 .190 3.009 .003 
Budgetary Participation .645 .047 .695 13.802 .000 .601 1.664 
Politics .238 .052 .228 4.540 .000 .601 1.664 
a.QependentVarlable:ManagorlalAoles 
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Table E.5: Excluded Variables 
Collinearitv Statistics 
Partial Minimum 
Model Beta In t Siq. Correlation Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
1 Politics .228a 4.540 .000 .325 .601 1.664 .601 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Cons!.ant), Budgelary Participation 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.6: Cl,llfnearlty Diagnostics' 
Variance Prooortions 
Condition Budgetary 
Model Dimension EiQenvalue Index (Constant) Particioation Politics 
1 1 1.9n 1.000 .01 .01 
2 2.273E-02 9.328 .99 .99 
2 1 2.963 1.000 .00 .00 .00 
2 2.304E-02 11.339 .83 .45 .02 
3 1.401E-02 14.544 .17 .55 .98 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.7: Residuals StatlstJcsa 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.3326 6.7342 4.4123 .7514 1n 
Std. Predicted Value -2.768 3.090 .000 1.000 177 
Standard Error of 
3.415E-02 .1340 5.587E-02 1.915E-02 1n Predicted Value 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.3524 6.7156 4.4113 .7509 1n 
Residual -.9463 1.9528 -5.92E-16 .4510 177 
Std. Residual -2.086 4.306 .000 .994 1n 
Stud. Residual -2.093 4.349 .001 1.003 1n 
Deleted Residual -.9518 1.9927 1.091E-03 .4589 1n 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.113 4.594 .002 1.012 177 
Mahal. Distance .004 14.374 1.989 2.279 177 
Cook's Distance .000 .129 .006 .012 177 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .082 .011 .013 177 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Budgetary Communication 
Table E.8: Variables Entered/Remove8 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Budgetary Enter Communication 
2 Politicsa Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.9: Model Summary 
Chanqe Statistics 
Adjusted Std. Error of R Square 
Model A R Souare R Souare the E stimate Change FChange df1 df2 SiQ. F Change 
1 .8288 .685 .684 .4930 .685 381.143 1 175 .000 
2 .847b .718 .715 .4682 .033 20.044 1 174 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant). Budgetary Communication 
b. Predictors: (Constant). Budgetery Communication, Politics 
c. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.10: ANOVA c 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sio. 
1 AegreSSlon 92.639 1 92.639 381.143 .0008 
Residual 42.535 175 .243 
Total 135.174 176 
2 Regression 97.033 2 48.516 221.332 .ooob 
Residual 38.141 174 .219 
Total 135.174 176 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Communication 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Communication, Politics 
c. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.11: Coefflclerfts 
Standardi 
zed 
Unstandardized Coefficien 
Coefficients ts Collinearit Statistics 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sio. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.922 .133 14.465 .000 
Budgetary 
.591 .030 .828 19.523 .000 1.000 1.000 Communication 
2 (Constant) 1.303 .187 6.968 .000 
Budgetary 
.484 .037 .678 12.964 .000 .592 1.688 Communication 
Politics .242 .054 .234 4.477 .000 .592 1.688 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Table E.12: Excluded Varlabfeb 
r.n111nearltv Statistics 
Partial Minimum 
Model Beta In t Slo. Correlation Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
1 Politics .2346 4.4n .000 .321 .592 1.688 .592 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Budgetary Communication 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.13: Collinearity Diagnostic\\ 
Variance ProPOrtions 
Budgetary 
Condition Communi 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Index (Constant) cation Politics 
1 1 1.960 1.000 .02 .02 
2 3.969E-02 7.028 .98 .98 
2 1 2.946 1.000 .00 .01 .00 
2 4.007E-02 8.574 .38 .65 .01 
3 1.383E-02 14.596 .62 .34 .99 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.14: Residuals Statistics! 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.6163 6.3827 4.4123 .7425 1n 
Std. Predicted Value -2.419 2.654 .000 1.000 1n 
Standard Error of 
3.580E-02 .1406 5.n5E-02 1.956E-02 1n Predicted Value 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.6099 6.3523 4.4114 .7415 1n 
Residual -1.1200 2.0107 4.341E-16 .4655 1n 
Std. Residual -2.392 4.295 .000 .994 1n 
Stud. Residual -2.401 4.343 .001 1.003 1n 
Deleted Residual -1.1283 2.0561 9.622E-04 .4738 1n 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.435 4.586 .003 1.013 1n 
Mahal. Distance .035 14.887 1.989 2.254 1n 
Cook's Distance .000 .142 .006 .013 1n 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .085 .011 .013 1n 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Test of Normality and Linearity for Budgetary Communication 
Histogram 
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Budgetary Control 
Table E.15: Variables Entered/Removel:J 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Budgetary Controfl Enter 
2 Politics8 Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.16: Model Summary 
Chanoe Statistics 
Adjusted Std. Error of A Square 
Model A R Souare R Souare the Estimate Chanoe FChange df1 dl2 Slo. F Chanoe 
1 .860" .740 .738 .4485 .740 497.101 1 175 .000 
2 .873b .762 .759 .4300 .022 16.352 1 174 .000 
a. Precftetors: (Constant}, Budgetary Control 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Control, Politics 
c. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Tabla E.17: ANOVAC 
Sum of 
Model Sauares elf Mean Sauare F Sia. 
1 Regression 99.978 1 99.978 497.101 .00()<1 
Residual 35.196 175 .201 
Total 135.174 176 
2 Regression 103.001 2 51.501 278.530 .ooob 
Residual 32.173 174 .185 
Total 135.174 176 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Control 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Control, Politics 
c. Dependent Variable: Managerial Role� 
Tabla E.18: Cocfflclenth 
Standardi 
zed 
Unstandardized Coefflcien 
Coefficients ts Colllneartt Statistlcs 
Model B Std. Error Beta I Sia. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -6.26E-02 .204 -.307 .759 
Budgetary Control 1.008 .048 .860 22.296 .000 1.000 1.000 
2 (Const&nt) ·.300 .204 •1.472 .143 
Budgetary Control .913 .080 .735 16.216 .000 .587 1.704 
Politics .201 .050 .195 4.044 .000 .587 1.704 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Table E.19: Excluded Varlablda 
Colllnearitv Statistics 
Partial Minimum 
Model Beta In t Sio. Correlation Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
1 Politics .19511 4.044 .000 .293 .587 1.704 .587 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Budgetal)' Control 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Tabla E.20: Collinearity Diagnostics 0 
Variance Prooortions 
Condition Buogetal)' 
Model Dimension Eiqenvalue index (Constant) Control Politics 
1 1 1.986 1.000 .01 .01 
2 1.381E·02 11.992 .99 .99 
2 1 2.971 1.000 .00 .00 .00 
2 1.814E-02 12.800 .83 .02 .44 
3 1.058E-02 16.755 .17 .98 .56 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.21: Residuals Statistics 0 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 1.9280 7.2128 4.4123 .7650 177 
Std. Predicted Value -3.247 3.661 .ODO 1.000 177 
Standard Error of 
3.272E-02 .1236 5.315E-02 1.763E-o2 177 Predicted Value 
Adjusted Predicted Value 1.9228 7.2320 4.4123 .7656 177 
Residual -.9386 1.7379 -7.53E-17 .4276 177 
Std. Residual -2.183 4.042 .000 .994 177 
Stud. Residual -2.221 4.073 .000 1.003 177 
Deleted Residual -.9718 1.7654 7.334E-05 .4349 177 
Stud. Deleted Residllfll -2.247 4.270 .002 1.011 177 
Mahal. Distance .025 13.541 1.989 2.251 177 
Cook's Distance .000 .087 .006 .011 177 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .on .011 .013 177 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Test of Normality and Linearity for Budgetary Control 
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Budgetary Monitoring 
Table E.22: Variables Entered/Remove8 
Variables 
Model Variables Entered Removed Method 
1 Budgetary Monitoring Enter 
2 Politicsa Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.23: Model Summafy 
Change StatiStics 
Adjusted Std. Error of A Square 
Model A A Square A Square the Estimate Change FChange dfl df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .asaa .753 .752 .4368 .753 533.638 1 175 .000 
2 .872b .760 .757 .4317 .007 5.100 1 174 .025 
a. Predictors: (Constant). Budgetary Monitoring 
b. Predictors: {Constant}. Budgetary Monitoring, Politics 
c. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.24: ANOV Jlf 
Sum of 
Model Squares di Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 101.793 1 101.793 533.638 .oooa 
Residual 33.382 175 .191 
Total 135.174 176 
2 Regression 102.743 2 51.372 275.621 .ooob 
Residual 32.431 174 .186 
Total 135.174 176 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Monitoring 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Monitoring, Politics 
c. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.26: Coefficient! 
Standardi 
zed 
Unstandardized Coefficien 
r .nnfficients ts r.n11inearit Stati"'� 
Model B Std. Error Bela I Slo. Tolerance VIF 
1 (l,0/lStanl) .288 .182 1.586 .115 
Budgetary Monitoring .933 .040 .868 23.101 .000 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant) .143 .191 .751 .454 
Budgetary Monitoring .844 .056 .786 15.109 .000 .510 1.961 
Politics .121 .054 .117 2.258 .025 .510 1.981 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Table E.26: Excluded Varlablea 
Colfinearilv Statistics 
Partial 
Model Beta In I Sia. Correlation Tolerance VIF 
1 Politics .1178 2.258 .025 .169 
a. Predictors in the Medel: (Constant), Budgetary Monitoring 
b.QependentVariable:ManagerialRoles 
Table E.27: Collinearity Dlagnostlca • 
.510 1.961 
Variance Proportions 
Condition Budgetary 
Model Dimension Eiaenvalue Index (Constant} Monilorina 
1 1 1.984 1.000 .01 .01 
2 1.649E-02 10.968 .99 .99 
2 1 2.970 1.000 .00 .00 
2 1.956E-02 12324 .98 .10 
3 1.017E-02 17.089 .01 .90 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table E.28: Residuals Statistics 0 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Predicted Value 2.0743 6.7969 4.4123 .7640 
Std. Predk:ted Value -3.060 3.121 .000 1.000 
Standard Error of 
3.270E-02 .1116 5.360E-02 1.697E-02 Predicted Value 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.0793 6.7823 4.4121 .7633 
Residual -1.0495 1.8555 2.032E·16 .4293 
Std. Residual -2.431 4.298 .000 .994 
Stud. Residual -2.453 4.336 .000 1.002 
Deleted Residual ·1.0689 1.8884 2.961E-04 .4362 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.490 4.578 .003 1.014 
Mahal. Distance ,015 10.762 1.989 2.034 
Cook's Distance .000 .111 .005 .011 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .061 .011 .012 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Budgetary Evaluation 
Table E.29: Variables Entered/Removenl 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Budgetary Evaluatiori1 Enter 
2 Polltics8 Enter 
a. All requested variables @ntered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Tebhl E.30: Model SIIITl1l'l.a'iy 
Chanaa Statistics 
Adjusted Sid. Err0t of A Square 
Model R A Sauare R Souare the Estimate ChanQe 
1 
2 
.6508 .423 .419 .6678 
_779b .606 .602 .5530 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Evaluation 
b. Predictors: (Constant). Budgetary Evn!ua1ion. Polities 
C.DependentVarlable:ManagerialRoles 
.423 
.184 
FChanoe 
128153 
81.154 
Tabls E.31: ANOVN 
Sum of 
Model Sauares df Mean Sauare 
1 Regression 57.143 1 57.143 
Residual 78.031 175 .446 
Total ,35.174 176 
2 Regression 81.961 2 40.981 
Residual 53.213 174 .306 
Total 135.174 176 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Budgetary Evaluation 
b. Predletors: (Constant), Budgetary Evaluation. Pofitics 
c. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Standardi 
Z8d 
Unstarntart1ized Coelflcien 
CoofflCients ts 
Model B Std. Error Bdta I 
1 (Constant) 1.516 .261 5.813 
Budgetary EV&lualion .732 .065 .650 11.320 
2 (Constant) .263 2S7 1.026 
Budgetary Evaluation .501 .059 .445 8.437 
Politics .490 .054 .475 S.009 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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dl1 dl2 Sia. F Change 
1 175 .000 
1 174 .000 
F S!Q 
128.153 . oooa 
134.002 .oooti 
Co!linnarit Statistics 
Ski. Tolerance VIF 
.000 
.000 1.000 1.00tl 
.306 
.000 813 1.229 
.000 .813 1.229 
Table E.33: Excluded Variable{\ 
Colllnearitv Statlstl= 
Partial Minimum 
Modol Betn In I Sia. Correlatlon Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
1 Politics .47S3 9.009 .000 .564 .813 1.229 .813 
a. Predictors In the Model: (Constant), Budgetary Evaluation 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Tabk! E.34: Colllnearlty Diagnostics 0 
Variance Prooortions 
Condition Budgetary 
Mooel Dimension 8oenvalue Index (COnstant) Evaluation Politics 
1 1 1.981 1.000 .01 .01 
2 1.870E-02 10.293 .99 .99 
2 1 2.962 1.000 .00 .00 .00 
2 2.066E-02 11.973 .02 .84 .57 
3 1.744E-02 13.030 .98 .15 .43 
a. Dependent VariabJe: Managerial Rotes 
Table E.35: Residuals statistics 0 
Minimum Maximum P-Aeat1 Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 22464 6.9532 4.4123 .6824 177 
Std. Predicted Value -3.174 3.723 .000 1.000 177 
Stmdard Error of 
4.187E-02 .1622 6.824E-02 2.303E-02 177 Predcled Value 
M;usted Predicted Value 2.2631 6.9460 4.4125 .6819 177 
Residual ·1.2571 1.52i7 1.194E·15 .5499 177 
Std. Residual ·2.273 2.762 .000 .994 177 
Stud.R�ual ·2.312 2.782 .000 1.003 177 
Deleted Residual ·1.3009 1.5493 -1.67E-04 .5591 177 
Stud. Deleted Residual ·2.342 2.838 .001 1.008 177 
Mahal.Distance .014 14.146 1.989 2.338 177 
Cook's Distance .000 .062 .006 .010 177 
Cew.ared Leverage Value .000 .080 .011 .013 177 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Budgetary Participation 
APPENDIX F 
STRUCTURAL POWER 
Table F.1: Varlable11 Entored/Removed b 
Deoartments/Units Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
.00 1 Budgetary Participation a Enter 
2 Pollt� 8 Enter 
1.00 1 Budgetary Participation 8 Enter 
2 Politics 0 Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table F.2: Mod.II Sumrnmy 
ChanQe Slalistfcs 
Adjus1ed Std. Error of A Square 
�rtmeolS Model R RSQuare RSmmre the Estimate Chanoe FChange dl1 dl2 $lg. F Change 
.00 1 .823" .678 .674 .5053 .678 185.282 1 88 .000 
2 -� .745 .739 .4520 .067 22.996 1 87 .000 
1.00 1 .864• .746 .743 .4382 .746 249.569 1 85 .000 
2 .86fJJ .753 .747 .4344 .007 2.494 1 84 .118 
a Predlctora: (Constant), Budgetary Participation 
b. Prodic1Dm: (Constuit), Budgetary Parlicipallon, Polltb 
Table F.3: Coefflclentl 
Unstandaroi.Zed Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Deoartments Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
.00 1 (l..OnSU!nlJ .967 .253 3.822 .000 
Budgelary Participation .ns .057 823 13.612 .000 
2 (Constant) .3'18 .264 1.206 .231 
Budgetary Participation .583 .065 .620 9.010 .000 
Politics .335 .070 .330 4.795 .000 
1.00 1 (Constant) 1.098 .220 4.988 .000 
Budgetary Participation .783 .050 .864 15.798 .000 
2 (Constan1) .868 .262 3.306 .001 
Budgetary Participation .717 .064 .791 11.116 .000 
Pofrtlcs .117 .074 .112 1.579 .118 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table F.4: Excluded Varlahlei 
Colllneartty 
Partial Statistics 
Oeoartments Model Beta In t Sia. Correlation Tolerance 
.00 1 POlltlCS .3308 4.795 .000 .457 .619 
1.00 1 Politics .1128 1.579 .118 .170 .560 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant}, Budgetary Participation 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Rotes 
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Budgetary Communication 
Table F.6: Varfablm.1 Entered/Aemovod b 
Departments Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
.00 1 Budgetary Communication II Enter 
2 Politics 11 Enter 
1.00 1 Budgetary Communication a Enter 
2 Polllics 8 Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table F.6: Model Summary 
Channe Stalistlc$ 
Adjusted Sid. Etl"Of of A Square 
llrunrlmtln!S Model A A Square RSouam ltlc Estmate Chanae FClw!Qe dl1 dl2 SIQ.FC� 
1 .821" 514 .670 .5084 .674 182.017 1 88 .000 
2 .esat' .736 .730 .4601 .062 20A28 1 87 .000 
1.00 , .834• .695 .691 .4002 695 193.590 1 85 .000 
2 .041b .707 .700 .4735 .012 3.420 , 84 .()68 
a. Pnld1dors: (Constant), Budgetary Comm1i1icatioo 
b. Pn!dic!ors: (Constanl}, Budgetary Comm1i1ication, Politics 
Table F.7: CoefllcientB 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Oeoartments Model 9 Std. Error Beta I Sia. 
.00 1 (=nt) 1.961 .184 10.674 .000 
Budgetary 
.574 .043 .821 13.491 .000 Communication 
2 (Constant) 1.105 .252 4.383 .000 
Budgetary .432 .050 .617 a.an .000 Communication 
Polit!cs .326 .072 .322 4.520 .000 
1.00 1 (Constant) 1.684 .195 9.680 .000 
Budgetary .606 .044 .834 13.914 .000 Communication 
2 (Constant) 1.516 2n 5.481 .000 
Budgetary .538 .056 .740 9.523 .000 Communication 
Politlcs .150 .081 .144 1.849 .068 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table F.B: Excluded Varlablai 
Collinearity 
Partial Statistics 
Oruiartmentt, Model Beta In t Sia. Correlation Tolerance 
.00 1 Po!ltiCS .3� 4.520 .000 .436 .599 
1.00 1 Polil!cs .1448 1.849 .068 .198 .578 
a. Predictors In the Model: (Constant), Budgetary Communication 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Rolas 
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Budgetary Control 
Table F.9: Variables Entered/Removed b 
Oeoartmem;. Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
.00 1 Budgetary Control 6 Enter 
2 Politics a Enter 
1.00 1 Budgetary Control 8 Enter 
2 Politics 8 Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Tablo E.10: Mcdl!I Summary 
Crumtte Statisb 
Adjusted Std. El'rtll'of A Square 
Departments Model R A Square A Souare lhe Estimate ChAnruo FCtuaMe df1 dl2 Sia. F ChanQe 
.00 1 .879" .772 .no .4248 .m 298.597 1 88 .000 
2 .13884' .789 .784 .4113 .017 6.875 1 87 .0,0 
1.00 1 .839* .704 .701 .4727 .704 202.434 1 85 .000 
2 .esr> .735 .729 .4500 .031 9.801 1 84 .002 
a. Precficulrs: (Constant), Budgelary Control 
b. Predlclors: (Constant), Budgelaly Control. Politics 
Table F.11: Coefflcfenuf 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
n..n,.rtments Model B Std. Error Beta I SiQ. 
.00 1 (Constant} -.146 .263 •.557 .579 
Budgetary Control 1.079 .062 .879 17.280 .000 
2 (Constant} ·.309 .262 -1.178 .242 
Budgetary Control .921 .085 .750 10.m .000 
Politics .185 071 .183 2.622 .010 
1.00 1 (Constant) 5.729E-02 .316 181 .857 
Budgetary Control 1.050 .074 .839 14.228 .000 
2 {Constant) ·.279 .319 •.874 .385 
Budgetary Control .896 .086 .716 10.459 .000 
Pofltlcs .223 .071 214 3.131 .002 
a. Dependant Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table F.12: Exclude:t Variable!! 
Collinearity 
Partial Statistics 
Oen::irtmen1S Model Beta In l Sia. Correlation Tolerance 
.00 1 Politics .1839 2.622 .Q10 .271 .500 
1.00 1 Politics .2148 3.131 .002 .323 .672 
a. Predlctors In the Model: {Constant), Budgetary Control 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Budgetary Monitoring 
Table F.13: Varfablos Entered/Removed> 
Departments Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
.00 1 Budgetary Monitoring a Enter 
2 Polillcs 8 Enter 
1.00 1 Budgetary Monltorlng 0 Enter 
2 Politics 11 Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Tl'lhlo F .14: ModGf Summary 
Cha......., Stalisbcs 
Adjusted Std. Error ol RSquare 
Departments Model R RSQuam RSQuare the Estimate Cham@ FCttanna df1 cll2 Sia. F Chanoo 
.00 1 .866" .749 .746 .4460 .749 262.821 , 88 .000 
2 .ssd' .751 .745 .4471 .002 .571 1 87 .452 
1.00 1 .008" .754 .751 .4311 .754 260.567 1 es .000 
2 .877° .768 .763 .4209 .014 s.,n 1 84 .025 
a. Prodictofs: (Constant), Budgetaiy Monitor.ng 
b. Predictors: (Constant), 8udgeta,y Moni!oring. Potit!cs 
Table F.15: Col7ffleient! 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Oeoartments Model a Std. Error Beta I Sia. 
.00 1 (Constant) .295 .253 1.162 .248 
Budgetary Monitoring .936 .058 .866 16.212 .000 
2 (Constant) .242 .263 .921 .360 
Budgetary Monitoring .879 .095 .813 9.213 .000 
Politics 6.761E-02 .090 .067 .755 .452 
1.00 1 (Constant) 249 .267 .932 .354 
Budgetary Monitoring .937 .058 .868 16.142 .000 
2 (Constant) 5.716E-03 .282 .020 .984 
Budgetary Monitoring .837 .072 .ne 11.707 .000 
Politics .157 .069 .151 2.275 .025 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table F.18: Excluded Varfabl'18 
Deoartments Model Beta In t 
.00 1 Politics .0678 .755 
1.00 1 Pontlcs .1518 2.275 
a Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Budgetary Monitoring 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Collinearity 
Partial Statistics 
Sia. Correlation Tolerance 
.452 .081 .366 
.025 .241 .627 
Budgetary Evaluation 
Table F.17: Variables Entered/Removed b 
Departments Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
.00 1 Budgetary Evaluation ° Enter 
2 Politics 0 Enter 
1.00 1 Budgetary Evaluation 11 Enter 
2 Politics 0 Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Tcble F.18: Model Summary 
ChanaeSta� 
MjUSll!d Sid. Error of RSquare 
Departmen� Model A R Square R Souare Ille Estmate ChanQe FChanoe dt1 dl2 I Sia. F Chana& 
.00 1 .7078 .500 .494 .6298 .500 87.908 1 88 .000 
2 -� .687 .680 .5010 .187 52.072 1 87 .000 
1.00 1 .604• .365 .358 .6927 .365 48.867 1 85 .000 
2 .73fl' .542 .531 .5917 .177 32.498 1 84 .000 
a. Prndiciors: (ConstantJ, Budgfllaly Evaluation 
b. Prod� (Constant), Budgetary Evaluation, Poli!ics 
Table F.19: Coefficient! 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Oennrtments Model B Std. Error Beta I Sia. 
.00 1 (Constant) 1.175 .343 3.425 .001 
Budgetary Evaluation .791 .084 .707 9.376 .000 
2 (Constant) ·2.92E-03 .318 ·.009 .993 
Budgetary Evaluation .536 .076 .479 7.062 .000 
Politics .496 .069 489 7.216 .000 
1.00 1 (Constant) 1.828 .389 4.703 .000 
Budgstary Evaluation .680 .097 .604 6.990 .000 
2 (Constanl) .519 .404 1 . .2$5 .202 
Budgetary Evaluation .4n .090 424 S.278 .000 
Politics .4n .084 .458 5.701 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table F .20: Excluded Variables 
Collinearity 
Partial Statistics 
Deoartments Model Beta In t Sio. Correlation Tolerance 
.00 1 Politics .4898 7.216 .000 .612 .783 
1.00 1 Politics .4588 5.701 .000 .528 .845 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Budgetary Evaluation 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Budgetary Participation 
Table G.1: Variables Entered/Removed> 
Education Model Variables Entered Variables Removed 
.00 1 Budgetary Participation a 
2 Politics 8 
1.00 1 Budgetary Participation a 
2 Politics a 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Tabla G.2: Modal Summary 
Method 
Enter 
Enter 
Enter 
Enter 
Chanoe Statistics 
Adjusted Std. Error of R Square 
Education Model R R Sauare RSauare the Estimate Channe FChaoae df1 dl2 Sia. F Char,oe 
.00 1 .835" .697 .691 .4561 .697 119.605 1 52 .000 
2 .83811 .703 .691 .4563 .006 .959 l 51 .332 
1.00 1 .84()11 .706 .703 .4908 .706 290.320 1 121 .000 
2 .867'> .752 .748 .4527 .046 22.196 1 120 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant). Budgetary Partlclpalion 
b. Predlcton.-: (Constant), Budgetary Purtlc!pation. Polillcs 
Table G.3: Coefficient! 
Unstandardu:ed Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Education Model B Std. Error Beta t Sia. 
.00 1 (Constant) 1.012 .324 3.128 .003 
BUdgetary Participation .790 .072 .835 10.936 .000 
2 (Constant) .741 .426 1.739 .088 
BU\ tgetary Participation .745 .085 .788 8.736 .000 
Politics .104 .106 .088 .979 .332 
1.00 1 (Constant) 1.041 .201 5.179 .000 
Budgetary Participation .n4 .015 .840 17.039 .000 
2 (Constant) .549 .213 2.580 .011 
BUdgetary Participation .599 .056 .651 10.728 .000 
Politics 284 .060 .286 4.711 .000 
a Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table G.4: Excluded Varfabfes b 
Collinearity 
Partial Statistics 
Education Model Beta In I Sfg. Correlation Tolerance 
.00 1 POIIUCS .0888 .979 .332 .136 .717 
1.00 1 Politics 2868 4.711 .000 .395 .562 
a. Predictors In the Model: (Constant), Budgetary Participation 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Budgetary Communication 
Table G.6: Variables Entorcd/Remove\!i 
Education Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
.oo 1 Budgetary Communicatlorfl Enter 
2 Politics0 Enter 
1.00 1 Budgetary Communicatiorfl Enter 
2 Poiltlcs11 Enter 
a. AU requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Tobie G.6: Model Summary 
Chanoe Statistics 
Adjuste<l Std. Error of A Square 
Education Model R R Souare RSouare tne Estimate ChanM FChanoe dfl dl2 Sia. F Chanoo 
.00 1 .84:34 .710 .705 .4459 .710 127.603 1 52 .000 
2 .844b .713 .701 .4486 .002 .372 1 51 .544 
1.00 1 .822& .676 .673 .5153 .676 252.104 1 121 .000 
2 -� .727 .722 .4751 .051 22.334 1 120 .000 
a. Prcdlctors: (Constant), Budgelaiy Communlcallon 
b. Predictors: (Cooslant), Budgelaiy Communication, Politics 
G.7: Coefflclents'I 
Unstandardized Stnndardlzed 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Education Model B Std. Error Beta ! Sia. 
.00 ; (Constant) 2.007 .228 8.818 .000 
Budgetary Communication .sn .051 .843 11.296 .000 
2 {Constanl) 1.&."6 .401 4.498 .000 
Budgetary Communication .556 .062 .812 8.986 .000 
Politics 6.470E-02 .106 .055 .610 .544 
1.00 1 (Constant) 1.890 .164 11.558 .000 
Budgetary Communication .595 .037 .822 15.878 .000 
2 (Constant) 1.185 .212 5.581 .000 
Budgetary Communication .449 .046 .620 9.667 .000 
Politics .301 .064 .303 4.726 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table G.8: Excluded Variable&> 
Collinearity 
Partial Statistics 
Education Model Beta In t Sio. Correlation Tolerance 
.00 1 Politics .0558 .610 .544 .085 .690 
1.00 1 Politics .30311 4.726 .000 .396 .554 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), BUdgetary Communication 
b. Depenc:ant Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Budgetary Control 
Table G.9: Varlablea Entered/Removed b 
Education Model Variables Entered Variables Removed 
.w 1 Budgetary Control a 
2 Polillcs • 
1.00 1 Budgetary Control B 
2 Politics 11 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table G.10: Model St.tlTlllmY 
Adjusted Std. Error of R Squtue 
Education Model R RSnt.,,re RSouare the Estimate C'..h:lnn<'! FChan<!A 
.00 1 .easa .789 .785 .3806 .789 194.515 
2 
.
89111 .793 .785 .3805 .004 1.021 
1.00 1 .850" .723 .721 .4763 .723 315.664 
2 .871
11 .759 .755 .4464 .036 17.772 
a. Prediclors: (Con.slant), BudgetaTy Control 
b. Prodictors: (CO!l3tant), Budgetary Control, Polltlcs 
Table G.11: Coefficients• 
Method 
Enter 
Enter 
Enter 
Enter 
Channn Statisllt:s 
dl1 dl2 Sin. F Chanoa 
1 52 .000 
1 51 .317 
1 121 .000 
1 120 .000 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Education Model B Std. Error Beta I Sig. 
.00 1 ( 1..,00SU!nl) -.431 .356 ·1211 .231 
Budgetary Control 1.150 .082 .888 13.947 .000 
2 (Constant) -.616 .400 -1.539 .130 
Budgetary Control 1.101 .096 .850 11.494 .000 
Politics a.168c-02 .087 .075 1.010 .317 
1.00 1 (Constant) 4.717E-02 248 .190 .849 
Budgetary Control 1.044 .059 .850 17.767 .000 
2 (Constant) -.181 .238 -.761 .448 
Budgetary Control .829 .075 .675 11.036 .000 
Politics 256 .061 258 4.216 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table G.12: Excluded Variables b 
COl!ineartty 
Partial S1alfstlcs 
Education Model Beta In I Sig. Correlation Tolerance 
.00 1 Pouucs .075° 1.010 .317 .140 .741 
1.00 1 Pontlcs .25811 4.216 .000 .359 .538 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Budgetary Control 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Budgetary Monitoring 
Table G.13: Vnrlables Entered/Removed b 
Education Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
.w 1 Budgetary Monitoring a Enter 
2 Politics • Enter 
1.00 1 Budgetary Monitoring a Enter 
2 Politics 0 Enler 
a. AU requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table G.14: Moool Summary 
Cha""" Statistics 
Adjusted Sid. Error ol A Squaro 
Education Model A RSaunru RSnu�M !he Estimate Chanoe F Ch= df1 dl2 Sia. F Chanoo 
.00 1 � .728 .723 .4321 .728 139.250 1 52 .000 
2 ,854b .729 .718 .4359 .000 .090 I 51 .765 
1.00 1 .8T.f' .761 .760 .4419 .761 386.319 1 121 .000 
2 .rrt'J> .m .769 .4329 .012 6.079 1 120 .015 
a. P� (Constant), Budgetary Monitoring 
b. Predlctots: (Constant), Budgetary Monitoring, Politics 
Table G.15: Cosfflclents a 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Education Model B Std. Error Beta t Sia. 
.00 1 (COnstant) .318 .358 .887 .379 
Budgetary Monitoring .921 .o78 .853 11.800 .000 
2 (Constant) .251 .424 .593 .556 
Budgetary Monitoring .905 .096 .838 9.408 .000 
Politics 3.139E--02 .104 .027 .300 .765 
1.00 1 (Constant) .271 .213 1.272 .200 
Budgetary Monitoring .939 .048 .873 19.655 .000 
2 (Constant) .132 .216 .610 .543 
Budgetary Monitoring .813 .069 .755 11.708 .000 
Politics .158 .064 .159 2.466 .015 
a Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
Table G.16: Excluded Variablesb 
Education Model Beta In t 
.00 1 PolitlCS .0278 .300 
1.00 1 Politics .1sga 2.466 
a Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Budgetary Monitoring 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Collinearity 
Partial Statistics 
Sia. Correlation Tolerance 
.765 .042 .671 
.015 .220 .455 
Budgetary· Evaluation 
Table G.17: Verfablen Entered/Removedb 
Education Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
.00 1 Budgetary Evaluation a Enter 
2 Politics 8 Enter 
1.00 1 Budgetary Evaluation a Enter 
2 Politics a Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Rllles 
Table G.18: Modef Summary 
:tiannoStatlslir<l 
Adjusted Std. Error of RSquam 
Education Modal R R&luare RSmmre the Es1lmate Channa FCMnn<> df1 df2 I !':In. F Chanae 
.00 1 .673" .453 .442 .6129 .453 43.036 1 52 .000 
2 .747' .557 .540 .5566 .105 12.059 1 51 .001 
1.00 1 .6411 .411 j .406 .6947 .411 84282 1 121 .000 
2 .79'!1> .632 .626 .5511 222 n21a 1 120 .000 
a. Predlt':tonJ: (Constml), Budgetary Evaluation 
b. Pl"4dlciors: (Constant), Budgetary Evaluallon, Polltics 
Tobte G.19: Coefflcfcnts• 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Education Model s Sid. Error Beta t Sia. 
.00 1 (Constant) 1.352 .485 2.788 .007 
Budgetary Evaluation .na .119 .673 6.560 .000 
2 (Constant) 2.715E-02 .582 .047 .963 
Budgetary Evaluation .662 .113 .573 5.880 .000 
Pofrtics .397 .114 .339 3.473 .001 
1.00 1 (Constant) 1.573 .312 5.038 .000 
Budgetary Evaluallon ' .716 .078 .641 9.181 .000 
2 (Constant) .351 .286 1.224 .223 
Budgetary Evaluation .438 .070 .390 6.217 .000 
Politlcs .530 .062 .533 8.502 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Managerial RoleS 
Table G.20: Excluded Variables b 
Education Model Beta In t 
.00 1 f'OlitiCS .3398 3.473 
1.00 1 Polltlcs .5338 8.502 
a, Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Budgetary Evaluation 
b. Dependent Variable: Managerial Roles 
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Col!lneartty 
Partial Statistics 
Slo. Correlation Tolerance 
.001 .437 .913 
.000 .613 .n9 
